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According to historian Mark Mazower, human rights attained 
sudden and unexpected prominence during and after the 
Second World War, amongst other reasons, because they of-
fered “an attractive and plausible alternative” to the League 
of Nations system of minority rights protection. That system 
had proven to be a blatant failure before and during Nazi rule 
over large parts of Europe, would be impossible to resurrect in 
Soviet-dominated post-war Europe, and would be an obstacle 
to the foreseen expulsion of more than ten million (ethnic) 
Germans as soon as Nazi occupation came to an end. No-one 
with a stake in shaping the post-war international system 
seemed to have an interest in reviving the League of Nations 
system of treaties protecting collective minority rights. And 
so individual human rights, internationally recognized but 
not legally binding at first, entered the stage of world politics. 
They served the interests of what would soon become the 
powers that be (Mazower 2004).
Despite the emergence of individual human rights in the 
United Nations, the minority treaties of its predecessor, the 
League of Nations, were not terminated, but smothered until 
a few years into its existence the UN concluded that they 
should be considered as having ceased to exist some time 
ago. In the meantime, human rights found their canonical 
formulation in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and three decades later, their political apex in US 
President Jimmy Carter’s new foreign policy.
Since that time, human rights were considered here to 
stay, or so it seemed. In recent years many books, articles, 
reports and opinions have been written about changes in 
the international order as a consequence of a gradual shift 
of power between its members. Power is moving East, at 
least according to some analysts of world affairs. Will new 
or resurgent global and regional powers become new major 
players in the system or will they prove to be game-chang-
ers, aiming to alter the rules and regimes for international 
and global affairs? It is not just academics and think-tanks 
debating these issues, but also politicians and lately even 
presidents have seen a need or opportunities to address the 
make-up of the international order more than once in the 
last couple of years in public speeches.
On 28 May 2014, President Barack Obama gave a speech at 
the United States Military Academy at West Point. Addressing 
West Point graduates, the President reflected on the United 
States’ foreign policy. President Obama acknowledged that 
the distribution of power in the world is rapidly changing and 
that the US and its partners and allies have to adjust to new 
realities. He said: 
“[T]he world is changing with accelerating speed. This 
presents opportunity, but also new dangers. We know 
all too well, after 9/11, just how technology and global-
ization has put power once reserved for states in the 
hands of individuals, raising the capacity of terrorists 
to do harm. Russia’s aggression toward former Soviet 
states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China’s 
economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors.  
From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with 
us, and governments seek a greater say in global fo-
rums. And even as developing nations embrace democ-
racy and market economies, 24-hour news and social 
media makes it impossible to ignore the continuation 
of sectarian conflicts and failing states and popular 
uprisings that might have received only passing notice 
a generation ago”.1
Although the President warned against future military 
adventures that are not closely related to the national 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/28/remarks-president-west-point-academycommencement-ceremony
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interests of the US, his reflections contained much 
continuity in foreign policy. The US should continue to 
strengthen and enforce the international order through 
multilateral institutions and it should continue to support 
human rights (and democracy) globally if only as a matter 
of national security.
Only two months earlier, Russian Federation President 
Vladimir Putin said in a speech on the “reunification of the 
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sebastopol with Russia” 
that:
 “… the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and 
what has been happening in the world over the past several 
decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we 
no longer have stability. Key international institutions are 
not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, 
they are sadly degrading”.2
In the meantime Xi Jinping, visiting Europe for the first time 
as President of the People’s Republic of China, said that 
his country is a lion that has awakened, but provided the 
assurance that it is peaceful, pleasant and civilized. In a 
foreign policy address in 2013 just before becoming presi-
dent, Xi said: 
“No country should presume that we will engage in 
trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow 
the ‘bitter fruit’ of harming our sovereignty, security or 
development interests”.3
For President Xi, foreign interference with Tibet or Xingjiang 
would clearly count as harming sovereignty, but foreign 
concerns over human rights in China probably also qualify 
as ‘bitter fruit’. 
The decline of the West, the Asian Century, the rise of the 
Rest, the post-American world - by now these are all well-
known and much shared concepts. But shared concepts 
are not a sufficient condition for shared theories. There is 
a great divergence of opinion on the consequences of the 
changes in the international order. Will it become more co-
operative or less? Will until now reluctant states be forced 
by the changes underway to get serious about Security 
Council reform or will the changing power relations result 
in a deadlocked Council which in turn will contribute to 
delegitimizing the United Nations as a whole? Will regional 
security and co-operation regimes flourish while global 
regimes wither? What will changes in the international 
order of states mean for human rights, the developing 
international criminal justice regime (with institutions 
like the International Criminal Court), the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) doctrine and international civil society 
organizations?
Like Mark Mazower described the sudden and unexpected 
prominence of human rights at the end of World War II, 
Stephen Hopgood foretells their imminent if unexpected 
end in his latest book The Endtimes of Human Rights 
(2013). The title says it all. He writes that the “shift to 
multipolarity will reinforce the peace and security focus 
of the Security Council and split human rights off as a 
sideshow in Geneva”.4 Hopgood’s main proposition is 
that we are entering a neo-Westphalian world. That is a 
world of renewed sovereignty, resurgent religion and the 
stagnation or rollback of universal human rights. In it no 
hegemonic power will be available to globalize human 
rights effectively. The meaning of ‘human rights’ will be 
contested more openly, by religious movements and others 
that consider individual human rights to be an attack on 
the family as a fundamental unit of social life, but also 
by human rights activists themselves. Consequently, 
the future will show that the international human rights 
movement does not, as such, exist. Around the world there 
will be many human rights movements, organizations and 
activists, but they will not be part of one unified global 
movement, which, Hopgood suggests, has not had much 
impact until now anyway. The future of the International 
Criminal Court and of the Responsibility to Protect do not 
look any better. 
This is the essence of the picture that Stephen Hopgood 
sketches in Endtimes (2013). He maintains that his vision 
is not one of a distant future. We are “on the verge of the 
Introduction
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imminent decay of the Global Human Rights Regime”, he 
writes in the preface to his book.
Of course such radical ideas about the near future of human 
rights like the ones brought forward by Stephen Hopgood do 
not go uncontested. For this collection of original essays, we 
invited academics and practitioners working in the human 
rights domain to critically reflect on Stephen Hopgood’s 
guerilla theatre, as Michael Barnett characterizes Endtimes 
(2013) in his contribution to this volume.
Barnett focuses attention on Hopgood’s dichotomy between 
upper-case Human Rights as a global structure of laws, 
court norms and organizations that act as if they are the 
representative of humanity, and lower-case human rights, 
local and transnational networks that aim to ensure that 
people are treated decently and with respect for their 
autonomy and integrity. For Hopgood, their relationship 
seems to be parasitic, with Human Rights living off human 
rights, but Barnett suggests that it might be overly romantic 
to assume that people are always responsible for their own 
liberation. Sometimes moral progress depends on bleeding-
heart liberals taking an interest in the lives of others.
Todd Landman argues that empirical studies challenge many 
of the arguments in Endtimes (2013). Recent studies show 
a positive impact of the international human rights regime 
on human rights compliance on the ground. Like Barnett, he 
is skeptical about Hopgood’s dichotomy between upper-case 
and lower-case human rights. Additionally, Landman argues 
that worldwide developments in trade, aid and material 
capabilities suggest that Hopgood might be exaggerating 
the emergence of a neo-Westphalian world order. Landman’s 
essay might suggest to the reader that a new bipolar world, 
not a multipolar world, is in the making. This might be bad 
news for human rights in the countries in China’s sphere of 
influence, but it does not necessarily imply the end of the 
international human rights regime.
Steve Crawshaw argues that even if neo-Westphalia is 
really in the making, this is not bad news for human 
rights per se. First of all, he reminds us that there never 
was a golden age of human rights in which Western 
powers respected these rights, while others violated 
them. According to Crawshaw, the emergence of new 
powers can also be an opportunity for human rights. He 
sees India’s change of tack on Sri Lanka as an example 
of this. Crawshaw argues that Amnesty International’s 
organizational strategy of setting up regional hubs and 
new national offices in countries like India, Brazil and 
Nigeria shows that the organization is preparing itself 
for a world in which BRICS, MINT and other powers might 
play a significantly greater part in making, promoting and 
protecting international human rights norms. 
César Rodriguez-Garavito adds that Endtimes (2013) 
has much to say about upper-case Human Rights, 
although not very positive, but in the end very little about 
lower-case human rights. Endtimes is a critique from 
the inside of Human Rights. By consequence, Rodriguez-
Garavito argues, the book misses many connections and 
collaborations between upper-case and lower-case human 
rights. He suggests that an ecosystem approach, in which 
there is room for national and international diversity and 
network-based connections between actors, topics and 
strategies, is a better description of the human rights 
domain than Hopgood’s approach based on two separate 
monocultures.
Monica Duffy Toft questions the negative effects of 
the resurgence of religion, a typifying phenomenon in 
Hopgood’s human-rights unfriendly neo-Westphalian order. 
She points out that in four successive decades religious 
actors often played a positive role in democratization 
processes. Duffy Toft also questions Hopgood’s contention 
that autocracy is on the rise. Actually, she tells us, 
empirical data show that there has been little movement 
across the categories of regime type.
Frank Johansson warns Amnesty International and others 
in the Human Rights field against failing to engage with 
Hopgood’s arguments which, according to Johansson, are 
in line with recent writings by Michael Barnett, Costas 
Douzinas, Martti Koskenniemi and Samuel Moyn. Unlike 
Rodriguez-Garavito, Johansson agrees with Hopgood that 
there is a structural difference between upper-case and 
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lower-case human rights. He also agrees with Hopgood 
that here is a triumphalist metanarrative that might not 
relate very well to reality. Johansson thinks that Amnesty 
International has tough choices to make about continuing 
along its current growth-oriented course, becoming more 
political, or returning to its original purpose: defending and 
supporting those who in their different circumstances are 
trying to change the world while becoming less political 
itself.
Daan Bronkhorst argues that human rights defenders 
like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Václav Havel and 
Wei Jingsheng have always been the link between upper-
case and lower-case human rights, but that broadening 
the concept of human rights defence to ‘the voice of the 
affected group’ is problematic. It would make almost every 
activist a human rights defender, thereby turning human 
rights defence into an activism which provides solutions 
for many different problems instead of limiting itself to the 
protection of those who try to find solutions.
 
Endtimes (2013) is not just a critique of the international 
human rights movement and organizations, but also of 
the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility 
to Protect. Like some African political leaders, Stephen 
Hopgood characterizes the Court as a European Court 
for Africa. Stephen Lamony argues that there are enough 
reasons to instead consider the Court as being an African 
court, but that neither characterization is really adequate. 
Nonetheless, broader ratification of the Rome Statute is 
needed and that is where, in support of this institution 
from the upper-case human rights machinery, local and 
regional (lower-case) human rights organizations have an 
important role to play.
Finally, Noel Morada looks at Hopgood’s examination of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Morada argues that 
Hopgood fails to present a nuanced picture of R2P as a 
universal norm, focuses too much on just one aspect of 
R2P, probably not by coincidence the most controversial 
one, and exaggerates the role of major powers in advancing 
international support for R2P. Morada disagrees with 
Hopgood that R2P stands no chance of surviving in a neo-
Westphalian world that does not rest on US power.
The entrance of human rights onto the political world stage 
did not abruptly and explicitly end the minority treaties of 
the interbellum. Those treaties first lost their relevance 
and then faded from existence. The same might happen 
to Human Rights if Hopgood is only partly right in The 
Endtimes of Human Rights. This makes his book relevant, 
whether one agrees with it or not. The critical reflections 
on Endtimes in this collection may help in assessing and 
responding to Hopgood’s provocations.
Lars van Troost and Doutje Lettinga
Introduction
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 Stephen Hopgood
The Endtimes of Human Rights
Now might seem an unusual time to be arguing that 
we face the endtimes of human rights. After decades of 
obscurity, global human rights advocacy has secured a 
foothold at the very highest level in the foreign policies of 
Western states and at the United Nations. This is a total 
transformation from the 1970s, when the language of 
human rights was new at the level of popular discourse, 
and the 1980s when a concern with sovereignty made even 
the UN reluctant to identify too fully with the human rights 
demands of a growing number of activists worldwide. 
The end of the Cold War, two decades of American 
primacy, an increase in the number of democracies, 
growing interconnectedness through globalisation, and 
the communications revolution which exposes acts of 
atrocity immediately and globally, all appear to have 
opened a window of opportunity. Global human rights 
advocates have made the most of it by creating law and 
institutions that have embedded human rights: the Rome 
Statute that created the International Criminal Court, 
and the Responsibility to Protect following a successful 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, are the most 
important institutional manifestations of this trend toward 
permanent embedding. 
If this was not enough, some scholars have recently argued 
that not only is war declining, but even where it continues 
we see some quality of life indicators going up (Pinker 
2012; Human Security Report 2013). Added to the hope 
stimulated by the Arab Spring and the increasing openness 
of Burma, to name just two examples, a whole array of 
developments seem to confirm human rights will widen and 
deepen their positive impact on a global scale. 
However, I want to argue, this picture is mistaken. The 
endtimes are coming for human rights as effective global 
norms for two reasons. The first is the relative erosion 
of American power, the absolute decline of European 
power, and the enhanced influence of not just China 
and Russia but a whole series of other newly emerging 
and re-emerging powers that want, at the very least, to 
renegotiate some global rules and institutions. This links 
to the second dimension – increasing contestation inside 
and outside the human rights movement. Global human 
rights norms emerged as political factors out of a Europe 
that was both dominant and secularising. In such a 
world, religion had been relegated to the private sphere, 
no longer able to explicitly dictate the content of public 
life nor to constrain public morality. However, re-emerging 
areas of the world are not secular. This does not mean 
they are necessarily religious in a regressive sense, but 
it does mean that religious authorities and faith are key 
elements of public life and therefore influence, in crucial 
ways, public attitudes. Added to existing social, cultural 
and national norms, religious principles concerning the 
family, legitimate public behaviour, duty and obligation, 
just retribution, the qualifications for legitimate citizenship 
(and the possibility that anti-social behaviour means you 
abdicate your rights), and what it means to be a person, 
create a variety of normative commitments that do not map 
neatly onto the rather narrow universalism of secular global 
human rights. Added to this is the possibility that different 
emphases will be forthcoming from human rights workers 
in the South focusing more on social justice and less on 
civil and political rights.
The language of human rights will not diminish in visibility, 
and human rights NGOs and institutions will continue 
to provide a running commentary on the killing and 
12Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
discrimination that remains depressingly ubiquitous around 
us. But what impact will this really have on the ground, 
where these abuses are a daily occurrence? In other words, 
will human rights be an effective way to pursue liberal 
conceptions of freedom in the world that is emerging?
Human rights achievements
Despite arguments over the origins of human rights, 
dated by different authors back to antiquity, or to pre-
modern Europe, or to the eighteenth century, or to 1945, it 
was in the 1970s that human rights took off as a global 
phenomenon (Moyn 2010; Neier 2012; Hoffman 2011; Iriye 
et al. 2012; Ishay 2008; Hunt 2008). This was because of 
the early groundwork done by Amnesty, formed in 1961, 
and after 1978 by Helsinki Watch and Americas Watch 
(before they became Human Rights Watch). But the major 
shift was the use by the American state of the language of 
human rights as part of President Carter’s rhetoric for a 
new kind of foreign policy to repair the crisis of confidence 
within American society and government about the future 
role of the United States in the world (e.g., Guilhot 2005; 
Keys 2014; Hopgood 2013a, chapter. 5). By the 1990s, 
after a decade of awareness-raising, Amnesty would be a 
million-strong global movement and Human Rights Watch 
an increasingly visible presence worldwide reporting on 
post-Cold War atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda. 
The achievements here are significant. Building on the entry 
into force in the mid-1970s of the international covenants 
on civil and political, and economic, social and cultural 
rights, on the conventions against torture and against 
discrimination against women, and on the children’s rights 
convention of 1989, the UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace of 1992 announced a new era 
where human rights would increasingly impose conditions 
on legitimate sovereignty. Following 1993’s UN Conference 
on Human Rights in Vienna, the UN’s Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights was established, followed 
by the Rome Statute (1998), the International Criminal 
Court (2002), the Responsibility to Protect (2001), the new 
Human Rights Council (2006) and the Universal Periodic 
Review (2008). These were all significant developments in 
the law of human rights. Numerous other institutions and 
conventions were passed and soon almost no advocates 
who sought progress on norms and their implementation 
– from migrants, to the disabled to those fighting against 
female genital mutilation (FGM) – failed to express 
their demands in the language of human rights. These 
institutional achievements are mirrored in global surveys 
that show public majorities worldwide support the idea of 
human rights (World Public Opinion 2011).
Far from being an infringement on sovereignty, human 
rights are heralded by advocates as integral to the exercise 
of legitimate government, a revolutionary change within 
four decades. Human Rights Watch’s children’s rights 
advocacy director, Jo Becker, has recently outlined a series 
of examples where some degree of success has been 
achieved ranging from stopping the use of child soldiers 
to ending violence against children to abolishing life 
sentences without parole for juveniles (Becker 2012; also 
Brysk 2013). The UN’s report on the appallingly repressive 
conditions in which people live within North Korea, released 
in February 2014, uses human rights, and their most far-
reaching legalised expression – crimes against humanity 
– as the framework for demanding both referral to the ICC 
and even the use of coercive pressure under the label of 
R2P (UN North Korea Report 2014). After several years of 
lobbying, the Human Rights Council has at last passed 
a resolution demanding Sri Lanka allow an independent 
inquiry into alleged crimes against humanity committed at 
the end of the country’s civil war in 2009.
In other words, in 2014, human rights are no longer 
marginal, they are mainstream. High-profile campaigns – 
for example to free members of the Russian feminist rock 
band Pussy Riot – garner global publicity on a mass scale. 
Human rights advocacy is funded to the tune of hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year and human rights now form part 
of the discourse of humanitarian intervention. The laws and 
institutions of the international criminal justice regime, 
especially the International Criminal Court, have introduced 
a whole new dimension to the campaign against impunity 
for committing mass human rights abuses, with two sitting 
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heads of state in Africa, President al-Bashir in the Sudan 
and President Kenyatta in Kenya, currently indicted.1
This is the Global Human Rights Regime. I capitalise 
it to illustrate the distinction I want to make between 
the vast array of local human rights struggles that use 
various strategies (sometimes including violence and also 
other languages of dissent and justice such as fairness, 
toleration, respect, religious obligation, duty, and national, 
or ethnic, identity) to advance demands for protection 
and progress. There is, I maintain, a significant difference 
between this less institutionalised, more flexible, more 
diverse and multi-vocal level, where social movements 
operate, and the embedded Global Human Rights Regime 
where law, courts, money, and access to power in New 
York and Geneva are more familiar terrain. Lower-case 
human rights may help, alongside other forms of social 
mobilisation, in changing the world in myriad small and 
positive ways, but they will never revolutionise global 
politics which is what Human Rights advocates aspire to do.
Questions for Human Rights in 2014
As I shall argue shortly, in my view, the outlook for the 
global human rights regime is bleaker in 2014 than it has 
been for at least two decades. Nevertheless, even before 
we consider the reasons for this – the decline of the West 
and increasing contestation – we should note an array of 
problems that human rights advocacy and activism face 
already, regardless of any transformational changes. There 
are, I suggest, at least seven important issues human 
rights advocacy faces, many of which are exacerbated in 
the direction of less human rights impact and effectiveness 
by the wider global shifts underway.
To begin with impact: There is no doubt that the most 
impressive achievements claimed by human rights 
advocates are in the fields of law and institutions, the 
Rome Statute and the ICC to the fore. The jury is, however, 
still out on the discernible impact of all of this work. Some 
recent scholarship is skeptical, to say the least, about 
what has been achieved, while even erstwhile supporters 
of what has been called ’the justice cascade’ register some 
concern (Hafner-Burton 2013; Risse & Ropp 2013; Sikkink 
2011; Simmons 2009). The key here is not more law and 
more courts but more compliance (Risse & Ropp 2013; but 
also Howse & Teitel 2010). In effect, the question is: What 
difference does it all make? Are human rights all output and 
comparatively little outcome? When we look at individual 
cases, as Becker and Brysk do, we see some progress but 
aggregate data tells a less promising story (Hafner-Burton 
& Ron 2009). Are other mechanisms, democratisation, for 
example, or social movements organised on the basis of 
ethnic or labour solidarity, or consumer boycotts, or hacking 
attacks, or mass popular protests, more likely to achieve 
positive effects than more law and courts? Some scholars 
argue that when states sign conventions like that against 
torture they are more likely to torture, or to be inventive 
about the forms of torture they use (Hathaway 2001; Rejali 
2009; but also Fariss 2014). In other words, upper-case 
Human Rights may have too narrow a range of permissible 
strategies – largely atrocity reporting, legal innovation and 
naming and shaming – and this may be a declining and 
ineffective way of getting real change. 
Hard cases: In many areas passing law is the easy part. The 
finding that human rights are observed best in the states 
that need them least should not surprise us (Hafner-Burton 
2013). Whether it is against the suppression of freedom of 
expression, or the use of violence and torture by entrenched 
authoritarian governments, or the resistance to women’s and 
LGBT rights in local religious communities, getting people in 
large numbers who are deeply committed to existing social 
norms to change their behaviour is extremely difficult, and far 
more difficult than creating policy and law. Implementation 
is what matters. Few strides if any have been made in these 
areas. Take FGM. Despite evidence that there is a decline in 
FGM in several African countries after more than two decades 
of intense activism, in cases like the Sudan, Somalia and 
Djibouti almost nothing has changed. Elimination efforts 
began in the Sudan, for example, nearly a hundred years 
ago (Boddy 2007) to little avail. In areas where there has 
been progress, the exact mechanism that explains positive 
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change remains unclear with greater emphasis on ‘human 
rights’ being one of several explanations that include rising 
incomes, women’s education, better information sharing 
and urbanisation (UNICEF 2013). This is to say nothing 
of the types of hard cases represented by resistance to 
human rights at the government level in Russia, China and 
numerous other states.
Pushback: There has always been pushback against human 
rights even by Western states. What we now see is a new 
intensity to this pushback, including in areas where the 
whole principle of human rights is under threat (Uganda, 
Sri Lanka, Russia) or the applicability of human rights to 
situations of great atrocity (North Korea) is challenged. The 
list of areas where we see increasing pushback against 
human rights grows daily: Ugandan president Museveni 
signing the anti-homosexuality bill, Russia denying 
freedom of expression and LGBT rights, China defending 
North Korea and actively opposing the discourse of human 
rights, Sri Lankan government impunity, Cambodia 
politically undermining the criminal tribunal to try Khmer 
Rouge leaders, President Kenyatta trying to collapse 
his trial at the ICC and mobilising the African Union to 
resist the court, Israel’s resistance to allow international 
investigations of operations like Cast Lead in Gaza, Spain 
unravelling its commitment to universal jurisdiction, the 
Indian Supreme Court outlawing homosexuality. Saudi 
Arabia, one of the world’s most systematic human rights 
abusers, used the language of rights to explain its decision 
to reject a UN Security Council seat while ASEAN’s human 
rights declaration is little more than a cosmetic exercise 
that allows public order and public morality concerns 
to trump rights by mimicking language in the Universal 
Declaration that had a wholly different intent. These are 
but a few high profile examples. Freedom House (2013) 
recently argued that authoritarian reactions to the Arab 
Spring have contributed to a trend away from freedom 
and openness. Are these signals of success in that human 
rights now incites more concerted resistance because it has 
made real gains? With low compliance rates, great power 
exceptionalism (e.g., the ICC), and increasing pushback on 
principle (e.g., Sri Lanka, Uganda), the conclusion that we 
have come such a short distance in terms of impact in the 
absence of serious resistance should be sobering.
Hypocrisy: Human Rights Watch head Kenneth Roth 
recently argued that the difficulties the ICC has faced in 
prosecuting President Kenyatta, and in securing legitimacy 
in Africa, alongside the exclusive focus on African men as 
indictees, should not make us lose hope in the court nor 
consider it partial or victor’s justice (Roth 2014). But the 
appearance at the ICC of either a head of state of a great 
power, or of a client state of one of the great powers (Sri 
Lanka, Israel, Syria) seems unimaginable. There is a clear 
double standard at work. President Obama recently went 
out of his way to publicly insist US soldiers in Mali need 
have no fear of the ICC, following up at least rhetorically 
the bilateral agreements the United States signed under 
the George W. Bush administration to avoid any prospect 
of US servicemen being arrested and taken to The Hague. 
Indeed, successfully resisting pressure to join the ICC 
may be seen as a positive sign of great power status. 
The counter argument – that worries about universal 
jurisdiction claims for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity have made some leaders wary about travel – can 
be met by the objection that after the then-Israeli deputy 
prime minister, Tzipi Livni, cancelled a visit to Britain over 
fears about being arrested, European states moved quickly 
to limit universal jurisdiction claims (Ellis 2012). Spain, 
an innovator in the area of universal jurisprudence, has 
recently seen a similar effort to roll back the possibility of 
universal jurisdiction (Kassam 2014). 
In terms of R2P, the selective application of its principles 
– yes in Libya, no in Sri Lanka and Syria – has led many 
states to be sceptical about its promise as a new human 
rights norm. Fears it was a post-Kosovo cover for NATO-led 
regime change had already led to R2P being effectively 
gutted within the UN system after 2005 (Weiss 2005). 
Within a judicial and policing system, where the rule of 
law operates, everyone (from paupers to princes) is in 
principle subject to that law. But we can see that there 
is no mechanism by which most state leaders could be 
brought before the court in the absence of military defeat 
or domestic compliance. Without the threat of great power 
pressure, or even intervention, the chance of a coerced 
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appearance at the ICC is tiny. Which means if you are a 
great power, or a great power client, you are effectively 
immune from justice. We are left with a system that is 
constitutively unfair and thus at some deep level unjust, 
undermining the whole idea of global norms and laws and 
providing an easy target for the committers of abuses to 
delegitimise attempts to, at the very least, expose their 
crimes. It does not matter how many states sign up to the 
ICC or R2P. There isn’t really a norm if the United States 
and China are not on board.
The political economy of human rights: Despite the 
success of the human rights ‘movement’, there is a 
political and moral economy about human rights which 
entrenches inequality of resources and influence. Some 
have pointed out how global Human Rights organisations 
are gatekeepers for issues they do not want to campaign 
on (Carpenter 2009). Others assert that global funding 
can displace local activism and warp local priorities 
(Suresh 2014). To what extent can this be one movement 
when money and power all flow in one direction, from the 
North to the South? Some of the inequities that mark the 
global political system as a whole are mirrored in the 
human rights movement. One key fault line, for example, is 
between those for whom human rights work includes social 
justice issues and those for whom these are distinct, if both 
important, ethical discourses.
Competition: There is increasing competition for funds 
between all non-profit organisations, particularly after 2008 
and the global financial crisis. The number of progressive 
organisations searching for donations is vast and grows all 
the time. Human rights organisations must compete in this 
marketplace, making sure they are visible and their brand 
well-known even if this means that some issues which 
ought to be priorities fall by the wayside. The Pussy Riot 
campaign was an example of an issue that generated huge 
global publicity but what kind of long-term impact did it 
really have? It also showed up the difficulty of global NGOs 
piggybacking on local struggles whose priorities may be 
swamped in the process (Guardian 2014). Competition may 
also come from other mobilising principles. For example, 
the resurgence of the Catholic Church under Pope Francis, 
whose attempt to move past women’s rights and LGBT 
concerns and get back to the Church’s core business of 
combatting poverty and suffering, might signal increased 
influence for an organisation from which many human 
rights advocates are exiles.
Demographics: As many international NGO fundraisers or 
membership experts will tell you, young people do not join 
organisations like they used to. They will support causes 
that matter to them, and they may involve themselves 
in an organisation for a year or two. But they will not 
stay for a decade, and not for life, and the activism they 
engage in needs to be quick, to promise a fairly immediate 
response (e.g., the delivery of a petition), or an email 
barrage against a government, and then they move on. 
The online pressure movement, Avaaz.Org, may seem like 
a progressive step in this sense but it may equally be wide 
but shallow ‘slacktivism’, a form of social action that has 
no lasting impact, builds no long-term leverage and doesn’t 
permanently recruit radicalised young people to social causes 
(Gladwell 2010). Networks may be good for information 
sharing but not for sustained activism, in other words. We do 
not as yet understand how demographic change and social 
media are changing normative advocacy and activism but 
there seems little doubt that the old-style model is not going 
to be the organisational form of the future. 
As if this was not enough…
Many of these trends were already underway in the last 
decade or more, the misplaced confidence (or hubris) of 
Human Rights advocacy papering over the cracks. But 
things are only really just beginning to fragment. There are, 
I would argue, two major changes underway, one structural 
– the decline of the West – and the other exacerbated by 
this, yet a separate trend towards contestation in areas 
where human rights confronts other social norms. 
a. The end of the unipolar moment
There is prima facie evidence that the US is declining in 
relative terms as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) rise, Europe is declining in absolute 
terms, and the world’s centre of gravity is shifting to the 
Asia-Pacific with only the Middle East and Russia/Central 
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Asia keeping the gaze of great powers close to Europe’s 
borderlands (Layne 2009). Although it is clear that the 
United States was the world’s largest defence spender in 
2012 by an order of magnitude ($682bn, compared with 
an estimate for second-placed China of $166bn), defence 
spending in Europe is static if not falling. Growth in 2012 
spending was all in Russia, China and Saudi Arabia 
(SIPRI 2013). The decrease in European defence spending 
represents a trend dating back to the end of the Cold War: 
as a percentage of GDP, for example, the UK’s defence 
spending fell from 4.4% to 2.2% from 1989 to 2008, 
France’s from 3.7% to 2.3% and Germany’s from 2.9% to 
1.3% (Liberti 2011). This has led to calls from the United 
States for more burden sharing, amid concerns that if the 
United States looks to the Asia-Pacific, Europe will need 
to police its own neighbourhood (World Today 2013). This 
issue has been brought to a head by the crisis in Ukraine. 
The long-term return to a world where China’s and India’s 
economies have the largest share of global GDP is also well 
advanced, the share of global GDP of Europe having fallen 
significantly in the last four decades and massively since 
the time in 1870 when Britain’s and the United States’ 
GDPs were comparable (Economist 2010).
We might take several recent crises as examples of US 
ambivalence and of European weakness, especially 
following the post-2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
Libya, the US was prepared to follow the UK and France 
but not to lead, in Syria, lack of UK and French support 
left an already wary US with no unilateral option, and 
in the Ukraine, US uncertainty has not been replaced 
by an agreed EU approach to the problem, much to the 
frustration of American diplomats. The reluctance of 
Germany to use its trade leverage over Russia is a case 
in point. American leadership remains pivotal, in other 
words, to the preservation of international order and the 
resolution of crises that threaten its stability. But against a 
combined Russia and China, as we have seen in Syria, what 
leverage does the United States have? Concerned about 
its own domestic problems, with stagnant real wages, 
high budget and balance of trade deficits, increasing 
competition, stubbornly high post-2008 unemployment 
and constant congressional-executive stalemate, the 
US may find it increasingly hard to further expand its 
multilateral engagements internationally (Kennedy 1987). 
In other words, the shift may be structural and not just a 
transient isolationist mood after more than a decade of the 
global war on terror (Pew Research 2013). Some essential 
multilateralism will remain in areas like trade and core 
national security concerns like Iran, North Korea and 
nuclear proliferation, but the days when the United States 
could afford to sustain a global force posture may be over 
(but see Jones 2014 and Lieber 2012).
To the extent that a liberal superpower has been essential, 
implicitly as well as explicitly, to support the Global Human 
Rights Regime (including international justice regimes), 
even as the United States itself has been a somewhat 
reluctant, part-time participant in multilateralism, the new 
world offers little hope and every prospect that this regime 
has reached its limits (Kupchan 2012; Ikenberry 2011). 
China’s response to the UN’s recent damning report on 
North Korea, which recorded ‘unspeakable atrocities’, is an 
example: ‘Of course we cannot accept this unreasonable 
criticism. We believe that politicizing human rights issues 
is not conducive towards improving a country’s human 
rights. We believe that taking human rights issues to the 
International Criminal Court is not helpful to improving 
a country’s human rights situation’ (Reuters 2014). Will 
we ever see a Chinese premier speaking the language of 
human rights? It’s hard to think so.
Embedded authoritarianism in Russia, China, and several 
of their client states, renewed confidence in numerous 
countries to pushback against international human rights 
and justice, not to mention increasing attacks against 
humanitarian aid personnel, all provide evidence of a 
world in which sustaining universal norms will be harder 
just at the point when greater investment of political 
resources than ever is required. China may represent a 
different kind of modernity, one where human rights may 
be an illegitimate language at state level but also one 
where the government points to the hundreds of millions 
pulled from poverty by China’s rapid economic growth as 
“real” human rights improvement. Will the Chinese middle 
class, newly affluent, be a progressive force for human 
The Endtimes of Human Rights
17Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
rights internationally? So far there are few signs of that. 
Bipolarity, or multi-polarity, in terms of the distribution 
of global power, will more likely mean a system where 
negotiated global norms backed by the self-reinforcing 
dynamic of reciprocity (what’s good for me is good for you) 
are likely to survive but hierarchical, sovereignty-contesting 
norms like Global Human Rights will not as a major force 
in world politics at state level. This would potentially be 
good for international humanitarian law (like the Geneva 
Conventions) which are in their essence sustained by a 
reciprocal logic, however much they are now viewed as 
customary law as well. 
b. Contestation
Contestation in this new world takes several forms. Within 
the human rights movement, for example, we may well 
find increasing tension between civil and political rights 
on the one hand and social justice issues on the other as 
persistent inequality, even as income increases, becomes 
a greater and greater focus of advocacy and activism. The 
UN’s 2013 Human Development Report (UNDP 2013), titled 
‘The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World’ 
refers to the importance of ‘enhancing global collective 
welfare.’ In this 200-page document, ‘human rights’ are 
mentioned 14 times whereas the word ‘equity’ is mentioned 
more than 40 times. Designations like the ‘Global South’ 
and the ‘Global North’ speak to inequality even where there 
is increasing wealth. There is a South in the North (poor 
migrant workers living on low wages with few protections, 
no insurance, no job security and no rights) and a North in 
the South (e.g., a growing Brazilian, Chinese and Indian 
middle class with disposable income, Western-style 
consumption patterns, social and geographical mobility, 
and an interest in the sorts of rights that protect their 
assets rather than dilute their wealth or influence). How 
will the Global Human Rights Regime help tackle such 
inequality when it relies on funding and support from 
the very middle classes which stand to lose most from 
policies of social justice that would redistribute economic 
and political power? It’s not clear what the Global Human 
Rights Regime and its funders will do if fairness and social 
justice, not international criminal justice, are the issues 
that command the widest attention.
The universality and indivisibility of the entire rights 
agenda may also not reflect the view of other, previously 
silenced human rights advocates. There was a time 
when the one rights commitment it was thought all 
Amnesty International members shared was an objection 
to the death penalty but this turns out not to be the 
case (Hopgood 2006). It’s hard to imagine anyone being 
considered a real human rights advocate who supports 
discrimination on principle against women or LGBT people, 
but is it likely in this new, global, multi-vocal world that all 
human rights advocates will support reproductive rights? 
For hard-core Human Rights advocates can there be any 
compromise on the principle that human rights entail a 
woman’s right to choose? If not, and if there are women 
who lay claim to being human rights advocates who for 
faith-based or other reasons think the unborn child has 
rights that trump its mother’s, can we really speak of one 
movement? In a more diverse human rights world, aren’t 
all these voices going to be heard, and isn’t that going to 
mean an end to unanimity and thus to the whole idea of 
one singular movement at all?
Contestation inside the human rights movement is 
matched by contestation outside. Global human rights 
norms emerged as political factors out of a Europe that was 
secularising (Hopgood 2006, 2013a/b; Joas 2013). In such 
a world, religion was no longer able to dictate the content 
of public life nor to constrain public morality. But the re-
emerging areas of the world are not necessarily secular. 
This does not mean they are religious in a regressive sense, 
but it does mean that religious authorities and faith are key 
elements of public life and influence, and in crucial ways, 
public morality. The new salience of religion globally, as 
well as its greater resonance within the foreign policies of 
Western states after 9/11, means that the foundations on 
which secular human rights were based are not available 
universally. Religious norms about the family, social 
norms about legitimate public behaviour, about duty and 
obligation, and just retribution, about the qualifications for 
legitimate citizenship (and the possibility that anti-social 
behaviour means you abdicate your rights), and about 
what it means to be a person, create a diverse multiplicity 
of principled commitments that do not map neatly onto 
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the rather narrow and arid universalism of secular global 
human rights. Religious pluralism, as a means to avoid 
the insoluble religion-secularism clash, is all very well 
but in the hard cases referred to above – Shari’a law and 
women’s rights, Catholicism and abortion, evangelism and 
homosexuality, national identity and freedom of expression, 
public morality and individual choice – the assumption 
that norms of moral equality and non-discrimination are 
recognised by all, the bedrock belief of global humanism 
for two centuries, may not hold. Religious pluralism already 
assumes, in other words, a shared normative world in which 
women are not treated as property or children as family 
assets or LGBT people as an affront to public morality able 
to be legitimately brutalised.
A defining article of faith for the human rights movement is 
that individuals hold their rights by virtue of being human. 
Everyone has them, without qualification, from President 
Bashir al-Assad to the children his chemical weapons 
attack so brutally murdered. But this principle, too, is not 
intuitive. Is the claim that the death penalty constitutes 
a form of justice really so hard to understand? Or that 
torturing people who have committed abuses against the 
community might be permissible by some conceptions of 
justice? If you betray your society and perpetrate anti-social 
acts, even act in ways that undermine community cohesion 
and safety, is it so surprising that you might be considered 
to have sacrificed your rights (Wahl 2013)? Human rights 
based on this understanding are much more like citizenship 
rights – that is, rights you qualify for and which can be 
taken away from you if you misbehave. Here they really do 
imply duties imposed on the rights-holder him- or herself.
Conclusion: The Neo-Westphalian World
The rapidly transforming world around us can be 
characterised as neo-Westphalian. Ever more extensive social 
and economic linkages will continue and intensify, especially 
as the speed of technological innovation grows. Global trade 
and finance, essential elements of the affluence of growing 
powers like China, as well as collective security concerns 
about transport, energy and weapons, create shared interests 
in the preservation of international order. In this sense, India, 
China, Brazil and perhaps even Russia have a stake in the 
continuation of the system. 
What they do not necessarily want to sustain, and certainly 
do not want to expand, is the hierarchical system of rules 
and norms centred around human rights and international 
justice. Humanitarianism – the unconditional giving of 
care to populations suffering from extreme deprivation 
– provides a form of service that, absent human rights 
conditionality, is often of use to even authoritarian regimes. 
But for human rights and international justice, the lack of 
an enforcing will (like that of the once all-powerful Europe 
and then of the United States), and the greater diversity of 
values, beliefs and faiths judged legitimate and progressive, 
spells the end-times for one world under global secular 
law and especially for the old model of human rights as 
an authoritative conscience, housed in Western Europe, for 
all the peoples of the earth. R2P and the ICC are in reality 
twentieth-century ideas in a twenty-first century post-
Western world.
The Endtimes of Human Rights
19Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
The Endtimes of Human Rights (Hopgood 2013a) is a 
whirlwind of provocations. The overall punchline –Human 
Rights is about to meet its demise, and the quicker it comes 
the better -- is bound to incite. Each step in the argument 
illuminates human rights from different angles: human 
rights began as a secularised deity, it became something 
of a saving figure after World War II, the Americans are 
largely responsible for turning a perfectly attractive human 
rights movement into a disfigured Human Rights industry, 
and religion and China are about to put the final nail in 
the coffin of Human Rights. Tying together these individual 
chapters in the past, present, and future of Human Rights 
makes Endtimes one of the most important statements 
on human rights in recent memory. Each page launches 
assertions that will cause the reader to write furiously in 
the margins, including contradictory comments such as 
‘Yes!’ ‘Really?’ ‘Brilliant,’ ‘You really want to say this?’ 
Yet Hopgood is not unnecessarily baiting the reader – he 
is challenging her to wrestle with an alternative, tragic, 
narrative of the history of human rights. And part of the 
reason why it is so compelling is because Hopgood has such 
an intimate understanding of the subject matter. He knows 
human rights, inside and out. He has produced a fearless 
book that asks scholars to look deeper into underlying 
structures that have buoyed and produced Human Rights, 
and gives activists an opportunity to look into a different 
mirror. The Endtimes of Human Rights is guerrilla theatre at 
its very best.  
Endtimes is not a history of human rights; instead it is a 
free-wheeling, no holds barred, argument about life, times, 
and eventual demise of Human Rights. Hopgood covers so 
much ground that it is hard to know where to start or end. 
However, I will focus my thoughts on how we understand 
Human Rights and its relationship to human rights, 
humanitarianism, and other smaller calibre movements 
designed to save suffering souls.
  
A parasitic relationship
To begin, what, precisely, is the relationship between 
human rights and Human Rights? Assuming I am 
reading Endtimes correctly, Hopgood imagines them in 
independent, nearly binary, terms. Lower-case human 
rights is comprised of local and transnational networks, 
springing from below, which try to bring publicity to 
violations and pressure their governments and other public 
bodies to take appropriate action. The ultimate goal of 
lower-case human rights is to treat people decently and 
respect their autonomy and integrity. Consequently, it can 
take many different forms and can go by many different 
names, but those in the West might not always see such 
movements as part of the terrain for human rights. For 
instance, Hopgood opens his book with a description of the 
resistance movement in East Timor prior to independence in 
1989; he insists that we see this as part of human rights, 
even though those in the West would not because it was 
indigenous and had little connection to Human Rights. The 
point is that people have been fighting for their ‘rights’ in 
all sorts of ways even if the West cannot see it because of 
its ‘human rights’ lens.  
More ominously, Human Rights is a ‘global structure of 
laws, courts, norms, and organisations that raise money, 
write reports, run campaigns, pay hefty monthly rents in 
nicely appointed offices in choice locations, and act as if 
they are the representative of humanity’ (Hopgood 2013a: 
ix). Upper-case Human Rights might have had its origins 
in human rights, but Human Rights has outgrown human 
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rights, become a personality unto itself, and become 
quite adept at exploiting human rights for the purpose of 
feeding the beast of Human Rights. Hopgood’s distinction 
between Human Rights and human rights is effective 
and convincing, and does real analytical and descriptive 
work. However, like all binaries, it imposes antonymistic 
characteristics that are not always warranted. For instance, 
because Human Rights is characterised as all power and 
hubris, human rights is sometimes over-romanticised, and 
its capacity for power and hubris overlooked.
Human Rights, it seems, has a nearly parasitic relationship 
to human rights. It takes and takes and takes, but gives 
little back in return. Human Rights certainly needs human 
rights, not only to give it a purpose but also to advertise 
the victims in order to meet their budgetary needs. More 
importantly, the West needs Human Rights because it is a 
partial ideological answer to the crisis of authority, brought 
on by a modernity that killed God, leaving humankind 
struggling for a new kind of authority, and finding it in 
themselves.
But is this relationship so one-sided? Does human rights not 
need Human Rights? Doesn’t Human Rights reciprocate, at 
all? Hopgood (2013a: 2) suggests that human rights can live 
without Human Rights, and, in fact, might live quite nicely. 
‘How different would the world really look without the multi-
billion dollar humanitarian, human rights, and international 
justice regimes?’ Hopgood writes. ‘How much less chronic 
suffering would there be?’ This is not just a really good 
question, it is basic to Hopgood’s argument. Yet because 
Hopgood does not force an answer, he ultimately leaves it to 
the reader to project his or her own preconceived notions. 
I have also struggled with the very same counterfactual in 
the domain of humanitarianism, but I seem to have come 
out with a slightly more charitable answer than Hopgood. My 
response is not based on evidence, but rather based on hope. 
Consequently, while I want to believe that more good than 
harm has been done, I am ready to be persuaded by Hop-
good’s rebuttal. Unfortunately, Hopgood leaves the rhetorical 
question as an assertion, and I am not ready to substitute his 
hopeless characterisation for my benefit of the doubt. 
A sobering historical truth
As I am drafting this essay, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights have just delivered a scathing report on 
North Korea, portraying it as a modern-day Holocaust. 
Undoubtedly, Human Rights will use this report to their 
material advantage. Yet is that the only consequence of the 
report? Is it not possible that this publicity will help those 
dying in labour and prison camps? Might China, which 
Hopgood portrays as unimpressed with human rights, now 
lean on its client state to make things better in order to 
make China’s life a little easier? Where would those in the 
labour camps in North Korea be without the assistance of the 
Human Rights International? Do they think that they would 
be better off? Do human rights activists in China believe 
that their cause would be helped if Human Rights just went 
away? I agree with Hopgood that Human Rights seems to 
have developed some combination of autism and arrogance, 
but I think that the relationship with human rights is more 
complicated and mutually nourished than he suggests. 
Hopgood might concede the point that there are occasions 
when Human Rights is needed for human rights, but North 
Korea is an extreme case. Yet how atypical is it? Could 
Human Rights not serve other functions that help the 
cause of human rights? Isn’t Human Rights something of 
a ‘force multiplier’ for human rights movements? Does the 
chance of success for grassroots activists improve from 
the existence of international legal norms and presence of 
Western moralisers?
As I was wrestling with Hopgood’s case for the irrelevance 
of Human Rights to the lives of vulnerable populations, 
I was reminded of an essay by Richard Rorty (1994) on 
human rights. As Rorty describes it, we are consumed by 
overly romantic notions of people responsible for their own 
liberation. Yet a sobering historical truth is that a fair bit of 
moral progress depends on the privileged taking an interest 
in the lives of the underprivileged. ‘We want moral progress 
to burst up from below’, Rorty (1994: 130) observes, ‘rather 
than waiting patiently for condescension at the top.’
Yet progress depends on condescension, on bleeding heart 
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liberals, on the Bill Gates and Warren Buffets taking an 
interest in the health of those in the Third World, on relatively 
wealthy, educated people in the West such as George Soros 
and his Open Society Institute deciding that they are going 
to plough resources into the campaign to expand human 
rights. The argument certainly does not dismiss the role 
that the weak play in their own liberation, but it does 
suggest that those narratives of justice that focus on the 
downtrodden taking matters into their own hands do not give 
proper credit to the role played by the bourgeoisie. 
Commodified compassion
I can anticipate two objections by Hopgood to my counter 
(though there are others, to be sure). Perhaps the problem 
is not condescension, but rather what happens when 
compassion becomes commodified. If so, the question 
is whether organised compassion would exist as an 
effective instrument of change in today’s world were it not 
commodified? Could compassion be mobilised and made 
politically consequential without being commodified? 
The second objection is that it relegates moral progress 
to what the rich and famous choose to care about. If they 
decide that they care most about civil and political rights, 
then economic rights and social justice, which might 
matter more to local actors, will become ignored. The rich 
and powerful have the luxury of pursuing a moral progress 
that is convenient to them, that makes them feel good, and, 
crucially, probably does not force them to undertake action 
that harms their fundamental self-interest. George Soros 
can continue to try and bring about an open society around 
the world, but not worry that the casino capitalism that has 
fed his wealth will ever be the target of the human rights 
movement that he has helped to create. 
Hopgood’s subtle analysis of how capitalism and 
commodification has altered Human Rights is fascinating 
and compelling, yet, according to him, the problem with HR 
is not only its commodification but also its arrogance. The 
roots of its sense of superiority owe much to modernity. Part 
of the ideological basis of HR is a dogged belief in its own 
universality; indeed, its confidence (and hubris) depends 
on it. The moment it is forced to acknowledge that human 
rights is not just plural but perspective-dependent, then it 
loses much of the sense of self it needs – not only to help 
address the crisis of authority in modernity but also to 
remain committed to the cause. 
This leads to another of Hopgood’s devastating critiques 
of HR: it is genetically unable to see or operate in a world 
of human rights. Its blinders leads to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
view of the world. And, just as grievously, it leads HR 
to reduce human rights to a subordinate role. Human 
Rights is to human rights what Michael Jordan was to 
the 1980s Chicago Bulls. The obvious question, then, 
is whether it is possible for Human Rights to operate in 
any other way? Could Human Rights change its game to 
elevate the supporting cast? After all, Jordan did not start 
winning championships until he learned to share. Hopgood 
might respond by saying that Human Rights is incapable 
of change, or, if it did, it would have to accept a less 
categorical, less secular, and less universal world; to do so, 
though, would cause a massive crisis of identity.
American power
Is the United States really that awful? The moment of 
transformation from human rights to Human Rights 
occurred when the United States decided to get involved 
in the 1970s. This was the beginning of the end. Chapters 
five and six of Endtimes (Hopgood 2013a) on this phase 
of Human Rights chapters are immensely enjoyable, and 
I am largely persuaded of the effects of the United States 
on international human rights. Yet I am left with several 
nagging thoughts. Was the transition really this abrupt? 
Whenever scholars periodise they have to exaggerate the 
differences between ‘before’ and ‘after,’ and my question 
is whether the problem was American power or American 
power. If the latter applies, then there is no reason to 
exclude European powers from the discussion. Indeed, 
if Western human rights has always been dependent on 
Western power, then the Europeans probably deserve more 
credit than they get. Or, if the problem is American power, 
then I need a little more convincing that the effects of the 
Americans on the development of Human Rights would 
have been different if the Europeans had remained in 
charge. After all, the European human rights regime seems 
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to have many of the very same characteristics described by 
Hopgood of Human Rights. Capitalism, commodification, 
and modernity are not limited to the American soil – they 
are very much alive and well in Europe. 
If so, then perhaps the problem is not with the 
Americans but rather with the conjunction of modernity, 
rationalisation, and capitalism, which perhaps had its 
own particular constellation on American soil. That is, the 
problem is not personal, it is structural. Yet if it is about 
America, then what is it? Is it about America as a cultural 
artefact? Or is the problem that a United States that was 
most interested in maintaining its geopolitical supremacy 
chose to hijack human rights toward that end? Or, would 
Europe, the cradle of modern human rights, have acted any 
differently if it had the good fortune to be a superpower?
 
Will the world be a better place without (an American-
produced) Human Rights? Hopgood suggests that we are 
about to find out, and he hints that we will like what we see. 
There are two primary challenges to Human Rights at this 
moment. The first is a change in geopolitics, namely, the 
pivot to Asia. I agree with him that Asia, to my naïve eyes, 
does not seem to need Human Rights to answer any crisis 
of authority caused by modernity (though I could be wrong). 
Or, at least it is likely to answer that crisis in some other 
cosmopolitan register, perhaps a nationalism that treats 
itself as the centre of the universe (much like many other 
nationalisms).
The reinsertion of religion
The other is religion. Hopgood rightly argues that human 
rights became a substitute for religion in late 19th century 
Europe, and while many religious figures were important 
to the human rights movement, in the end human rights 
represented an alternative to religion as a basis of 
authority. The religious resurgence, then, might be a shot 
across the bow of Human Rights. Yet, what are we to make 
of the very prominent faith-based movements in the United 
States (and elsewhere) that utilise the language of human 
rights in their search to save souls and the world? How 
are we to make sense of the US’s International Religious 
Freedom Act and the growing prominence of religious 
freedom in the discourse of human rights?
Perhaps Hopgood might respond that the re-insertion of 
religion represents a fundamental change in the character 
of a secularised human rights, and he might be right. Yet, 
to what extent was this secularised human rights truly 
devoid of theological undertones? Secularisation did not 
cause the removal of religion, but rather changed the way 
religion functioned and operated in modernity. If one was to 
shine an infrared light to detect the religious discourse in 
the human rights architecture, it would become obvious to 
the naked eye. In any event, Human Rights is likely to suffer 
one humiliating blow after another. And this might be good 
news for the future of human rights.
The role of religion in human rights and Human Rights 
is more complicated than I think Hopgood allows, for 
another reason. When referring to the end of Human 
Rights, Hopgood asserts that ‘What people do not need 
is another universal church’. Yet an argument can be 
made that this is precisely what they need. Could the 
decline of religious authority in the 19th century have been 
replaced by something other than a secularised religion 
that had its own universalising dimensions? Many of the 
world’s religions have a universalising aspect. There were 
anti-universalistic ideologies that emerged as worthy 
successors, some quite nasty and lamentable, that 
appeared and then, thankfully, disappeared. Moreover, 
many Great Powers see themselves as representing 
civilizations. ‘Humanity’ can only exist in a cosmopolitan 
ethos and people have a metaphysical need to believe in 
something larger than themselves. 
Humanitarianism
Some sort of universalising discourse will replace Human 
Rights. Perhaps, as Hopgood suggests, it will be the 
language of social justice. It might not achieve Human 
Rights’ cause-célèbre status, and it might not be able 
to escape the effects of modernity and commodification, 
but there is likely to be some movement (or movements) 
that are attentive to human flourishing. Human Rights 
answered a need felt by humankind. Human Rights might 
go away, but the need won’t.
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Could humanitarianism be an adequate substitute? 
The Endtimes of Human Rights is clearly about human 
rights, but on occasion Hopgood refers to its relative 
of humanitarianism, the project to save the lives of 
distant strangers. At times he sees humanitarianism as 
susceptible to the same excesses as Human Rights, and 
at other times it seems to have some built-in immunities. 
Humanitarianism also has its upper-case characteristics, 
is commodified, is comprised of some very large Western 
non-governmental organisations that get most of their 
money from the United States and Europe, and often 
sees itself as expressing the best of humanity. Yet if 
humanitarianism has one characteristic that differentiates 
it from human rights, and difference that saves it from 
itself, it is that its sole ambition is to reduce the suffering 
of those in immediate risk and in times of urgency. Its 
ambitions are much more modest. To save a life does not 
require knowing what is the purpose or meaning of life. 
For some, it is the very modesty of humanitarianism that 
makes human rights such an attractive alternative – it 
allows us to act toward the dream of a better world. Yet this 
very ambition bordering on hubris is precisely why so many 
in the humanitarian community are wary of human rights. 
In its view, it is the very modesty of humanitarianism that 
makes it attractive, pluralistic and inclusive, and more 
resistant to the corruption and decay. For those in the 
humanitarian community, The Endtimes of Human Rights 
can be read as a huge warning sign.
What’s So Funny About Peace, Love and Human Rights?
24Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
25Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
Introduction
In his compelling, wide-ranging book The Endtimes of Human 
Rights, Stephen Hopgood develops a highly critical argument 
that seeks to account for the biased genesis, dysfunctional 
enforcement, and precarious future of what have become 
known as internationally recognised human rights. For 
Hopgood, human rights are a secular yet sacred set of 
claims that have been advanced for human beings by virtue 
of them being human. The metanarrative that underpins 
their evolution from the middle of the 19th century to their 
current manifestation in an increasingly complex array of 
international legal instruments is a product of European 
middle-class intellectuals that is akin to what Pierre 
Bourdieu has called ‘social magic’; the performative concept 
that captures the idea that certain ‘speech acts’ create 
significant political outcomes. 
Hopgood argues that the sacred metanarrative of human 
rights has been symbolised through great architectural 
temples in Geneva (Palais des Nations), New York (UN 
Headquarters), and in the future, The Hague (the planned 
home for the International Criminal Court). The metanarrative 
has also been developed in ways that has largely ignored 
grass roots and organic struggles against oppression 
leading to the gulf between what Hopgood (2013a: viii-ix) 
calls human rights (localised and self-styled struggles) and 
Human Rights (international sacred discourse). The elitist 
and sacred nature of Human Rights has its own set of codes 
and conventions, and has become a hermetic community 
that has little relevance for the everyday struggles for justice 
taking place at the local level (Hopgood 2013a: ix, 24-46).
Despite their sacred and self-evident nature, the 
mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights have been 
notoriously weak and over-reliant on the power and purpose 
of the United States, which has led to a human rights double 
standard (mixed application with wildly varying results) 
and marketisation (professionalisation of large and wealthy 
human rights NGOs). These twin attributes have undermined 
the very ideals of the human rights movement and created 
a patchwork application of universal standards. Moreover, 
and the subject of this essay, the rise of Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRICs) challenges US (and European) hegemony 
in the world in ways that have created what Hopgood calls a 
‘neo-Westphalian’ world, where the probability of successful 
protection of human rights is more limited than ever.
While some of the book resonates with my own experiences 
and understanding of human rights, I argue in this essay 
that the empirical analysis of human rights with which I 
am most familiar offers serious challenges to many of the 
arguments that Hopgood puts forth. The essay focuses on 
two main areas. First, I show that a new series of studies 
demonstrates a positive effect for the regime on rights 
developments when it is considered alongside other key 
explanatory factors (see Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; 
Landman 2005; Simmons 2009; Smith-Cannoy 2012; Risse, 
Ropp, & Sikkink 2013). Not only do these studies show the 
general impact of the regime on human rights, they also 
show that the regime contributes to the struggle for human 
rights by providing important legal standards, public 
discourses and political levers that help local groups realise 
their aims. Second, I argue that the rise of the BRICs and 
now the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) may 
challenge US and European hegemony and represent new 
nodes of power and influence that have a negative impact 
on human rights; however, in terms of market size and 
material capabilities, the only real contender in the world for 
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the medium term is China, while its patterns of economic 
development raise aspirations of its own population that 
puts pressure on the continuation of authoritarian rule.
Human Rights versus human rights
Hopgood argues that there is a large gap between the elite 
and socially constructed architecture of human rights at 
the international level (Human Rights) and the grassroots 
struggle against oppression that is taking place around 
the world (human rights). He argues further that not only is 
there this large gap, but that the regime itself has had very 
little impact on the protection of human rights. Empirical 
political science analysis, however, has made great strides 
in identifying the factors that account for the variation in 
the promotion and protection of human rights in ways that 
challenge both these claims. Large-N quantitative analysis 
has built increasingly complex cross-section and time-series 
data sets comprised of different measures of the de jure 
protection and de facto realisation of human rights, including 
coding the international human rights regime, counting 
violations of human rights, coding country performance, 
probing individual perceptions of and experiences 
with human rights, and amassing socio-economic and 
administrative statistics within assessment frameworks (see 
Jabine & Claude 1992; Landman & Carvalho 2009). Across 
these efforts at measurement and analysis, the international 
law of human rights developed since the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides a useful framework 
and ‘systematised’ definitions (Adcock & Collier 2001) of 
human rights that have been variously operationalised for 
empirical analysis (Landman & Carvalho 2009). 
This large-N analysis has revealed much about the country-
level conditions that are associated with the promotion 
and protection of human rights. Early models showed that 
democratic political institutions, high levels of economic 
development, and the absence of civil war are all associated 
with higher levels of protection of civil and political rights, 
and/or ‘physical integrity rights’ (see, e.g. Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). Subsequent studies 
have included new sets of explanatory variables such as 
trade, direct foreign investment, structural adjustment 
programmes, income and land inequality, and ethnic 
fractionalisation (see Abouharb & Cingranelli 2007; Landman 
& Larizza 2009). Studies that examine the international 
regime of human rights find mixed results (as Hopgood 
observes on page 104) with some that show a positive 
impact of the regime alongside other significant domestic 
and international variables (see Landman 2005b; Simmons 
2009; Smith-Cannoy 2012). These studies on the regime 
show that it does not have a wholly independent effect on 
human rights protection, but certainly contributes to the 
advance of human rights. Indeed, in her book Insincere 
Commitments, Smith-Cannoy (2012) shows that even in 
those states that ratified treaties as a form of ‘cheap talk’ 
to gain international credibility, provisions for individual 
complaints provided political levers for domestic struggles 
for human rights among transitional countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.1
The statistical analysis on truth and justice shows strong 
support for what Kathryn Sikkink describes in (2011) ‘Jus-
tice Cascade’, which analyses the impact of different types 
and combinations of domestic mechanisms such as truth 
commissions, trials, and other bodies for redressing ‘past 
wrongs’. More than 100 countries have embraced legal and 
quasi-legal processes to address past wrongs, including 
large-scale human rights violations and crimes against 
humanity committed during periods of civil war, authoritarian 
rule, and foreign occupation (see Hayner 1994; 2002; Olsen, 
Payne & Reiter 2010; Sikkink 2011). Popular processes in-
clude trials, amnesties, truth commissions, commissions of 
inquiry, reconciliation forums, human rights commissions, 
and ‘lustration’ processes which seek to provide a public ac-
counting of what has happened, who is responsible, who the 
main victims of the crimes against humanity are (or were), 
and what should be done about the truth that is discovered. 
1  In addition, new research on participation in UniversalPeriodic Review (UPR) shows that countries that are wealthy,have high levels of human development, and high rates of
human rights treaty ratification make significantly morerecommendations under the system. See Elizalde, P. (2013)‘Human Rights Foreign Policy: Explaining states behaviourunder the UPR’, unpublished Master’s Dissertation, MA in theTheory and Practice of Human Rights, Human Rights Centre,University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO43SQ. Available upon request. 
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Between 1970 and 2007, there have been 848 of these diffe-
rent processes, where the most popular have been amnesties 
(424 or 50% of the total),2 followed by trials (267 or 32% of 
the total), truth commissions (68 or 8% of the total), lustrati-
on policies (54 or 6% of the total) and reparations (35 or 4% 
of the total) (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010: 39). Between 1979 
and 2009, there have been more than 425 cumulative years 
of prosecution for human rights violations (Sikkink 2011: 21). 
The use of trials has increased dramatically over this period, 
while the use of truth commissions has declined dramatically 
since 2000 (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010: 100). Large-scale 
comparative analysis of these different mechanisms has 
shown statistically significant and positive benefits for the 
presence of particular truth and justice mechanisms. For 
example, for Latin America between 1976 and 2004, Sikkink 
(2011: 150-153) shows that the average level of human 
rights violations was much lower for countries that engaged 
in a long-term process of prosecutions for past crimes. 
For a global sample, she finds that while the average level of 
human rights violations has decreased slightly between the 
1980s and 2005, the levels of violations were higher than the 
global average for countries that did not have prosecutions 
and lower than the global average for countries that did 
have prosecutions (Sikkink 2011: 183-188, 273-277). These 
results were obtained for a measure of truth commission 
experience and the cumulative total of prosecution years 
over the period of her analysis. In similar fashion, Olsen, 
Payne and Reiter (2010: 131-151) find that the adoption and 
implementation of truth and justice mechanisms in general 
have positive and statistically significant effects on both 
democracy and human rights, where levels of each are higher 
for countries that have undergone various combinations of 
truth and justice mechanisms.
Small-N comparative and single country studies have also 
demonstrated the value of the international human rights 
2 Amnesties here are defined as ‘official state declarationsthat individuals or groups accused or convicted of committinghuman rights violations will not be prosecuted or furtherprosecuted or will be pardoned for their crimes and releasedfrom prison (Olsen, Payne & Reiter 2010: 36)’.
regime in providing a framework in which transnational 
advocacy networks operate. In these accounts, thwarted 
attempts to contest human rights conditions at the 
domestic level are escalated to the transnational level, 
where assistance from international NGOs is coupled with 
the international regime and powerful states to bring about 
domestic change from reluctant state actors (see Risse, Ropp 
& Sikkink 1999; Risse & Ropp 2013). Hawkins (2002) shows 
that the interaction between domestic mobilisation and 
international condemnation of human rights practices during 
the Pinochet regime drove a wedge between different factions 
within the regime in ways that contributed to the transition to 
democracy; findings which can be extended to explain change 
in South Africa and the absence of change in Cuba.
Across these examples, the international human rights 
regime sets out a framework for analysis in which human 
rights are systematically delineated, country performance 
is assessed, and the ‘transmission belt’ of change is 
analysed. Results across these studies show support for 
the positive impact of international human rights, ceteris 
paribus. In this way, the gap between Human Rights and 
human rights in Hopgood’s terms may not be as wide as 
he suggests. Rather, the law and language of rights is 
available to scholars, practitioners, and activists in a way 
that can be used to analyse country conditions and galvanise 
popular mobilisation for better human rights protection. In 
the absence of the emerging consensus around the law and 
language of human rights, local struggles are still possible 
but may not have had the kind of international linkages that 
have been able to contribute to many of the successes that 
have been observed. I am perfectly happy to concede that 
the notion of success is highly variable, incremental and 
subject to reversal, but jettisoning the whole idea of human 
rights in the face of setbacks does not appear a sensible 
strategy in the face of current global challenges. Rather, 
it makes more sense to harness what we now know about 
the advance of human rights, continue to research ongoing 
challenges around that advance, and continue the empirical 
and normative ‘conversation’ across local, national and 
international levels.
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BRICs, MINTs and the Neo-Westphalian 
Order
Another central plank of Hopgood’s thesis in Endtimes con-
cerns the relative decline of US and European global power, 
which limits liberal internationalism generally and undermi-
nes the promotion and protection of human rights in particu-
lar. For Hopgood (2013a: 166-182), the world is experiencing 
a shift away from American and European hegemony to one 
of multi-polarity in which newly emerging powers such as 
the BRICs are now in a position to challenge that hegemony. 
At least two BRICs (Russia and China) are less committed 
to human rights in theory and practice, while two (Brazil and 
India) are committed to human rights in theory, but certainly 
have significant difficulties in realising them in practice. The 
new multi-polar world for Hopgood is a ‘neo-Westphalian’ one, 
with multiple sources of authority and global discourse, where 
human rights compete alongside other claims about how to 
organise society and promote human well-being. In addition to 
the BRICs, the MINTs could extend this argument even further 
given their economic ascendency in the world and their poten-
tial to challenge traditional hegemonic powers. 
My own take on this argument starts with what is meant by 
the ‘Westphalian’ system. There are three main and contested 
understandings of this system. The first is that the Treaty 
of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and established 
a system of independent states that possessed sovereignty 
over their own domestic and international affairs, or ‘terri-
toriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
authority structures’ (Krasner 1999: 20). This is the classic 
understanding developed throughout the 20th century and 
has become the foundation for international relations theory. 
Realists and neo-realists see the Westphalian system as the 
basic building block of theory and assume that sovereign 
nations are motivated by the pursuit or maintenance of their 
own power. Idealists also accept this understanding of the 
Westphalian system, but argue that it has become eroded 
through the successful construction of global norms that 
both challenge the realist assumptions and transcend the 
interests of individual sovereign states. For example, Zacher 
names his article ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian 
Temple’, which illustrates this notion of undermining the 
sovereign state system, and which has been used as a refe-
rence point for the discussion and analysis of international 
regimes, including the international human rights regime.
The second understanding is that states have always allowed 
their sovereignty to be compromised, where the desire to stay 
in power may lead to the decision to participate in arrange-
ments or activities that many would see as antithetical to 
any notion of state sovereignty. In his book, Sovereignty: 
Organised Hypocrisy, Stephen Krasner (1999) shows how the 
twin logics of ‘expected consequences’ and ‘appropriateness’ 
(see March & Olsen 1989) explain what may be perceived 
as contradictory state behaviour across such topic areas 
as human rights, slavery, minority rights, and the political 
economy of lending. In following this logic, Moravcsik (2000) 
explains the birth of the European system for the promotion 
and protection of human rights not as some challenge to 
state interest, but as a function of the needs of ‘new’ post-
war democracies to ‘lock in’ future generations to a suprana-
tional legal framework as a means to protect their nascent 
democratic institutions from authoritarian temptation.
The final understanding of the Westphalian system argues 
that it is actually a myth (Osiander 2001). In this view, the 
Thirty Years War was not due to the Hapsburgs wanting to 
expand their empire, but other powers (Denmark, Sweden 
and France) seeking to diminish it, while the threat to the 
independence of other actors from the Hapsburgs simply 
does not bear up to historical scrutiny (Osiander 2001: 260). 
There has been undue and incorrect attention from the 
international relations community about the true nature of 
the war and its settlement through the Treaty of Westphalia. 
Many international relations scholars and Hopgood 
(2013a:260) see the peace of Westphalia as being concerned 
with the issue of sovereignty, the need to ‘reorder’ the 
European system, and to formulate new rules. In labelling 
the emerging world system as ‘neo-Westphalian’, however, 
Hopgood is making a claim that the main features typical 
of this classic understanding of the Westphalian system 
are returning, but are also combined with features of 
the state system that have developed since the Treaty of 
Westphalia. His account of the successful ‘social magic’ of 
the human rights movement rests on an assumption that 
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the middle class and European ‘construction’ of human rights 
have challenged the Westphalian system, but that now the 
emergence of new poles of power in the global system mean 
that the endtimes of human rights are upon us since there is 
no solid guarantor for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.
For me, the expansion of the international rights regime is 
remarkable given the state of the world directly after World War 
II. Bobbio (1996) observed that those involved in the drafting 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights could 
never have foreseen the growth in the depth and breadth of the 
international human rights regime. Hopgood is correct to say 
(après Krasner 1999) that many of the human rights successes 
in the 20th century are down to the support from powerful 
states. He is also correct to say that many of the failures and 
‘double standards’ (Reiff 1999) are down to the absence of 
support of these same powers. But there is a certain tension in 
his worry over the rise of neo-Westphalianism on the one hand 
and the grassroots struggle for human rights on the other. His 
account that there is an emerging set of new powers that may 
be less inclined to promote human rights stands in contrast to 
evidence of people struggling for human rights. 
Towards a Neo-Westphalian System? 
Trade, Aid and Material Capabilities
The key question then is to determine the degree to which 
there is a neo-Westphalian world and whether it matters 
for human rights. One way to examine his claim is to look 
at comparative data on the US, the European Union, BRIC 
and MINT countries to see the extent to which the US and EU 
have actually declined vis-à-vis these new powers. For these 
purposes I compare the size of the US and EU market for 
goods and services (itself an important lever for international 
compliance), the size of the ‘material capabilities’ of states (a 
measure of the coercive potential), and the value of overseas 
development assistance (another lever for international 
compliance). As we shall see, only China stands as a major 
contender in the global power game and which has the size 
and capacity to challenge the US and the EU.
Using WTO statistics for 2012, it is a simple matter to compare 
the global share of exports and imports across the US, the EU, 
the BRICs and the MINTs as a measure of market size. Figure 
1 shows these figures where it is clear that the EU and the US 
dominate global trade, while the BRICs run in third place, and 
the MINTs much further behind. The US and the EU combined 
make up 51.9% of global exports and 56.8% of all imports. 
Despite their dominance, however, the US and European export 
figures have declined from 11.2% and 43.5% in 1983 to 8.6% 
and 35.6% in 2013, respectively. China’s share of exports has 
risen from 1.2% in 1983 to 11.4% in 2013, while its imports 
Figure 1. Global share of exports and imports 2012Source: World Trade Organisation (2013) International Trade Statistics 2013.
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have grown from 1.1% to 10% over the same period.
Using data from the OECD and a recent study from the RAND 
Corporation, Figure 2 compares the time-series trends in 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from the US, Europe, 
G7, DAC EU Members, and EU institutions. The MINTs are not 
included in the figure as they still tend to be recipient countries. 
The figure clearly shows the dominance of the EU as the number 
one donor for the whole time period, and both the US and Europe 
have a series of conditionality clauses and mechanisms that 
require recipient countries to address the quality of democracy, 
good governance and human rights as part of the ODA 
relationship. The EU has increasingly mainstreamed democracy, 
good governance and human rights into its foreign aid policy 
across its many different instruments and institutions, even if 
they are not directly related to questions of governance. China 
is a recent actor in this policy area, with total disbursed monies 
estimated to be $1.7 billion in 2004 increasing to $20.352 billion 
in 2011. In contrast to the US and the EU, Chinese aid comes 
with ‘no strings attached’ and thus does not bind recipient states 
to improvement in democracy, good governance or human rights.
The third measurement worth examining is the Correlates of 
War project Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The 
CINC combines total population, urban population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military 
expenditure. The CINC is a classic realist measure of power 
expressed as total material capability for each country in the 
world. It sums all the observations on each of the components 
per year, converts each country’s absolute component to a share 
of the international system, and then averages across the six 
components. Figure 3 shows the average CINC for the US, the EU, 
the BRICs and the MINTs for the period from 2000 to 2007. It is 
very clear from the figure that the US and China are the world’s 
predominant powers in terms of raw material capability. China 
has over one billion people which, when combined with the other 
components of the CINC, means that it surpasses the US for this 
period. Other BRIC countries do not come near these two global 
powers, while the MINTs lag far behind. While China is large and 
powerful, its global distribution of military capability and real co-
ercive power is nowhere near that of the United States at present.
Figure 2. Total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), 2004-2011
Sources: OECD (2012) ‘Development aid: Net official development assistance (ODA)’, Development: Key Tables from 
OECD, No. 1; Wolf, Wang & Warner (2013) China’s Foreign Aid 
and Government Sponsored Investment Activities, RAND National Defense Institute.
United States
G7, total









2004    2005     2006    2007    2008    2009    2010   2011
Figure 3. Average Material Capabili-ties (CINC), 2000-2007Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, & John Stuckey (1972) ‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965’ In: Bruce Russett (ed) 
Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage: 19-48; National Material Capabilities 4.0. 
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The presence of such large and powerful states in the 
global system, however, does have implications for human 
rights. Preliminary spatial econometric analysis of human 
rights using a pooled-cross section time series data set and 
‘gravity’ modelling shows that countries located in close 
proximity to large ‘rights-protective’ countries (Donnelly 
1999) have a higher probability of improving their rights 
protection, while those that are in close proximity to large 
rights-violating countries have a much lower probability 
of improving their rights protection (Landman, Antonio-
Cravo, Edwards & Kernohan 2011). Such analysis captures 
the idea of international ‘diffusion’ with respect to human 
rights and demonstrates important ‘neighbourhood’ effects. 
Countries in the neighbourhood of the US and EU are more 
likely to be better at protecting human rights, while those 
in the neighbourhood of China are not (South Korea, Taiwan 
and Mongolia are notable exceptions). 
Taken together, the measures for markets, foreign aid, 
and material capabilities combined with the contested 
understanding of the Westphalian system suggest that 
perhaps Hopgood has overdrawn his case for the emergence 
of a neo-Westphalian world. Even if such a neo-Westphalian 
world does exist, it is not clear that the rise of human 
rights is all that surprising, nor does it appear that any 
new world order significantly threatens the predominance 
of the US and the EU as global actors across the different 
measures presented here. In terms of a rising market 
share and material capabilities, China is the key contender 
for world hegemony. The US has had a mixed and often 
contradictory approach to human rights, and President 
Obama’s recent decision to continue security assistance and 
reduce democracy assistance to the Middle East is certainly 
problematic. Research from the Pew Foundation shows that 
across 39 countries in six regions, the US continues to be 
thought of as the leading global power and a defender of 
human rights at home and abroad, while China is perceived 
as an emerging power that may one day supersede the 
US even though it is perceived to have less respect for 
the human rights of its own citizens (Pew 2013). The EU 
continues to be more of a ‘civil power’ and has at its disposal 
a number of instruments to continue to support democracy, 
good governance and human rights. Its own policy of 
enlargement has brought peace, stability, and increased 
respect for human rights in the region, while it remains the 
world’s largest donor, with significant influence over the 
governments of recipient countries.
 
Summary
This essay has sought to address some of the major 
arguments in Endtimes. While I do not disagree with all 
of the arguments found in the book, I have assessed the 
strength of two of them – the gap between Human Rights 
and human rights and the rise of the neo-Westphalian 
system – in light of my own experiences and the extant 
literature on the empirical analysis of human rights. I 
have argued that Human Rights are not irrelevant to those 
individuals and groups struggling against oppression 
throughout the world. Rather, they provide a language, lever 
and entry point to internationalise their struggle in ways that 
would not be possible in the absence of Human Rights. The 
general impact of the regime is beginning to receive strong 
empirical support, while more in-depth studies show that 
the power of human rights can transcend the gulf between 
the international community and national and sub-national 
struggles for human rights. I have also argued that while 
the world has changed significantly, the notion of neo-
Westphalianism is problematic since of the new emerging 
powers Hopgood cites, China is the only real contender 
against US and European strength, making the world more 
bi-polar than multi-polar. While such a bi-polar world may 
have a deleterious impact on human rights in those countries 
of the world within China’s sphere of influence, such a 
bi-polar view of the world ignores the possibility for reform 
within China. I thus continue to be a cautious optimist about 
the future for human rights, where the struggle for human 
dignity, framed in the language of human rights continues to 
offer significant hope to individuals around the world.
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It is good for any human rights organisation to be criticised. 
In human rights work, as in life more generally, the failure 
to ask tough questions can be deadly. Complacency is an 
ever-present danger. Basking in the historic respect for an 
organisation’s reputation, and failing to address the tough 
questions about how best to achieve change in a changing 
world, is a recipe for disaster. 
Many of the questions which Stephen Hopgood raises in 
his recent book, The Endtimes of Human Rights, and in the 
related essay in this volume are important. Those questions 
partly boil down to this: what relevance do the global 
human rights organisations and human rights institutions 
have today, where the geopolitics and nature of civil society 
are changing so much around us?
Hopgood implies that the whole edifice is close to pointless. 
In his words: ‘How different would the world really look 
without the multibillion-dollar humanitarian, human rights, 
and international justice regimes?’ When the question 
is put as bluntly as that, it is difficult – if one works in 
the field of human rights, and if one is thus part of what 
Hopgood calls ‘the Human Rights Regime’ - to respond 
without sounding prickly and defensive. It is tempting to 
return to the old Monty Python sketch from 1979, which 
asked: ‘What have the Romans ever done for us?’ The 
rhetorical question, it turned out, had too many answers. 
‘Ummm… Aqueducts?… sanitation?…. education….?’ 
And as the list continues, the increasingly irascible John 
Cleese eventually explodes: ’Yes, but what have the Romans 
done for us… apart from all those things….?’.
For all the faults of the human rights organisations and 
human rights architecture of the world – and for all the 
bad news which surrounds us today, from Central African 
Republic to Syria and beyond – it is difficult to accept 
Hopgood’s bleak analysis that we are on an inevitably 
downward trend for the understanding and observing of 
human rights worldwide, and for a shared understanding of 
why that matters.
Thus, to take head-on Hopgood’s ‘What has the 
Human Rights Regime ever done for us?’ question: the 
International Criminal Court can bring genocidal killers to 
justice from anywhere in the world. A range of previously 
unthinkable arms treaties exists, including a global arms 
trade treaty which makes it illegal for state parties to sell 
weapons where they may be used to commit atrocities. 
Thousands of prisoners of conscience have been released. 
The death penalty, previously almost universally practised, 
is now used only by a diehard minority... And so it goes on. 
The arms trade treaty can be said to be ‘just a piece 
of paper’, but if governments thought the treaty would 
prove so meaningless, why all the fuss over the past two 
decades? Governments understand that a treaty like this 
can have teeth. Clearly, there is often a significant gap 
between ratification and implementation. But that does not 
make the ‘mere’ existence of a treaty worthless.
Hopgood responds, in effect: ‘Yes, but apart from all 
those things, what have the human rights organisations 
achieved?’ He seems to believe that the only ‘real’ progress 
is made by local activists on the ground, in a way that can 
sometimes sound distanced from the messy reality of life. 
In reality, the work of local grassroots activists is closely 
entwined with Amnesty International’s international high-
level advocacy work in New York, Geneva and around the 
Steve Crawshaw
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world. That can be still more the case, as the organisation’s 
global headquarters, the International Secretariat, 
significantly shifts its centre of gravity to the Global South 
in the next few years. 
Even where Hopgood acknowledges past achievements 
by those he describes as the Human Rights Regime, he 
seems reluctant to imagine that such achievements can be 
replicated in the future. 
Opportunities of a ‘Neo-Westphalian’ 
World for human rights
Thus, the final chapter of Hopgood’s book is entitled ‘The 
Neo-Westphalian World’. Hopgood (2013a: 166) describes 
how that world might look: ‘A world of renewed sovereignty, 
resurgent religion, globalized markets, and the stagnation 
or rollback of universal norms about rights.’
For the purposes of this discussion, we can leave to one 
side the arcane arguments about whether the Peace of 
Westphalia was in fact ever Westphalian in the way that 
word is now understood. As Todd Landman points out in his 
essay in this volume, there are many interpretations of the 
word ‘Westphalian’. Many bear little relation to the terms 
and wording of the original Peace of Westphalia in 1648. But 
the word is now widely used, with a clear meaning regarding 
sovereignty, and we may in this essay for simplicity follow 
Stephen Krasner (1999: 20), who uses this terminology 
because ‘the Westphalian model has so much entered into 
common usage, even if it is historically inaccurate.’
Certainly, it is true that we are seeing significant pushback 
on the spread of human rights and its more global 
acceptance. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War in the early 1990s, there was – briefly - an easier 
global consensus than we see today. The most significant 
pushback comes from Russia and China – who, to be fair, 
have never exactly been proponents of a more robust stance 
by the Security Council or other global bodies on human 
rights issues, except when scoring points against others. 
In addition to the old issue of Russia’s and China’s poor 
track record, the growing influence of emerging powers 
– BRICS, MINTs, or any other of a clutch of new acronyms – 
means a significant shift of power, which often goes hand-
in-hand with a reluctance to use the language of human 
rights. 
But none of this means that human rights is no longer 
relevant, nor that human rights progress is less achievable 
– in some ways, perhaps, the contrary is true. The growth 
of the BRICS and the MINTs can be seen as an opportunity 
as much as it is a challenge. India’s change of tack on Sri 
Lanka, as described below, is just one example of what can 
happen when civil society is mobilised. 
On a range of issues across the Global South – on the 
International Criminal Court, for example, in Africa and 
elsewhere - the voices of civil society must be much 
more loudly heard. The 54-member African Union (though 
sometimes in denial of this point) can influence the 
geopolitics of the world significantly, not least because 
none of the permanent members of the Security Council 
– including the seemingly all-powerful China and Russia – 
wants to have a face-off with African member states. 
The world bullies thus rely on the silence of governments in 
the south. With stronger voices for human rights in Africa 
and elsewhere (Amnesty International is opening four 
new regional and national offices in sub-Saharan Africa 
alone in 2014), powerful governments like South Africa 
and Nigeria should be persuadable to raise their voice for 
human rights in a way that they have done too rarely in the 
past, apart from during the brief Mandela era. 
As for the West’s supposed lost power to change human 
rights for the better: we are sometimes in danger of 
forgetting that there was no golden age when Western 
powers behaved in accordance with human rights norms, 
while others violated them. Still less was there a time 
when those powers regularly waved a magic wand in order 
to prevent mass atrocities. Even after the end of the Cold 
War – a time of complete deadlock on human rights issues, 
with each side supporting its own Bad Guys – the 1990s 
included historic failures in terms of reacting to human 
rights crises, including the Rwandan genocide and the 
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nightmarish war in Bosnia. On both occasions, the world 
looked away until it was much too late. 
Nor was it just a matter of failing to respond sufficiently. 
Complicity or worse in serious human rights violations has 
been common. In Latin America, the United States backed 
military regimes which tortured and disappeared its oppo-
nents, including by dropping them from helicopters into the 
ocean. Margaret Thatcher was proud to describe the Chilean 
military leader, Augusto Pinochet, as a ‘staunch, true friend.’ 
France welcomed Rwanda’s rulers to the Elysee Palace during 
the genocide (Wallis 2014) and the British ambassador to the 
UN complained to the Czech ambassador that the Security 
Council would be a ‘laughing stock’ if it condemned the mass 
killings in Rwanda as genocide (Smith 2010: 155). In more 
recent years, the list of countries where serious human rights 
violations take place while Western powers stay silent or even 
offer praise remains long. If Western powers were ready to 
criticise rulers in the Middle East and North Africa region wit-
hout taking account of geopolitics, alliances or resources – in 
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, to take four obvious 
examples – it would have significantly dented the sense of 
human rights impunity, with important implications for the 
stability of the region. 
Human rights’ progress 
We have, however, seen significant progress over the 
decades in understanding that rights do matter. Rights are 
indeed universal, as LGBTI defenders in Uganda and across 
Africa are clearly asserting now, even at risk of their lives, 
in a way that would have seemed unthinkable some years 
ago. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu pointed out, staying 
quiet on what is happening to others is not as ‘neutral’ as 
it may sound. ‘If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a 
mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not 
appreciate your neutrality.’
A few decades ago, Pol Pot in Cambodia or Idi Amin in 
Uganda could commit mass atrocities in the certain 
knowledge that they would never face accountability for 
their crimes. When I interviewed the Serb leader, Slobodan 
Milosevic, in 1992, he was equally certain that he would 
never land in the dock for the crimes committed in Bosnia 
and elsewhere. He looked more baffled than angry, when I 
suggested to him that he might one day do so. 
In the intervening years, things have changed beyond all 
recognition. The International Criminal Court has many 
failings. But it has ended the notion that even the worst 
crimes committed in another country must somehow 
remain beyond the reach of, and of little interest to, the rest 
of the world. 
Hopgood talks of the International Criminal Court as ‘an 
elaborate form of organized hypocrisy’. He rightly criticises 
the fact that the permanent members of the Security 
Council have refused to make some key referrals to the 
Court, as with Syria. But that does not make the court 
itself redundant. Nor is the court in the pocket of powerful 
governments, despite Hopgood’s attempts to suggest 
differently. Indeed, the United States so loathed (and feared) 
the Court that US Congress passed a blustering bill which 
came to be known as the Hague invasion clause; George W. 
Bush’s ambassador John Bolton said the day when the US 
unsigned the treaty was his ‘proudest moment’ (Gwertzman 
2008). Even now, the US has not ratified the Rome Statute 
and is thus not a member of the Court.
Hopgood appears to have bought into the narrative of 
some African government leaders (including, most notably, 
abusive ones) that the International Criminal Court is 
‘anti-African’ because all of the cases so far have come 
from Africa. Hopgood talks of the Court’s alleged ‘imperial 
vision’. But it seems odd to blame the Court itself – 
whose respected chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is 
herself Gambian – for the failures of the Security Council, 
mentioned above. The African cases so far have in any case 
mostly been self-referred. More broadly, the obvious failure 
to make the Court sufficiently global is a challenge that 
must be faced by all governments, to put the International 
back into the ICC, more than is the case today. 
We have already begun to see how the increased power 
of human rights advocacy in the Global South can create 
unexpected change, suggesting that failures are not 
necessarily as absolute or permanent as Hopgood suggests. 
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Hopgood is rightly scathing on the UN’s ‘shocking failure’ 
on Sri Lanka, where tens of thousands of civilians were 
killed during the last phase of the conflict in 2009, in what 
a UN report (Panel of Experts 2011: 4) later described as ‘a 
grave assault on the entire regime of international law’.
But some of the institutions which Hopgood seems to so 
mistrust – including human rights NGOs and the UN itself 
- have in the meantime ensured that the human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka are not completely put to one side. 
On the contrary, they are discussed much more than ever 
before. The Human Rights Council voted in March 2014 by a 
substantial majority for a resolution which demands greater 
accountability than ever before, including the need for an 
international inquiry, which NGOs have been campaigning 
for. Only five years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict, Sri Lanka seemed to have gained a free pass. In 
2014, however, the vote, by 23 to 12, was overwhelmingly in 
favour of accountability (China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
were among those who voted against; now, there’s a 
surprise.). There is no reason why a change like that should 
not be replicated. 
No future victories can ever be guaranteed. Each victory 
takes planning and hard graft. But Hopgood’s all-
embracing pessimism sometimes seems to rely on a kind 
of circular argument to make his points. Thus, he declares 
(2013a: 177), as though it were a self-evident truth 
needing no supporting evidence: ‘That there is genuine 
global solidarity is a conceit of human rights advocates 
in Geneva, New York, and London. A political and moral 
economy keeps the global and the local irrevocably apart.’ 
Human rights activists around the world, from Sri Lanka to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, would beg to differ. In rea-
lity, that solidarity is the glue that makes much else possible. 
Amnesty adjusting to the new world
Hopgood draws a contrast between capitalised Human Rights 
and lower-case human rights. Broadly: he is full of contempt 
for the former, and full of praise for the latter. But this can 
be a somewhat artificial distinction, especially when that is 
combined with a binary north-south separation. 
First, on the capitalised vs lower-case division of Human 
Rights vs human rights types. For Hopgood the capitalised 
Human Rights types – presumably including myself and my 
colleagues at Amnesty International, as well as for example 
those who work for the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, a particular bugbear of Hopgood’s - are 
cut off from the ‘locally lived realities’ of lower-case human 
rights. And yet, my understanding of ‘locally lived realities’ 
includes the fact that colleagues around the world (including 
from many working for the organisations which Hopgood so 
mistrusts) spend their lives working closely with local human 
rights activists and highlighting violations on the ground, 
everywhere from Somalia to Syria and Mali to Myanmar. They 
risk their lives to do so, because they care. H or h?
Hopgood rightly notes that human rights organisations 
and institutions should be more genuinely global. That 
point is widely acknowledged; indeed, it is the starting 
point for many conversations about human rights today. 
Hopgood (2013a: 22) is on shakier ground when it comes to 
offering new solutions. His suggestions include a ‘syncretic, 
ground-up process of mobilization’ which would lead 
towards ‘genuinely transnational social communities.’ He 
also ‘rejects the reality of universalism in favor of a less 
predictable encounter with the diverse realities of today’s 
multipolar world.’ 
And yet, adapting to the ‘diverse realities of today’s 
multipolar world’ is exactly what many of the organisations 
he criticises are already doing. Much of Amnesty’s 
work is already in broad coalitions with others, and the 
organisation’s tone of voice will no doubt change again 
through some of the changes described above. But none 
of that means an abandonment of the basic word that 
underlies everything else. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is called ‘universal’ for a good reason. 
Amnesty International’s work is clearly grounded both in the 
Universal Declaration and the framework of international 
human rights and international humanitarian law, also 
including, especially in recent years, a strong body of work 
on economic and social rights. The organisation’s principles 
are clear – but so, too, is the ability to ensure compromise 
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with other stakeholders. As anyone who has ever worked 
in an NGO quickly comes to appreciate, the ability to 
compromise is key. Every group in a given coalition always 
has slightly different aims. Reaching a consensus can be 
exhausting and rewarding in more or less equal measure. 
Being able to collaborate lies at the heart of the work. 
The world’s two largest human rights organisations, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch – both in 
Hopgood’s sights – have in their different ways sought to 
strengthen their presence and voice in the Global South, 
and continue to do so. Amnesty International, with millions 
of members around the world, has embarked on a historic 
shift, which has been discussed within the movement for 
many years and is finally taking place now. A series of new 
regional offices is opening up in Africa and Asia in 2014, 
with more to come, including in Latin America and the 
Middle East, in the next few years. Amnesty International is 
also opening up new national offices in, for example, India, 
Brazil, and Nigeria. Together, these changes look set to 
significantly shift the balance of the organisation from its 
current global headquarters at the International Secretariat 
in London to a more geographically balanced spread. In 
1961 it was reasonable that the organisation could be 
created in London and then spread across cities especially 
in North America and Western Europe. In 2014, we live in a 
very different world.
Already, that global expansion has begun to have an impact 
on the organisation’s work, and on human rights advocacy 
more generally – with more than a million people signing 
up for an Amnesty India petition to ensure a more robust 
response on Sri Lanka, for example. As described above, India 
has partly shifted its position at the Human Rights Council 
on Sri Lanka, and those pressures from the grassroots are 
generally agreed to be part of the mix. The Brazil office, 
working closely with domestic human rights organisations 
like Conectas (H or h? – in reality, both) has seen similar 
engagement on human rights issues – in a way that has 
obvious implications for ensuring that human rights can be 
part of the global discourse as we move forward. 
Some fear that increased global footprint of the global 
human rights organisations can itself become a danger, 
sucking the life out of local activism. Thus, in the words of 
Vijay Nagaraj (2013), writing for the Global Rights series 
on openDemocracy: ‘Why should one not see this as a new 
wave of occupation, with global human rights in its search 
for greater influence, power, and money, trying to plant its 
flags, franchises and not to mention fund-raisers, all over?’ 
The question is valid enough, and important to ask. But 
the reality is that this kind of trampling of the ground 
would be lose-lose for the cause of human rights. Amnesty 
International can only work if it is able to work in coalition 
with others. That will now be more important than ever. If 
Amnesty International’s arrival does not increase the overall 
human rights space, it will have failed in a significant way. 
In his musings on the growth of the ‘neo-Westphalian 
world’, Hopgood (2013a: 253) talks about ‘resurgent 
religion’ and ‘the last days of secular religiosity’ as one 
reason why his ‘Human Rights Imperium’ is doomed. 
But there is nothing new about the challenges posed by 
some extreme elements of religion. And, in parallel to 
that, religious leaders and communities have provided a 
courageous bedrock for human rights in countless contexts 
over the years. Religious groups and leaders can be key 
partners in confronting discrimination and other violations 
or, for example, on achieving the momentum for an arms 
trade treaty. 
Endtimes aren’t endtimes till it’s over
The challenges that Hopgood identifies are many, and 
real. But most of them are not fundamentally new. 
Peter Benenson, founder of Amnesty International, was 
told when he first came up with the idea of using mass 
pressure to force intransigent regimes to release prisoners 
of conscience (a phrase that Benenson himself created) 
that this was ‘one of the larger lunacies of our time.’ 
In the meantime, that lunacy has achieved remarkable 
things. In Amnesty International’s most recent Letter 
Writing Marathon, an annual event which builds directly 
on Benenson’s legacy, more than two million actions were 
taken worldwide. As a direct result, prisoners of conscience 
in Cambodia and in Russia were released, just two of the 
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thousands of results that have been achieved over the 
years. Stories like this are repeated every day. 
Hopgood emphasises the supposed disconnect between 
the dull professionals and the courageous activists on 
the ground. But the connection between discussions in 
well-appointed conference rooms in Geneva or New York 
and human rights violations on the ground, between his 
much-derided human rights professionals and grassroots 
activists, need not be as tenuous as Hopgood suggests. 
Thus, for example, activists from some of the most perilous 
countries in the world risk harassment, arrest or even their 
lives to go to Geneva and bear witness, for example in advan-
ce of their country’s Universal Periodic Review at the Human 
Rights Council. They would hardly do so if they thought that 
this whole dry-as-dust procedure was meaningless. 
Nor is there anything new about that kind of merging of on-
the-ground activism in one part of the world and advocacy 
elsewhere. Take the approach of human rights activists in the 
Soviet bloc, 40 years ago. They took a dry inter-governmental 
process – the Helsinki Final Act, full of apparently empty 
verbiage – and made it their own. They were repeatedly jailed 
for doing so, in what many perceived as a fruitless struggle. 
Backed by an international human rights movement, they 
created the possibilities of extraordinary change, as the 
historic perspective made clear. 
In short: endtimes aren’t endtimes till it’s over.
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I first read about the work of Stephen Hopgood in Quito, 
Ecuador amidst public events marking the first anniversary 
of one of the most important decisions of the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights. In it, the Court condemned 
the Ecuadorian government for illegally authorising oil 
exploitation activities in the territory of the indigenous 
people of Sarayaku in the Amazon (IACHR 2012).
Midway through 2013, Hopgood was holding a virtual 
debate on openGlobalRights with Aryeh Neier, co-founder 
and former director of Human Rights Watch. The debate 
involved two radical and radically different views of the 
trajectory and future of human rights. Hopgood’s arguments 
foreshadowed those in his book The Endtimes of Human 
Rights. ‘Human Rights are a New York-Geneva-London-
centred ideology’ dominated by the elites that comprise 
‘1%’ of the movement, and led by the likes of Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch (Hopgood 2013b). 
Those Human Rights in upper-case letters (HR) were based 
on a world order that was disappearing before our very eyes 
– the unipolar world centred in Euro-America – along with 
its ideology and architecture. For Hopgood, this was good 
news because HR would be replaced by human rights in 
lower-case letters (hr), more decentralised and politicised, 
based more on local work and grassroots mobilisation than 
global legal strategies.
Neier’s equally forceful response jealously guarded the 
conventional boundaries of Human Rights. Within those 
boundaries, he sees only room for liberty rights (as opposed 
to socio-economic rights) and proposes a continued focus 
on ‘naming and shaming’ strategies, but now also directed 
at the emerging powers of the Global South (Neier 2013).
 
I remember feeling that what I was reading in the Hopgood-
Neier debate was very far removed from what I was seeing 
in Quito, even though I was on a classic human rights 
mission, advocating for compliance with a regional court’s 
ruling. As is typical of this type of endeavours, I was 
working in collaboration with an international coalition 
of NGOs and social movements, which includes the 
organisation I co-direct, the Center for Law, Justice and 
Society (Dejusticia), based in Bogota, Colombia.
In reality, the daily practice of human rights, in the Global 
South as well as in the North, is much more complicated 
and diverse than what Hopgood and Neier suggest. 
Although they are on opposite sides of the debate, they both 
have one thing in common: an all too simplistic view of the 
actors, the content and the strategies of the international 
human rights movement, as I argued in a blog post at the 
time (Rodríguez-Garavito 2013a).
Yet many of Hopgood’s criticisms resonated with my own 
experience as a human rights scholar-practitioner: the 
dominance of Northern states and NGOs, the hegemony 
of legal language and tools, the disproportionate role 
that those of us trained in law have in the movement, the 
nagging yet elusive question about the actual impact of 
human rights work. 
In Endtimes, Hopgood takes these and other critiques to 
the extreme, to the point of exaggerating and caricaturising 
the reality of HR. From an academic standpoint,             
this makes him a target of analytical and empirical 
objections. Frequently, the book leaves conceptual loose 
César Rodríguez-Garavito
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ends,1 abandons an argument halfway,2 and fails to 
offer sufficient empirical evidence to support sweeping 
generalisations.3
But the payoff of his argumentation strategy is that it is 
highly provocative. Like all caricatures, it has truth in it that 
is both destabilising and questioning. We should welcome 
this in the field of human rights, where we have erected 
walls that are so high that it has become difficult for us to 
be reflexive and self-critical. That is why, instead of reading 
Hopgood’s book literally and delving into the weaknesses of 
his arguments and data, in this article I am interested in 
exploring its destabilising and provoking potential. I choose 
this reading because my main interest is to take the critiques 
and difficulties of the practice of human rights he presents 
seriously in order to make such a practice more efficacious 
and egalitarian. Efficacious so that it is able to tangibly 
change the living conditions of victims of civil, social, 
economic, cultural and environmental rights violations. 
Egalitarian in terms of its inclusiveness and the participatory 
nature of the processes, so they reduce the asymmetries 
(between North and South, between genders, between 
professional NGOs and grassroots communities, etc.) that 
mark the human rights movement.4
Based on this perspective, I have organised the rest of the 
article into two sections. In the first, I discuss what I see 
as the strengths and the limitations of Endtimes. As for the 
strengths, I single out five convincing critiques of HR, and 
elaborate on their importance for an improved practice of 
human rights. 
As for the weaknesses, I argue that the book has much to 
say about HR, but very little to say about hr. I posit that this 
asymmetry stems from the fact that Endtimes’s critique is 
confined to the experiential and epistemological limits of 
HR. In practical terms, it is based on the experience of its 
author at Amnesty international and generally in the ‘New 
York-Geneva-London’ axis he singles out for criticism. In 
academic terms, its point of reference and bibliography is 
almost exclusively Euro-American scholarship. As Hopgood 
surely will have no problem admitting (although he does not 
do so in his book), it is a critique from the inside of HR. This 
makes it especially effective and useful as a deconstructive 
tool, but it leaves unfinished the reconstructive task. 
Indeed, the book barely touches upon hr, which remains the 
amorphous nemesis of HR. 
Since it largely misses hr, it also tends to miss the 
many connections, overlaps and collaborations between 
the worlds of HR and hr. I provide evidence of these 
intermediate zones based on the practice of human rights 
on multiple topics to compensate for the disproportionate 
focus in Endtimes on international criminal justice.
In the second section, I seek to contribute to the reconstructive 
task Endtimes leaves open. To this end, I expand the geo-
graphic and bibliographic horizon to include emerging ideas 
and practices on human rights in the Global South, as well as 
collaboration models that bridge South and North, local and 
global, elite and grassroots, in sum, HR and hr. Based on this 
broader view, I argue that instead of the monocultures posited 
by each extreme – the hegemony of Hopgood’s hr or that of 
Neier’s HR – we are headed toward an ecosystem of human 
rights: a field with actors, strategies and frameworks that are 
much more varied, and, perhaps much more efficacious and 
egalitarian than those that have characterised the theory and 
practice of human rights until now. 
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The Critique of Human Rights: 
Potential and Limitations 
As noted, the strength of Endtimes is its critiques of the 
HR status quo. I highlight five that I found particularly 
thought-provoking because they point to serious problems 
that lessen the efficacy of human rights causes. 
Five problems with Human Rights
First, HR as a discourse and as a movement tends to be 
vertical and rigid. Perhaps the best example is the one 
Hopgood focuses on: international criminal justice. Those 
of us who practice human rights in societies that are trying 
to overcome long periods of armed conflict, like Colombia, 
experience the well-known tension between the dictates of 
international criminal law on the one hand, and the need 
for political negotiations to be able to transition to peace on 
the other. While we collaborate with global NGOs on this and 
many other issues, we note with surprise the inflexibility of 
some of their positions with regards to transitional justice, 
stemming from a seemingly unconditional prioritisation 
of criminal justice. And the International Criminal Court, 
with its preliminary investigations into transitional justice 
processes like those in Colombia, tends to harden even more 
the message of HR. This is detrimental in contexts where 
peace negotiations with actors like the FARC (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) requires greater flexibility and an 
appreciation of national issues, without implying impunity 
for crimes against humanity (Uprimny et al. 2014). Yet 
the rigid interpretation of international justice that some 
global organisations espouse (as do, as we will see, some 
national organisations) leaves little room for alternatives 
– for instance, reduced prison sentences and restorative 
justice – and instead, tend to present their interpretation 
as the definitive content of international criminal and 
humanitarian law. 
A second accurate critique of Endtimes pertains the 
over-legalisation of HR. This relates not only to the 
emphasis on constructing international legal standards 
that characterise HR, but also to the disproportionate 
role given to lawyers in the movement. Although the 
international legal framework for human rights is a historic 
achievement, the over-legalisation of the field has had two 
counterproductive effects. First, as Amartya Sen (2006) 
has argued, viewing human rights claims exclusively 
through the lenses of legal standards may reduce their 
social efficacy, as their greatest power lies in the moral 
vision they embody regardless of whether it has been 
translated into hard legal rules. Second, technical legal 
knowledge is an entrance barrier to the field that alienates 
grassroots activists and other professionals (from experts 
in information technology to natural scientists and artists) 
that make invaluable contributions to the HR cause. This 
is particularly worrisome when it comes to fundamentally 
important topics like climate change, which profoundly 
affect human rights, but cannot be understood or 
transformed without the participation of professionals from 
other fields. It may also alienate key new constituencies 
like citizen e-activists, who are already using human rights 
frameworks but feel distant from the technical language 
and tools of the traditional movement.
Over time, the closed nature and legal specialisation of 
HR has led to another difficulty identified in Endtimes: the 
tendency to adopt the defence of legal HR frameworks as 
an end in itself, instead of as a means to improving the 
living conditions of those who suffer violations of their 
rights. The current international debate about business 
and human rights is a clear example of this. As those of us 
who have participated in regional and global consultations 
convened by the UN Working Group (WG) (in charge of 
implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human rights) have seen, this is a highly polarised debate 
in which both sides staunchly defend their positions. 
On the one side, there are those who defend a soft law 
approach to the Guiding Principles. On the other side, there 
are those who refuse to use the Principles and demand a 
binding international treaty. What is clear is that a good 
part of the polarisation and unproductiveness of the debate 
is due to the fact that both the WG and the law-oriented 
NGOs tend to concentrate on defending a regulatory 
paradigm, instead of focusing on the difference that such a 
paradigm could make in practice.
A fourth critique in Endtimes that should be taken 
seriously is the obvious asymmetry between North and 
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South in HR. The organisations in the North receive 
over 70% of the funds from philanthropic human rights 
foundations (Foundation Center 2013). They continue to 
have disproportionate power when it comes to setting the 
international agenda, as evident in the above-mentioned 
field of international criminal justice. And too often they 
define this agenda based on internal deliberations, rather 
than through collaborative processes with NGOs of the 
Global South, social movements, activist networks, and 
other relevant actors. 
Finally, Hopgood puts his finger on the pulse of a 
particularly complex problem: how can we measure the 
impact of HR and calculate the opportunity cost of the 
resources and efforts dedicated to their advancement? 
For a movement dedicated to creating legal standards 
and dominated by those of us with legal training, the 
question of the actual impact of these norms does not 
come naturally. For foundations and NGOs that are used 
to talking in terms of outputs instead of outcomes, the 
question of how to measure the latter remains elusive. This 
is a conversation and an ongoing task that I believe should 
concern the entire movement. 
A Critique of the Critique
Faced with these critiques, the response could be denial, 
celebration or reconstruction. Denial tends to be the reaction 
of NGOs and some lawyers who are highly invested in the 
dominant model of HR advocacy. Celebration tends to be 
the response of certain sectors of academia, especially in 
the Global North, who, after having turned towards what 
Boaventura Santos (2004) calls ‘celebratory postmodernism,’ 
are content with deconstruction (Kennedy 2012). Reflexive 
reconstruction is the response of those who recognise value 
in the critiques, but believe that they do not represent the end 
of an ideal and the struggle for human rights, but rather the 
need for new forms of thinking about and practicing them.
 
Since my engagement with Endtimes is based on the third 
type of response, for the remainder of this text I will focus 
on the task of reflexive reconstruction. Thus, my critique of 
Endtimes has more to do with what it does not do, that is, 
shed light on alternatives to HR.
While the discussion about HR is rich and detailed, the one 
about hr is strikingly sparse. Instead of a rigorous description 
with empirical examples of hr, the book is sprinkled with 
quick and incomplete allusions to what they are. In different 
parts, hr is described with various adjectives, each one in 
opposition to HR: grassroots (v. elite), bottom-up (v. top-
down), mass political mobilisation (v. lawfare), local (v. 
global), South (v. North), malleable (v. rigid). 
These dyads show that, ultimately, hr play a more 
functional role in the book than a substantive one; they 
help describe what HR is not, thus remaining as the ‘other’ 
that goes beyond HR, the shadow that allows one to focus 
more on the object in the spotlight. 
It would be unreasonable to ask Hopgood to fully flesh 
out hr in a work that is ultimately about HR. But this 
choice is costly, since it affects the coherence and 
usefulness of Endtimes. First, it makes the book an 
internal critique of HR that shares some of the limitations 
of what it criticises. In particular, it is striking that all the 
academic sources and the vast majority of the empirical 
evidence comes from the same ‘New York-Geneva-
London’ axis. Hopgood’s academic dialogue is only with 
English-language literature, produced by academics 
and organisations based in the Global North. While this 
limitation is coherent with the focus on HR, it leaves out, 
consciously or unconsciously, the rich literature and novel 
practices from other academic and activist circles, in 
regions and languages as diverse as the world of hr. 
Secondly, as with analyses fully anchored in ‘the West’, it 
risks exoticising ‘the Rest’ (Said 1977). By constructing 
such extreme dyads, it loses sight of the important 
connections between its poles: between social movements 
and NGO professionals, between organisations from the 
South and from the North, between the discourse on human 
rights and other social justice discourses. 
For example, despite the North’s dominance within HR, 
today this professional field is also made up of hundreds 
of law-oriented NGOs based in the Global South (Dezalay & 
Garth 2002). Therefore the critiques of HR described above, 
like the over-legalisation of topics such as criminal justice 
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or corporate human rights duties, can also be made against 
numerous local NGOs in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
Furthermore, contemporary human rights activism has 
always implied a combination of local and global work, 
of hr and HR. In its classical form, famously described as 
the ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998), it has been 
based on a coalition of NGOs that make use of international 
opportunities to generate pressure at the local level. The 
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, one of the hr icons mentioned 
by Hopgood, probably would not have met their objectives 
without the support of HR organisations like the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (that visited 
Argentina at a key moment in the late 1970s) and Human 
Rights Watch (that lobbied the US government to pressure 
the Argentinean military officials in power to respect human 
rights) (Keck & Sikkink 1998). As we will see, today these 
coalitions are changing in response to the emergence of a 
multipolar world, but they are still combining hr and HR. 
Heretofore I refer to these multiple combinations as hr/HR.
One version of the exoticising of ‘the Rest’ that has gained 
strength in the human rights literature is the divide between 
the grassroots and the elite. While it points to real problems 
of inequality within the movement (both within the North and 
the South), it tends to oversimplify the terms of the dyads 
and loses sight of the many connections between them. 
For example, the rights defended by HR NGOs (Hopgood’s 
‘1%’) often overlap with those claimed by the most 
oppressed sectors of society, the 99 percent, from indigenous 
peoples like the Sarayaku to internally displaced persons 
with whom we have worked in Colombia in collaboration with 
international organisations. Human rights language has 
been domesticated, adapted and vernacularised by local 
communities (Lemaitre 2009; Merry 2006), which have then 
gone on to use it to organise transnational campaigns that 
embody legal globalisation ‘from below’ (Rajagopal 2003; 
Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). 
In sum, Endtimes makes a powerful and useful internal 
critique of HR. However, it leaves out the intellectual 
and practical contributions made from outside HR, 
the discussion about hr alternatives, and the multiple 
connections between hr and HR. 
In the next section, I focus on this pending reconstructive 
task by pointing to ideas and practices that, by recognising 
the pitfalls of HR, seek to expand the repertoire of hr/HR. 
Towards a Human Rights Ecosystem: 
Actors, Topics, and Strategies
The main trait of the contemporary human rights movement 
is its striking diversity. The twenty-first century has 
witnessed a true explosion of actors who use the language 
and the values of human rights and surpass, by far, the 
traditional boundaries of HR. Among them are grassroots 
communities, social movements, online activists, religious 
organisations, think-tanks, artists’ collectives, scientific 
organisations, film-makers, and many other individuals 
and organisations around the world.
In addition to the growing multi-polarity of the world 
order on which Endtimes concentrates, this expansion 
stems from social and technological transformations 
that receive little attention in the book. First, the rise of 
information and telecommunication technologies has 
multiplied the connections and collective mobilisations 
in favour of human rights, from the street protests 
of the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement to the 
virtual protests against the exploitation of workers in 
Bangladeshi sweatshops (Zuckerman 2013). Second, 
networks have become the dominant form of social 
organisation. The horizontal and decentralised power of 
networks has gained ground over the vertical and unified 
power of hierarchies in all types of organisations, from 
government to business to NGOs, to the point that we now 
live in ‘network societies’ (Castells 2009).
In the world of human rights, the result of these changes 
has been unsettling. In the academic bibliography as well 
as the debates between practitioners, there is a marked 
uncertainty about what will be the new contours of the 
human rights movement and what impact these changes 
could have on its future trajectory.
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As occurs in all moments of turbulence in social fields, 
human rights actors are engaged in ‘boundary processes’ 
(Pachuki et al. 2007), whereby they seek to redefine the 
boundaries of the field. Some like Hopgood try to radically 
redraw the boundaries to leave behind existing spaces and 
open new ones. Others like Neier argue that it is necessary 
to keep the traditional boundaries.
I have argued that instead of strengthening the divide 
between HR and hr, the boundaries of the field must be 
expanded to include both, and open spaces for new actors, 
themes and strategies that have emerged in the last 
two decades. To capture and maximise this diversity, I 
have suggested that the field of human rights should be 
understood as an ecosystem, more than as an institutional 
architecture or a unified movement (Rodríguez-Garavito 
2013a). As with every ecosystem, the emphasis should be 
on the highly diverse contributions of its members, and the 
relationships and connections among them. 
Just looking around we see examples of this ecosystem 
in motion. With regards to the diversity of actors, current 
human rights campaigns involve not only (and often, not 
mainly) professional NGOs and specialised international 
agencies, but also many others. For example, the campaign 
to ensure compliance with the Inter-American Court decision 
that brought me to Ecuador included the indigenous 
people involved (Sarayaku), social movements (mainly 
the Ecuadorian indigenous movement), local NGOs (like 
the Pachamama Foundation), international NGOs (CEJIL, 
Amnesty), national NGOs from other countries who work 
internationally (Dejusticia), and online activists networks 
(like Avaaz). While in these and other campaigns power 
differentials persist (between North and South, professionals 
and non-professionals, etc.), efforts to mitigate them through 
different forms of collaboration are also evident. 
A similar ecosystem approach is required with regards 
to the expanding range of topics that hr/HR is taking up. 
This is clear, for instance, in the realm of socio-economic 
rights. Although initially raising doubts among scholars 
(Sunstein 1996) and advocates (Roth 2004) in the North, 
efforts by NGOs, movements and scholars in the South 
have successfully incorporated them into the legal and 
political repertoire of the field. As a result, socio-economic 
rights are recognised in international law and constitutions 
throughout the world (Rodríguez-Garavito 2011), and have 
become the pivot of large sectors of the human rights field, 
giving rise to new theories of justice and human rights 
(Santos 2004; Sen 2011). 
Activists, academics and courts of countries like Argentina, 
Colombia, India, Kenya and South Africa have developed 
sophisticated legal doctrines and theories that have 
improved compliance with socio-economic rights (Gargarella 
2011; Gauri & Brinks 2008; Liebenberg 2010). International 
human rights agencies such as the UN Special Rapporteurs, 
the African Commission and the Inter-American Court are 
busy creating content and effectiveness for these rights 
(Abramovich and Pautassi 2009; Langford 2009).  They do 
all this without diluting the idea of human rights into social 
justice, and without weakening civil and political rights.
An equally open and pluralistic approach is required with 
regards to the strategies in the field. Instead of hr or HR, 
what is needed is hr/HR coalitions and collaborations that 
combine careful documentation and ‘naming and shaming’ 
Amnesty and HRW style, the presence on the ground 
and the legitimacy that only local NGOs can have, and 
mass mobilisations, both real and virtual. This is what is 
happening in the most successful cases, such as the recent 
campaign for labour rights in Bangladesh, which involved 
the labour movement, national and international NGOs, and 
virtual activist networks like Avaaz.
In addition to positive-sum combinations of existing 
approaches, the human rights ecosystem is developing new 
strategies. Since multi-polarity makes it increasingly difficult 
for the classical ‘boomerang effect’ to be effective, hr/HR 
actors are trying new approaches. For instance, through 
what I describe as a ‘multiple boomerang’ strategy, Latin 
American NGOs forged a successful coalition in defence 
of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission when it 
came under attack from governments throughout the region 
between 2011 and 2013 (Rodríguez-Garavito 2013b). Since 
the US was part of the problem (it never ratified the Inter-
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American Convention on Human Rights), and its regional 
influence has declined, lobbying the US to put pressure on 
Latin American governments to back off would have been 
useless, even counter-productive. Thus, national NGOs chose 
to put pressure on their national governments to support the 
Inter-American Commission, with the Brazilian government 
ultimately tipping the balance in favour of the Commission. 
Thus, it was a coalition of national organisations, lobbying 
their national governments and the emerging power of the 
region, which ultimately made the difference.
Nurturing hr/HR collaborations is easier said than done. For 
international HR organisations, this implies a difficult 
challenge: adjusting the vertical and highly autonomous 
modus operandi that has allowed them to make key 
contributions, to a more horizontal model that would allow 
them to work with networks of diverse actors (Levine 2014). 
In that vein, Amnesty’s ongoing institutional decentralisation 
to be ‘closer to the ground’ is a move in the right direction. 
For national HR organisations, it entails creating new 
strategies that link up with each other, and use the new 
leverage points of an increasingly multi-polar world, as well 
as opening themselves up to non-legal professionals, social 
movements and online activists. 
Instead of seeing human rights as a mono-culture, we should 
see it as an ecosystem. At least that is how it looks from this 
location in the middle of the world. 
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In The Endtimes of Human Rights Stephen Hopgood 
presents his reader with a strong claim: the advancement 
and protection of human rights in the world is dying, near 
death. His argument is relatively straightforward. He bases 
it on an empirical survey that highlights the persistence 
of gross human rights violations, implying the persistent 
ineffectiveness of human rights organisations. This is despite 
the fact that there is an immense organisational architecture 
devoted to the global human rights project; one undergirded 
by ideals designed to protect individuals universally and 
globally. So disenchanted is Hopgood (2013a: 2) by this state 
of affairs, he asks: ‘How different would the world really look 
without the multibillion-dollar humanitarian, human rights, 
and international justice regimes?’.
The remaining chapters of his book proceed to interrogate this 
question, seeking to understand how it is that, despite decades 
– centuries even – of concerted efforts to build an effective and 
efficacious human rights regime, humans continue to be the 
victims of violence and war, poverty and privation.
Endtimes is a searing tome. Hopgood’s disenchantment 
with the human rights past and anxiety about its future 
is palpable. In his telling, the global human rights regime 
was dominated by a few elites who brought with them the 
moral sentiments of a Western liberal order: protection of 
the individual above all else. Although partly successful, 
but only minimally, this human rights order was killed, 
in Hopgood’s telling, by a failure of American leadership 
and by that country’s declining power. The international 
community, the world, failed to deliver basic protections 
to the globe’s suffering populations. The book goes on to 
detail how the human rights regime became, and remains, 
a sham; narrowly defined in Western, secular, liberal terms, 
and promoted by a narrow (and narrow-minded) few. In 
Hopgood’s view, it is time for the international community 
to look elsewhere. Here he predicts that its replacement will 
have to be ‘a syncretic, ground-up process of mobilization. 
It could even lead us toward more genuinely transnational 
social communities based on a shared economy rather than 
identity or ideology. The churches may be a model for this 
form of activism. It may not prevent mass atrocities, but 
the alternative has failed in that endeavour as well’ (p. 22).
Although readers will appreciate the forcefulness of Hop-
good’s argument, and may find his logic for why the global 
human rights ‘project’ has failed to deliver on its promises to 
alleviate the worst excesses of humanity’s suffering – mass 
atrocities such as genocide and rape – compelling, the 
conceptual and empirical record on which Hopgood relies to 
support his arguments are far more mixed than he allows for. 
Just consider the claim that the human rights regime had 
its apex from 1977–2008, a period in which an elite one 
percent based in New York, Geneva and London, could 
direct the world’s interpretation and implementation of 
human rights globally. According to Hopgood, the one 
percent can no longer dictate how to define human rights.
The problem with this claim is twofold. First, it understates 
the degree to which human rights norms have diffused 
around the world. And second, it overlooks additional 
factors that have led to this diffusion. 
Western theoretical misconceptions
A number of scholars of human rights, for example, have 
found that there has been a systematic diffusion of human 
rights across the world. They make the case that we 
missed it because we were relying on models and theories 
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of human rights that circumscribed how human rights 
were defined and thought to diffuse. According to Thomas 
Pegram, for example, this is what transpired among human 
rights scholars and practitioners (Pegram 2010). Once we 
expand our thinking, we can then see just how widespread 
human rights norms are globally. Similarly, in terms of 
humanitarian interventions – the military kind – Martha 
Finnemore (2003) has persuasively supported this view by 
showing that contemporary theories of international politics 
such as realism and liberalism (and their variants) cannot 
supply a materialist or interest-based account of such 
interventions, which entail a high degree of risk both in 
the costs of initiating them and in the likelihood of failure. 
Finnemore concludes that only a new norm – one focusing 
in particular on a permanently expanded conception of 
‘human’ and demanding multilateral effort – can explain 
humanitarian intervention.
An analogous sort of theoretical misconception as 
Hopgood’s led to a misinterpretation of events that occurred 
among theorists of secularization of religion; who also 
crafted their models based on a West European experience. 
Sociologist of religion and Boston University professor Peter 
Berger predicted in 1968 that religious communities would 
dwindle and that the remaining few faithful would be left 
alone and isolated, ‘huddled together to resist a worldwide 
secular culture’ (Berger 1968: 3). Three decades later, 
having witnessed this resurgence in religion, Berger (1999) 
courageously retracted his thesis. Not only did religion not 
die out, it has actually undergone a resurgence, particularly 
in politics and the public square.
Why were both academics and policy-makers so surprised? 
Because their theories led them to expect that religion, both 
as a private matter and in the public sphere, would decline 
and then disappear. No longer would individuals need 
‘superstitions’ to help them to interpret the world around 
them. When religion resurged in the 1970s and into the 
1980s, academics and policy-makers alike were shocked 
that people around the world still held deep religious 
beliefs. And more importantly, these beliefs were less and 
less likely to be private. The most striking increases in the 
worldwide growth in religious belief in the past decade have 
been among sects who consider the intensity and publicity 
of their adherents’ faiths to be the same. 
The Iranian revolution was only the most profound and 
unanticipated of these religious ‘shocks.’ After all, the 
Shah of Iran was a modernizer and Iran’s economy was 
industrialised, buttressed by a large middle class. Middle 
classes, as ‘everyone knows,’ are generally fearful of their 
own mortality and obsessed with material consumption and 
wealth accumulation. From where then did the religious 
revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini come? How could he 
possibly have any influence or popular support? Well, he 
came from the Universities in Qom and markets in Tehran. 
Western theories and conceptions about the role of religion 
in public life offered left most academics, and economic, 
political, and social elites blind to the potential power of 
religion; in particular its political implications.
Hopgood’s misinterpretation of 
human rights evolvement
The same sort of blindness could be said of Hopgood’s 
understanding of how a ‘human rights process’ was 
expected to unfold. In a paradoxical way he falls victim 
to the same sorts of conceits he finds in those who have 
attempted to build and expand the human rights project. 
He fails to notice that there are alternatives, and that some 
of the alternatives do afford protections, and furthermore, 
in some cases, might just be more powerful in promoting 
and providing the desired protections than his idealised 
vision allows. 
Just consider Hopgood’s own evidence about the membership 
status of leading human rights organisations, which he 
claims have failed to build a global constituency, as if a 
global constituency is the only form that matters, or should 
hold pride of place. According to Hopgood, this failing 
is tremendous despite the fact that there were no other 
human rights organisations to join for decades and now 
there are tens to thousands of them in the Global South. 
The problem with this claim is that this same evidence 
that he uses to support this claim that these organisations 
have failed, provides strong support for an opposite claim: 
that the proliferation of these NGOs is actually evidence of 
False Prophecies in the Service of Good Works
49Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
the wide-spread acceptance and diffusion of human rights 
(i.e. success) and not just in the North, but the South as 
well. Therefore membership status is not an indication of 
the ‘Endtimes’, but is exactly what Hopgood contends is 
needed and needs to happen for human rights to thrive. In 
other words, the human rights regime is not only not dead, 
but thriving. Furthermore, it is locally owned more so than 
he allows. So, although it might be the case that the elite of 
the human rights project failed to construct fully globalised 
and fully effective institutions from the top down (e.g. from 
the Northern to Southern hemispheres), they were part of a 
far more complicated, localised and diffused process than 
Hopgood seems to indicate. 
Considered a bit more theoretically, one could argue that 
Hopgood’s critique is premature (it might be right, but it is too 
soon tell) in that the human rights project is still progressing 
along what might be seen as a two-phased process. Following 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), the first phase 
is the ‘Boomerang’ phase, whereby activists connect with 
human rights groups and then use their influence to apply 
pressure to their local governments to change their oppressive 
behaviour. The second phase, the ‘Spiral’ phase, subsumes 
and continues the first, but with the addition that governments 
that initially allowed human rights concerns to influence their 
policy for instrumental reasons – i.e. the activists made doing 
business more costly – come to internalise them resulting in 
the emergence of new norms.
And indeed, if one looks more broadly than the more 
narrowly defined human rights project itself, one can see 
that some of the most basic tenets of the human rights 
project seem to be taking hold. In The Better Angels of our 
Nature, Stephen Pinker (2011) persuasively shows that all 
forms of deliberate inter-human violence have declined 
markedly during the period of Hopgood’s analysis. Although 
this source of human suffering is only a part of Hopgood’s 
concern, it is hardly a trivial finding; and more to the 
point, suggests that to the extent the very human rights 
organisations which are the target of Hopgood’s derision 
gave priority to inter-human violence as a source of human 
suffering, again, their efforts may be deemed successful. 
Alternatively, consider another important potential indicator 
of human ‘betterment’: the decline in authoritarianism in the 
past four decades; a critical point overlooked by Hopgood, 
despite his own reliance on the same data. Freedom House 
has provided a comparative assessment of political rights 
and civil liberties of states for the past four decades. In 
1973, 46 percent of the states surveyed were coded as ‘not 
free’ – these states imposed severe restrictions on their 
citizens. However, the proportion of these regimes dropped 
by more than half to 22 percent by 2008, the beginning of 
‘Endtimes’ for Hopgood. Furthermore, by the end of 2013, the 
figures remained the same as in 2008. 
It is here that Hopgood’s well-intentioned analysis begins 
to go off the rails; where we begin to see a problem with 
how narrowly he defines and understands the problem of 
human rights. In the face of directly contrary empirical 
evidence, Hopgood claims (2013: 145–146) that the world 
is backsliding, and the autocrats are winning. He then 
goes on to describe the terrible happenings in Sri Lanka. 
Although Sri Lanka may be lagging, the general data do 
not suggest that autocracy is gaining headway. Instead, 
there has been little movement across the categories 
of regime types, and if anything, one could argue that 
the movement is in the right direction, towards greater 
freedom. There are now two more states in the international 
system since 2008, an indication of popular sovereignty, 
and the proportion of ‘free countries’ has dipped by only 
one percent, to 45 percent. Yet, how does Hopgood interpret 
these data: ‘[O]verall “global backsliding” and a sixth 
consecutive year of decline is the story’ (2013: 146). The 
picture is far more mixed than such a conclusion warrants.
How these trends are interpreted indicates how Hopgood 
makes his case throughout the book. First there is the bold 
claim, followed by a selective interpretation of data to 
support it. Although he does so with finesse, more often than 
not, the data are misconstrued or critical factors and actors 
in the historical record are overlooked. In examining the 
post-WWII period, the way Hopgood characterises the world 
makes it seem as if some golden moment or period existed 
with a model of human rights based on a west European 
conscience. For example, he claims that the ‘global system is 
now religious and secular, Christian and Islamic (and Hindu 
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and Jewish, etc), about human rights and traditional social 
hierarchies, about sexual orientation and gender identity 
and sexism and homophobia… We have entered an era of 
multipolar authority where what is “normal” or “appropriate” 
no longer has one answer’ (p. 167). I have news for him. 
The world has always been Christian and Islamic, Hindu 
and Jewish, and about human rights and traditional social 
hierarchies, and so on. By making such broad-based claims, 
he seems to be buying into the very conception of a human 
rights – or (to paraphrase Benjamin Barber), a ‘McRights’ – 
project he has set out to critique (Barber 1996). 
So, although readers may concede the point that the world 
is entering a period of multi-polarity (whether it gets there 
is not yet known), it hardly follows that the other facets of 
today’s world are all that different from those of the past. 
The idea that the human rights project, or that human rights 
themselves, must be forwarded by Western elites alone is as 
narrow-minded and off-base as he accuses those Western 
elites of being conceited. As Finnemore’s work on norms of 
humanitarian intervention implies, what Hopgood may indict 
as a failure is instead a success: the lack of leadership of 
‘Western’ human rights organisations he decries may instead 
indicate a success in diffusion, in getting local elites and 
the peoples they lead to internalise a new understanding 
of proper limits to human suffering; whether man-made or 
environmentally sourced (Finnemore 2003). What Hopgood 
seems to have discovered is rather the mature recognition by 
Western social, economic, and political elites that top-down 
approaches and interventions don’t work, and that instead, 
real progress in the amelioration has to come from the 
bottom up. This is not a process that can be understood in 
purely material terms either, it directly indicts identity politics 
and norms (two complicated factors which remain very much 
under-studied in the Western canon). 
Hopgood’s secular bias
Finally, reading through the book I cannot help but feel 
that Hopgood is seriously concerned that religion has made 
a comeback and that its resurgence might run counter 
to the ‘secular global human rights’ project. Hopgood’s 
concerns reflect a widely-shared (and historically-rooted) 
Western secular bias. It may be that transnational religious 
organisations have done as much or more to alleviate 
human suffering as they have done to justify it. But we 
should keep two important facts in mind when considering 
the relative distribution of religious harm and benefit to 
human rights. First, it is relatively easier to measure harm 
(which results in a human corpse as a metric) than it is to 
measure benefit. And second, when measuring benefit, it 
will be difficult to weigh and compare an individual’s self-
security or even happiness as a result of religious faith, 
especially in circumstances in which some supposedly 
‘objective’ measure of material support is lacking. 
In fact, should Hopgood’s concerns about the expected 
harmful impact of religious organisations be heeded, they 
might shift behaviour such that the human rights project is 
undermined. The historical record reveals that not only have 
religious actors been at the forefront of advancing rights and 
freedom, but they have been doing so for decades. Such facts 
and trends are not covered in Hopgood’s book. Again he is 
rather selective in what he chooses to emphasise. 
In general, his treatment of religion is not only dismissive 
but wrong. According to Hopgood (2013: 155), ‘There are 
clearly “multiple modernities” and “multiple secularisms.” 
This is conceptually and empirically obvious.’ He then 
continues to question whether a religious doctrine could be 
universalistic. Not surprisingly his answer is no: ‘The moral 
authority of global humanism (and thus human rights) is 
constitutively secular, universal, and non-negotiable.’ He 
then goes on to describe religious actors as ‘opponents’ 
who are under no illusions (2013: 155-156): ‘they know 
they are locked in an ongoing struggle over the authority to 
determine how we will live.’
Not only is this passage inflammatory, but again, factually 
incorrect. What is striking in reading Hopgood’s book is that 
although he uses religion as a metaphor to structure his 
arguments in a clever way, perhaps overly so, his treatment 
of religion and its influence in the human rights project is 
woefully ignorant. There is no mention, for example, of the 
shift in doctrine on religious freedom and human dignity 
coming out of the Catholic Church’s Vatican II in the 1960s. 
This doctrinal shift set the stage for bishops, local clergy and 
False Prophecies in the Service of Good Works
51Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
laypeople to challenge authoritarian regimes in a whole host 
of states across Latin America and Eastern Europe. In large 
measure, this shift was so profound that Samuel Huntington 
(1991) called the third wave of democratisation, the ‘Catholic 
Wave’. And it wasn’t just Catholic clerics and lay people that 
challenged autocratic regimes and advanced human rights. 
In Indonesia it was Islamic-based parties that challenged the 
authority of Suharto. 
This is not to say that all religious ideas and actors advanced 
the human rights cause. It is to say however that just as 
there are religious militants for violence and war, there are 
religious militants for human rights and peace. This idea 
of the good and bad of religion is neatly captured by Scott 
Appleby’s (2000) idea of the ‘ambivalence of the sacred’. 
And indeed, in a fair number of cases, religious actors have 
advanced democracy and held democratisation efforts back: 
one need only think of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Yet, the Taliban are not the norm. As Pinker might argue, they 
are merely the squeaky wheel that gets the media attention 
grease. It turns out that religious actors are more likely to 
advance democracy than stall it (Pinker 2011). As my co-
authors and I outline in God’s Century, the role of religious 
actors in democratisation efforts between 1972 and 2009 
has been extensive and consequential. In those countries 
that witnessed substantial democratisation, religious actors 
played a democratising role in 45 of 78 of them, or 65 percent 
of the cases (Toft, Philpott & Shah 2011).
In other words, in well over half of democratising countries, 
religious actors were a pro-democratic, human rights defen-
ding force. To claim that religious actors promoted democracy 
in these countries does not mean that they were the single 
most decisive factor. Nor does it indicate that all or even most 
religious actors in these countries were at the forefront in 
advancing democracy. Yet, it does indicate that the advance-
ment of human rights was far broader and diffuse than Hop-
good indicates. And perhaps more importantly, that religious 
actors need not be opponents in the continued struggle, but 
potential partners, particularly around issues of government 
accountability and social justice. 
The rising sun on human rights
In sum, Hopgood’s book merits everyone’s attention, but not 
necessarily because its central argument is sound. Hopgood 
means, in his provocative title, to provoke Western political 
elites to devote the material resources to once again take 
up the very difficult, complex, and enduring challenge of 
supporting a floor below which a majority of the world’s 
human beings must not sink. And the multiple failings and 
painful hypocrisy he catalogues are hardly imaginary. But 
Endtimes fails in its understanding both of the direction of 
human rights and in its necessary authorship. The floor has 
risen over time, not stalled or descended; and this despite 
the very real, painful, and destructive counterexamples Hop-
good rightly cites. Moreover, much of what Hopgood is in fact 
measuring is the diffusion of responsibility or authorship of 
human rights as a burgeoning norm from Western political 
elites to affected peoples in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; 
a diffusion that must, in my view, be counted as evidence of 
success rather than failure, whether dedicated organisations 
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or Mé-
decins San Frontières are directly responsible for this diffusi-
on or are themselves artefacts of the ongoing shift. 
His failings are understandable, given that Hopgood 
himself is an academic embedded, as much of his 
audience will be, in a profoundly Western, secular, 
advanced-industrial understanding of human rights and 
indeed, ‘human.’ The same perspective and experience 
that bedevils Hopgood’s analysis had the same effect on 
‘our’ collective understanding of both the dangers and 
the constructive possibilities of religious faith worldwide. 
Sadly, that means that Hopgood is likely to be in good 
company today, just as Peter Berger was in the 1960s.
But in this reader’s view, the diffusion of concern for 
human rights belies the urgency and bitterness of 
Endtimes. The sun is rising on a heterogeneity of views on 
what counts as rights, how and how quickly these should 
be implemented, and by whom. That’s not a bad thing, 
that’s a good thing.
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Ever since publishing Keepers of the Flame, his in-depth 
study on Amnesty International in 2006, Stephen Hopgood 
has been an official academic interpreter of sorts for 
Amnesty. Thanks to his colourful and provocative language 
and style he has also managed to gain some larger 
publicity for his analysis. Within the organisation itself, the 
response to Hopgood has always been mixed. The official 
response to Keepers of the Flame was very defensive, 
portraying it as simply ‘an academic work premised on 
certain philosophical and sociological assumptions.’1 But at 
the same time, in many parts of the organisation the book 
is the preferred introduction for newcomers.
For me, reading it was an eye-opener. After already having 
worked for the organisation for fifteen years, I finally felt 
that I understood my employer. It encouraged me to read 
more of similar writings, what a colleague in another 
organisation called ‘wrong books’, and soon I was like a 
carthorse whose blinders had suddenly been removed. 
An entire new world opened up to me, but at the same 
time I became part of a minority within the organisation: 
strongly believing we as practitioners need to be asking the 
most difficult questions ourselves, constantly putting the 
paradoxes of our work out in the forefront. This essay is an 
attempt to do that.
The semi-official Amnesty reaction to the publication of 
Endtimes for Human Rights (Crawshaw 2013) is very 
similar to the response to Keepers of the Flame. Instead of 
engaging with Hopgood on the absolutely crucial issues for 
Amnesty that his book raises, his premises are questioned 
and the main message avoided: the distance between those 
we work for and ourselves has grown, we live in different 
worlds and we view human rights very differently. The big 
issues of social and economic justice cannot be solved 
through the human rights paradigm, as it doesn’t confront 
economic power.
I think most of Hopgood’s points in Endtimes are valid. 
Even though we can certainly find individual people 
occasionally bridging this gap, there really is a structural 
difference between Human Rights (the international 
regime) and human rights (the grassroots movements) and 
the most important factor here is power, both between the 
two levels and within them. As the French anthropologist 
Didier Fassin (2012: 3-4) has shown, there is always a 
hierarchical power relationship between the helper and 
those being helped. The helper is stronger and in the end 
can decide. Those being helped have no say.
In a similar way the American international relations scholar 
Michael Barnett (another contributor to this collection) 
asserts that all through history those ‘doing good’ have 
been amazingly insensitive to their own power and to the 
paternalism of their relations with those they seek to help. 
Barnett’s point (2011: 231-34) is that humanitarianism has 
always been linked to other global forces. A hundred years 
ago, colonials were on a mission to civilise savages through 
commerce, and at the same time saving souls through 
Christianity. Today’s humanitarians work with a strong belief 
in the holy trinity of the global market economy, promoting 
liberal democracy and human rights.
It is also important to recall the Harvard academic David 
Kennedy’s ten pertinent assertions from 2001: Human 
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rights hegemony crowds out other solutions, human rights 
leave too much out, human rights are too universal, human 
rights are too specific, human rights are liberalism in 
disguise, human rights promise too much, human rights 
accept violations, human rights is a bureaucracy, human 
rights is bad governance, human rights are bad politics. 
Through exploring these, Kennedy (2001: 245-267) asked if 
the Human Rights movement was more part of the problem 
than the solution.
His answer then and in subsequent texts was that (Western) 
Human Rights organisations should accept that they are 
part of global power, that they are political. He wanted 
organisations to become more openly strategic and to focus 
on real results and not just strengthening of institutions. 
On returning to the original article a decade later, Kennedy’s 
assessment was that the organisations had learned 
their lesson. At the same time he seems to concede, in 
contradiction with his earlier message, that human rights 
as an emancipatory idea had become less compelling and 
too easy to interpret as a ‘cover for political objectives, 
particular interests clothing themselves in the language of 
the universal’ (Kennedy 2012: 22). Or as the Finnish theorist 
and historian of international law Martti Koskenniemi 
(2011: 164) puts it: ‘The choice is never between that which 
is universal and that which is particular. The choice is 
between two kinds of particular.’
Though they would disagree on many issues, Kennedy 
(2012: 34) concludes very much in line with Hopgood 
that other political discourses have overtaken Human 
Rights: ‘Perhaps a hundred years from now human 
rights professionals will still invoke norms, and shame 
governments, and publicize victims, and litigate injuries 
and indignities. But politics has moved on. Human rights is 
no longer the way forward – it focuses too longingly on the 
perfection of a politics long past its prime.’
What Hopgood is saying about the evolution and 
development of the Human Rights Empire, and how this has 
falsely been simplified into a ‘triumphalist metanarrative’ 
is very much in line with other recent scholarship (Barnett 
2011; Douzinas 2007; Moyn 2010). Likewise his critique 
of the International Criminal Court and the principle of 
Responsibility to Protect are not in contrast with what 
distinguished writers had said previously – these processes 
are suffused by Western power (Koskenniemi 2011: 171-
198, 234-35; Mamdani 2013: 33-34; Orford 2011). His 
analysis that the EU is losing the power battle at the UN 
had already been noticed some years ago in a policy paper 
from the European Council on Foreign Relations (Gowan & 
Brantner 2008).
Anyone working in the field recognises the Human Rights 
market: How the growth that professional fundraising has 
brought major organisations has shifted their emphasis 
from grassroots engagement to easier online activism. As 
they recognise that most of those who are the target of 
these easy-asks are overwhelmingly happy with their role. 
They want to feel good, not change too much in their own 
life. It suits them and they are happy to give us seven Euros 
a month as well.2
Unfortunately it seems that these critical discussions are 
passing Amnesty by. Maybe more of my colleagues should 
put ‘wrong books’ on their reading list. 
Why are critical human rights debates 
passing Amnesty by?
The important question to ask is of course why this 
scholarship does not come up on Amnesty’s radar screen. 
To understand this, and before getting to some reflections 
on what the message in Endtimes could or should be for 
Amnesty, it is necessary to briefly dwell on Hopgood’s 
original anthropological analysis of what kind of people 
inhabit Amnesty and what this means for the organisation.
Hopgood quite crudely, but at the same time succinctly, 
divides Amnesty people into two groups. The first are the 
old guardians of the original ethos of the organisation, 
characterised by long-term, almost religious devotion to 
their work on specific countries and individuals. These are 
mostly found among country researchers and volunteer 
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co-ordinators. In a reference to Amnesty’s candle burning 
within barbed wire, they are called the ‘keepers of the 
flame’. The second group are the reformers, among 
which there are two subgroups: the campaigners and the 
modernisers. The former want to change the world through 
action and are not satisfied with just bearing witness. The 
modernisers are either fundraisers and brand managers or 
focused on accountability, evaluation and other business-
oriented issues (Hopgood 2006: 11-12).
Since the book was published, my own observations tell 
me that reform-thinking within Amnesty has increased, 
particularly among its management. Most discussions at 
the latest International Council Meetings and at Chairs’ 
Assemblies and Directors’ Forums2 have been about the 
organisation itself, its governance, its finances and its 
change process. It almost seems as if the form of the 
organisation and the smoothness of its internal processes 
are more important than the actual content of our work. 
Likewise, due to the explosion of social media and 
Amnesty’s persistent focus on growth, which is seen as a 
necessary solution to all our problems, we now have more 
fundraising and communications people both centrally and 
in sections.3 We are modernising fast.
Neither of these groups is primarily interested in 
‘philosophical debates’ on how much influence the Human 
Rights regime has or how to really empower the human 
rights movement. The modernisers want neat organograms 
and positive-results sheets and the marketing people 
need fundraising consent from the victims, catchy sellable 
messages and larger markets. Doubt and questioning is 
not part of their work.
Unfortunately for Amnesty it also seems that only a 
minority of the ‘keepers of the flame’, both staff and 
members, are interested in this debate. Most of them are 
almost fundamental ‘true believers’ in Human Rights 
and are not ready to compromise on the content of ‘the 
commandments’ nor are they open to discussions on 
different interpretations of human rights raised by local 
activists and critical academics all over the world.5
The Kenyan professor Makau Mutua (2002: 29-70) catego-
rises legal professionals working within Human Rights as 
belonging to four groups: conventional doctrinalists, consti-
tutionalists, cultural pluralists and political instrumentalists. 
According to him, the first group is the most influential in 
promoting universal norms, which he sees as anchored in 
a liberal understanding of the world. This is also the most 
typical person found in international human rights NGOs. The 
second group conceptualises, i.e. focuses on, mapping out 
and explaining the framework of human rights law, and are 
also prevalent in NGOs as well as in universities. The third 
group tend to be outsiders, mainly represented by critical 
academics many of whom come from the Global South. They 
are very rarely seen in international NGOs and are usually 
characterised as cultural relativists by the first two groups. 
The last group is mainly found in governmental departments 
using human rights law for their own ends.
What Mutua says helps us understand why Amnesty so 
rarely interacts with critical academic discourse and also 
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so rarely, though there certainly have been efforts, succeeds 
on a broad front in engaging with local human rights 
activists on their chosen social justice agenda.
The people that lead and work for Amnesty talk and 
communicate mostly with like-minded people. We seem 
to lack these, even among leadership in the sections from 
the Global South, who would want to engage in critical 
discussions and the end-result is a rather narrow and insular 
internal debate on human rights. And when Hopgood tells us 
this, many get very upset.
Because we (rightly) constantly criticise Western governments 
on their failings on human rights, we ourselves fail to see 
how close to and how reliant on Western power we as an 
organisation and the whole field of international Human 
Rights have historically always been. Instead of only speaking 
truth to power we have become the expert voice of power. 
And when that Western power is no longer powerful enough, 
we face the problem Hopgood has put in front us. We have 
previously succeeded in empowering groups (be they victims 
of military regimes in Latin-America or dissidents in the 
former Soviet Union), but then this was on the agenda of 
major representatives of Western power as well.
Is Amnesty ready to listen and learn?
As I see it, international human rights organisations like 
Amnesty have roughly three options. The first option is that 
we continue on the path we are on. We will probably grow 
for some time yet and we will keep most of our Northern 
support happy, but as Human Rights as a vehicle of change 
loses its political power, we will probably not change the 
world. The creeping doubts about the usefulness of this very 
expensive operation will surely grow as we have so little real 
structural change to show.
At the moment a huge and ambitious project is in place to 
decentralise the Amnesty headquarters in London and to 
open international Amnesty offices in the Global South. The 
marketed and supposed end-result of this is to broaden our 
support base and make us more sensitive to voices from 
the south. It is a very costly exercise and an open question 
whether or not it will really change the way we work. I 
would be more optimistic about it, if it was a bottom-up 
decentralisation, instead of just a top-down relocation.
Hopgood (2013a: 114) is doubtful if the Amnesty ‘business-
model’ can make even this limited change. A former 
Amnesty activist and now independent researcher from 
India, Vijay Nagaraj (2013) is openly critical: ‘Frankly, the 
potential “success” of Amnesty’s relocation (…) concerns 
me more than the possibility of “failure”. What does it imply 
for the many micro- and macro-practices of human rights 
and even social justice? Why should this be a blessing for 
the Global South? Why should one not see this as a new 
wave of occupation, with global human rights in its search 
for greater influence, power, and money, trying to plant its 
flags, franchises and not to mention fundraisers, all over?’
Paradoxically, the second and third options both involve 
relinquishing power. Either we become overtly counter-
political, engaging with those both inside and outside 
the West who question the current international order. 
Here we would use human rights (which would probably 
slowly evolve into justice) from the bottom up, working to 
completely change not just the Human Rights system, but 
the whole financial and political system. It would be an 
extremely political project. This is the preferred ‘popular 
front’ option offered by Hopgood (2013a: 22), but I am 
sceptical as to its applicability.
The third option is to return to the original moral power 
of what Amnesty was at its foundation, lowering our own 
political ambitions, removing the hero’s and, to some 
extent, also the expert’s cloaks and instead focusing on 
defending and supporting those who in their different 
circumstances are trying to change the world. In a sense, 
this is resurrecting the secular religiosity, which Hopgood 
himself originally propagated, but now seems to have been 
dismissed as a lost cause (2013a: 178-182). I will return to 
the potentiality of this model at the end of the essay.
My doubts about the second option stem from Amnesty’s 
experiences so far. A few years ago, when the organisation 
launched its global Demand Dignity campaign on 
economic and social rights, one of the catchphrases was 
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empowerment. We were going to break the vicious circle 
of poverty - discrimination, voicelessness, lack of service, 
insecurity - by creating agency. In her book, The Unheard 
Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, published as part of the 
campaign launch, Irene Khan (2009), Amnesty’s secretary 
general at the time, clearly talked about using human 
rights to challenge the system of injustice and doing so by 
giving a voice to and taking advice from the local rights-
holders. Again a project not lacking in ambition.
Looking at where we stand now on this campaign, we have 
not followed through on this commitment of a dialogue 
in a meaningful way. Yes, there are good news stories on 
maternal mortality and yes, we have managed to stop 
evictions from slums and we have co-operated with both 
local organisations and rights-holders. These successes 
need to be celebrated, but overall, as an ethos for the 
movement, listening and learning still seems too strange 
for Amnesty.
We have always been used to knowing the answers, to 
knowing we are right, to having power. That is what a 
professional expert organisation is all about. However when 
it comes to issues such as poverty, there are myriad factors 
that complicate this straightforward work: developmental 
economics, the global financial architecture, land 
ownership, tax policies and climate change, just to name 
a few. These are issues that cannot be answered only from 
a human rights perspective; they are deeply political and 
economic questions. Do we want to move away from a, even 
if broadened, still narrow human rights focus and take a 
political stand against the more fundamental question of 
injustice? Choose a certain social policy as our goal? Can 
we do so without both ostracising Western power and those 
within the West whose money makes the organisation run? 
Even if we decide to take this step: who are we supposed 
to influence, on what authority (apart from a political view) 
is this based? When and how is the voice of the poor heard 
in this work? Following Kennedy’s assertions presented 
above: the human rights approach is too narrow, and other 
discourses are needed alongside it. Are we ready to move 
from Human Rights to another discourse? Or as Hopgood 
would put it, to human rights understood not as a system 
but as a moral value, using human rights language broadly 
for justice?
As Koskenniemi has so powerfully shown, human rights and 
international law can best be seen as a language in which 
politics take place. Very seldom, prohibition of torture being 
the easy exception, can you find a clear answer to how a 
right should be acknowledged in the right itself. The answer 
almost always involves a political choice, even if, in the end, 
it is provided in the legal human rights language.6  Are we 
ready for these choices?
Furthermore, because of our increasing professionalization, 
the need for growth of resources has for many years been 
imperative for Amnesty. In a very simplified way we have 
repeatedly been told that only by growing will we become 
better. This message is very much the ‘new ethos’ of the 
modernisers. And because our growth depends on private 
fundraising, focusing on a continuous dialogue without 
clear answers becomes problematic. If we tell our donors 
that we want money to discuss, to engage and to learn how 
to tackle the problem, many will probably say ‘fine, I’ll give 
you the money when you know the solution, but not before 
that.’ So, engaging up-front in an open-ended dialogue 
becomes a disincentive. Even though there are attempts 
to engage in a genuine dialogue with the rights-holders 
themselves on these issues, be it forced evictions from 
slums, maternal mortality or corporate responsibility, the 
temptation, in the end, to go back to doing what we always 
have done: knowing better than the rights-holders what 
we should do, retreating into the Human Rights cocoon, 
leaving the conversation before it began and remaining at 
the top of the hierarchy that Fassin describes, is always 
there. Even though we talk about empowerment, we are 
actually not re-inventing the organisation in a way that 
would give more power to local activists and rights-holders; 
on the contrary, we are striving for more centralised top-
down control. 
In the event that Amnesty was to take a clear counter-
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political stand, the fundraising dilemma again becomes 
acute. Within our current model of operation, would we find 
the support to fund an overtly anti-establishment political 
campaign? Would we find the constituency, who is ready to 
step up from the easy lifestyle engagement, the clicktivism 
that we currently offer through web appeals, and get 
involved seriously?
In a scenario exercise on the future of Human Rights in 
Europe, my colleague from Amnesty Netherlands, Dirk 
Steen, presents four options, one of which talks about an 
increasing economic and ecological crisis. He describes 
a not-too-implausible future situation where quite a few 
people in Europe find the system rotten and want to change 
it. He calls this scenario the angry young women option 
and asks: ‘What would the human rights movement have 
to say here? (...) Would it be seen as relevant? Is it able 
to deal with such rigorous possible paradigm shifts? Or 
would it be seen as too slow, too limited, too cautious, too 
much connected to the status quo? (...) Can we adapt the 
“business model” of human rights in a way that makes it 
able to deal with these issues? (...) Can it do more than 
give partial responses like e.g. guaranteeing the rights to 
assembly and freedom of expression? Or should it simply 
stick to its current role: cautious, patient and in reasonable 
dialogue with power so as to avoid losing the strength and 
standing it has now?’ (Steen 2013: 27).
I think that too many within the Human Rights Empire have 
too much to lose for a more political engagement to be 
plausible in the near future. Less money, less influence, less 
access to power and too many open questions, like those 
asked above and throughout this essay, which are likely to 
divide politically: we just cannot confront every problem in 
the world, and even if we try, we’re not being very successful.
Is Amnesty prepared to re-invent 
solidarity?
Because of my long history in Amnesty, I have a certain 
attachment to the old days. The attachment is not just 
sentimental; I actually think that many things in the old 
model made sense. Therefore returning to a less ambitious, 
but at the same time ethically and morally sound, concept is 
probably my preferred option - the third - to explore further.
The old Amnesty volunteer movement (before we became 
fully professionalised) contained some brilliant ideas, 
which unfortunately have been side-lined to a great 
extent along the way. The central point is focusing on the 
individual. To be involved in quick reactive work supported 
by long-term commitment. 
Central in this model is the local volunteer group that 
meets on a regular basis in person. Its tasks are threefold: 
to keep up long-term sustained appeal work on behalf of a 
named individual; to organise Amnesty events in a public 
space mainly on behalf of the plight of the individual but 
also for political change in their own communities (more 
on this below); and to study, converse and learn about why 
and how we are doing this work, both the politics and the 
legal grammar of human rights, with which you can move 
in the political arena.
In best-case practice, the old appeal work resulted in 
volunteers not only communicating with the person on 
whose behalf they were working, but also his/her families 
and other support groups from around the world (Amnesty 
groups in Tanzania, Finland and the Netherlands could all 
be working for the same person). Through this work, the 
person was not just an object, but a real person who was 
able to talk in his (they were then mostly men, but need 
not be so in the future) own voice or at least through his 
relatives or friends. 
Again in best practice, it resulted in the groups studying 
and learning the political dynamics of the home country 
of the individual assisted and through the triangle of their 
own group, other similar groups living and working in very 
different circumstances and the individual’s own story, 
it cultivated both a real sense of global community and a 
cosmopolitan worldview. The voice of the oppressed was 
heard, had a history and at least some agency, and as the 
work usually took a number of years, the relationship was 
an intense one. And the commitment to keep doing this 
work, until a positive end-result took place, was the moral 
basis for Amnesty’s fame.
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The obligation to take your work out on the streets took 
people into real-life conversations with strangers (so 
different from on-line chatter) and therefore also into 
argumentation about the why and political how.
So as not to romanticize this picture, it is important to realise 
that best practice probably was an exception; in most cases, 
the work was very paternalistic: one-way, no communication 
with others and the meetings were more about feeling 
superior with tea and biscuits. But it need not be that way 
and we surely have the resources to develop this model in the 
current world of IT and digital communication.
In Amnesty’s work today, all these elements are still there 
but on a very small scale. In 1974, Amnesty produced 2458 
prisoner-of-conscience files for local groups. In the 1980s, 
the number of individuals for which long-term work was done 
had dropped below 1000. And in the 1990s, the files first 
became geographical action files, only to then be dropped 
completely in the new century. Lately the long-term work for 
individuals has fortunately been revived and right now the 
number of named individuals in the organisation’s long-term 
database is somewhere between 200 and 300. In 1974, the 
budget for the International Secretariat of Amnesty was the 
equivalent of around 625,000 Euros and there were fewer 
than 100 people on staff. Today, the annual budget is over 
45 million Euros and the number of staff is at around 500 
(Hopgood 2006: 83-85 and Hopgood 2011).
These figures show that long-term work for individuals has 
been completely overshadowed by more ambitious theme 
campaigns, by spectacular pre-choreographed demonstra-
tions, by online petitions and by professional media and 
advocacy work. And because of the size of the operation: a 
larger back office of administrative, financial and managerial 
staff. And the same is happening in national sections.
I am not saying that Amnesty could work without professional 
staff; without competent research staff, no work for 
individuals (nor any other) would be possible. Keeping the 
information in the individual files up-to-date is actually more 
resource-intensive than most things (and a reason it was 
dropped). We also still need lawyers and other experts at the 
international level for another reason: to assist local experts’ 
work on our own governments for human-rights-based social 
and political change in our own countries.
As the American international relations scholar Emilie 
Hafner-Burton (2013) controversially and forcefully argues, 
the universal Human Rights system has not really worked, 
the more new laws and new institutions we create, the 
more violations and more bureaucracy we have around 
the world. In her view, real human rights change only 
takes place if there is a local constituency working for 
that change. In this sense, building local constituencies 
is paramount and if Amnesty’s relocation will create these 
political constituencies, it will be a good thing. But again, 
the questions remain: Why are we not building democratic 
local sections, with all the debate that it involves, but 
regional and international led offices? Is relocation about 
growing our market or really growing a local constituency? 
Will we listen to the local voices or will we overwhelm them 
with our expertise?
If our social change work becomes more national or 
regional - it has already this status in Europe, where the 
local sections have the money and the constituency - the 
greater the need for an expansion of the international 
solidarity work, and social media could easily be harnessed 
for this. Even today, the most celebrated successes, those 
given the most publicity and generating the greatest feel-
good factor, are those involving the positive outcome of 
an individual’s story – be it long-term work or the hugely 
important Urgent Action network, which fortunately is still 
working well.
If you ask any political activist anywhere in the world what 
they want from Amnesty, it is probably the knowledge 
that if anything happens to them, we will be there to 
assist them promptly (Urgent Actions going out as soon 
as possible by email and passed on through social media 
and mobile devices) and if the positive outcome is not 
immediate, we will be there long-term: both as a back rest 
and as a megaphone for their plight.
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What they probably don’t want is us taking over their 
struggle. I personally would see it as very arrogant if 
professional Human Rights workers from the West supported 
by however many thousands of online activists thought they 
knew better than the local population in for example China 
or Egypt what kind of society these countries want and 
need. But I’d be more than happy to defend people in these 
countries (regardless of the cause they are fighting for, be 
it civil and political or economic and social) if their right to 
organise and make their voices heard is not allowed. 
Working long-term to defend activists does not require 
massive local resources, but it does require commitment. 
You can keep a group going just as well in India as in 
Brazil, in Russia and in the USA. It just takes five or six 
people, communication tools and skills and of course the 
commitment. Urgent Action networks definitely need a 
bit more infrastructure. This work might not change the 
world in itself, but done in the proper way it would not be 
paternalistic and would be moral education at its best.
Are we prepared to step down from the pedestal of Human 
Rights and just be satisfied with ‘doing good’ on a small 
scale? By giving a voice to those we work for, making them 
and their view of the world known instead of promoting 
ourselves? Are we prepared to let social justice be the 
territory of other more political organisations, other system-
changing emancipatory discourses? Are activists in the 
North ready to make this commitment; are activists in the 
Global South really interested in this solidarity work or do 
they primarily want to work on the more ambitious social 
justice projects? Can we provide them the room for this?
There are no easy answers and so we need to keep 
debating. At the moment, asking all these questions is 
more important than answering them. The answers will 
come only after a debate, and that has barely started. Let’s 
not walk away from it.
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In this essay I will proceed from Stephen Hopgood’s 
Endtimes to discuss human rights defenders as a layer that 
may be overlooked between the capitalised Human Rights 
Regime of conventions and intergovernmental bodies, and 
the lower-case human rights activism. I do so based on 
the premise that Hopgood has touched on an important 
truth: some things are rotten in the State of Human Rights 
and these things had better be addressed before it is too 
late. I will present a series of recurrent problems in human 
rights discourse, issues that could each be called a fallacy 
or half-truth, or the term I prefer: pitfall, ‘a hidden or not 
easily recognised danger or difficulty.’1
Truth, says German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1990: 
58), comprises three elements. A communication must 
correspond to the facts. It should comply with a normative 
system that allows others to make judgements. And a true 
statement should be sincere, ‘truthful’. When I visit my 
doctor, I want her to tell me the facts, what is really wrong 
with me. I want to hear them in a form that reflects her 
professional knowledge and ethics. And whether she is soft-
spoken or outright or cool, I want her to be sincere. If she 
doesn’t comply with these conditions, I’d rather go and see 
another doctor. This paradigm may sum up what Stephen 
Hopgood elaborates in The Endtimes of Human Rights. The 
basic tenet of that book is the distinction between human 
rights and Human Rights. The first can be full truth, the 
second fails the test of truthfulness.
Human rights discourse revisited
The capitalised Human Rights Regime is a phenomenon 
that gathered momentum in particular from the 1970s. It 
is, says Hopgood, deemed to expire, and for good reason. 
Hopgood’s book abounds with examples of how Human 
Rights Regimists invented norms and institutions that 
were supposed to ‘deal’ with gruesome situations, and 
in the end did not live up to expectations, or made no 
difference at all, as was the case in Sudan, Sri Lanka 
and Syria, and as is happening with the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P), and the Cambodia Tribunal. Those who support 
these institutions claim that the world tends towards a 
globalisation of justice. However, the actual direction, 
according to Hopgood, is neo-Westphalian. Countries and 
cultures are not converging into a huge human rights pool, 
they are instead diverging into the separate domains of 
their political culture, religion and regional power. Most 
scathing is Hopgood’s critique of the ICC and the R2P. The 
first had one successful conviction in the first ten years 
of its existence – and for whatever that is worth: at the 
cost of some 900 million dollars. The second, designed 
to prompt international intervention once a government 
starts massacring its citizens, has failed as miserably in 
Syria as it did in all other situations since it was brought to 
prominence in 2005.
International human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch are far from 
immune to this erosion of actions and impact. They actually 
reinforce the gap between rhetoric and reality. Amnesty’s 
spiritual father Peter Benenson didn’t use the word ‘human 
rights’ once in his foundational book Persecution (1961), 
yet Amnesty has since claimed ever more territory under its 
human rights mission. Some years ago, the organisation 
initiated a Demand Dignity Campaign focusing on social 
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and economic rights – and Hopgood wonders whether the 
very word ‘dignity’ was chosen because the organisation 
was not so sure of the human rights tag on these issues. 
That campaign has actually petered out. Amnesty’s 
homepage (as consulted in April 2014) no longer carries 
word of it. The once much-promoted campaigns on women’s 
rights has survived only in the form of a generalised 
campaign, My Body My Rights. ‘Being able to make our 
own decisions about our health, body and sexual life,’ 
reads the introduction to that campaign, ‘is a basic human 
right. Yet all over the world, many of us are persecuted for 
making these choices – or prevented from doing so at all.’ 
This wording could cover the work of a plethora of NGOs. 
Apart from that generalised activism, Amnesty’s homepage 
nowadays is dominated by its traditional issues such as 
prisoners and ‘individuals at risk.’
In line with Hopgood, we should note how large human rights 
organisations perpetuate their work, and very existence, 
by ever more professional promotion and fundraising. It’s 
the numbers that count: membership, income, regional 
hubs, local centres. And of course, signatures on online 
petitions. Amnesty International takes pride in its 3.2 million 
‘members and supporters,’ but most are not expected 
to pay a membership fee. At the Dutch section, activism 
now includes an estimated 100,000 individuals who are 
asked to ‘return’ an email, which by virtue of a single click 
makes them effectively a signatory of the action in that 
email. Although this is not a bad thing, it is a far cry from 
the tenacious letter-writing for prisoners of conscience, 
sometimes for years on end, that characterised Amnesty’s 
local group members. The number of Dutch groups has 
halved since the early 1980s. Amnesty India, one of the new 
sections flaunted by the International Secretariat, claims to 
have gathered over 168,000 ’signatures’ (clicks) on a petition 
to prevent the Sri Lankan president from becoming chairman 
of the Commonwealth – the kind of political target that 
Amnesty had been steering away from for decades. Amnesty 
India claims the international organisation has ‘4.6 million 
supporters, members and activists.’2 
NGOs are often well aware of the limited effects of human 
rights work, but find ways around admitting that. One pitfall 
is their viewing developments from a sort of teleological 
perspective: if there is human rights improvement, it’s the 
human rights community that did it. Soviet dissidents, for 
instance, have been portrayed as those who have forced 
democracy through by their courageous resistance. Did 
they? The demise of the Soviet Union has been ascribed 
to President Reagan, the Pope, the nuclear arms race, the 
inherent weakness of the Communist economic system, 
globalised education and much more, while the role of 
dissidents and international NGOs is mentioned in the 
margin at best (Kalashnikov 2011).
 
Another example of claimed success is how Amnesty, 
having campaigned for years on the closing of the 
Guantánamo Bay facility, celebrated the announcement 
of its end in January 2009. For various reasons, it’s still 
functioning five years later and NGOs may have been 
insignificant in the politics of closing and non-closing. One 
more example is what Amnesty sections achieve in their 
own Western countries when it comes to changing refugee 
policies. After decades of campaigning, most of these 
policies are now even more restrictive. One may rightly 
blame the political winds. Regardless, there are no grounds 
for claiming success. Yet the times (not the endtimes) 
have prompted organisations in the direction of making 
more and further-reaching claims. In the old Amnesty days, 
one did not boast of achievements. Staff was instructed 
never to write that something was the result of an Amnesty 
campaign - at most one could indicate a correlation. Now 
Amnesty spokespersons easily use words such as ’amazing 
results’ or ‘great success’. The flip side is that it makes 
an organisation vulnerable to criticism - that it did not 
prevent Rwanda or Srebrenica or Kivu or Homs – and here 
organisations remain silent.
Hopgood pronounces hard truths on states and non-state 
actors alike. Is his critique always illuminating? One issue 
that may not sit easily on the reader’s mind is his view on 
the United States. That country sank deeply, of course, in 
waterboarding, extraordinary renditions, administrative 
detention and other post-9/11 practices, all the while 
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heralding a neoliberalism that was condescending towards 
those who live in misery. The American grip on the human 
rights regime has been seriously waning because of this 
and uni-polarity had to yield to emerging countries that 
offer alternatives, also in human rights. At one point 
Hopgood pits liberal-minded US against the ‘community-
oriented’ China. This equation, even though Hopgood at 
other places lists China’s many human rights abuses, is 
poor. The US has legal institutions, a huge press and the 
world’s most dynamic public opinion machine to address 
the wrongs they do as the richest, mightiest, military and 
technologically most advanced country in the world. While 
waterboarding may once have been legitimised by state 
lawyers, it certainly has not left political life indifferent and 
was fiercely rejected by the successor government. 
China, on the other hand, is not at all community-steered. 
No village council, trade union, consumer organisation, 
group of elders or even parliament has a real say in China’s 
national politics. One prominent Chinese intellectual 
addressed precisely that lack of communal voice in a 
human rights charter signed by thousands. His name is 
Liu Xiaobo and he is one of the most remarkable political 
thinkers of our time (Liu 2012). He won a Nobel Prize yet 
was not interviewed in Chinese media or criticised in op-ed 
items as he has been sentenced to eleven years in prison 
and for all practical purposes made a non-existent person 
within the country. His imprisonment, as that of other 
‘rights activists’, is one of the main reasons why it is so 
difficult to amass evidence about the widespread illegality, 
corruption, imprisonment, torture, capital punishment, 
abject poverty and perplexing lack of rights in China. 
The US has unattractive aspects, but China is massively 
unattractive (Shambaugh 2013). Well-off families in 
Bhutan or Bahrain still aspire to send their kids to study in 
Boston, not Beijing.
Human rights defenders: a missing 
floor?
Having been an Amnesty staff member at a national section 
for decades, I found Hopgood’s book an often shocking 
confrontation with the truth (and truthfulness). I recognised 
the hubris of my own organisation, its rhetoric, some of 
the quite extravagant payments at the international level, 
the shallow play of figures and numbers, the threats of 
empty fundraising messages. I also recognised how an 
organisation such as mine supports institutions such as 
the United Nations or the International Criminal Court 
that seem to have delivered so little on more than one 
occasion, even if that support is given in good faith or 
within the constraints of something slightly better, being 
better than nothing. With Hopgood, I admire the basicality 
of Red Cross work, with the pursuit of the type of restricted 
goals that once characterised Amnesty before modesty 
was superseded by ‘agency’. During the many reflective 
moments that this book prompted, I was nostalgically 
steered back to the time when Amnesty was proud to be 
a ‘human rights organisation’ only in the sense that it 
worked for a strictly demarcated mandate of some types 
of prisoners, and victims of only torture, execution and 
disappearance. That was the time when Amnesty didn’t 
presume to advise on political options for governments. 
When the organisation, in Max Weber’s ([1919]2004) 
dichotomy, was about the ethic of principles, not about the 
ethic of responsibility – more about that later.
 
My core question about Hopgood’s book is this: is it possible 
that the author has missed one storey in his human rights 
building? That there are those who represent this ‘ethic of 
principles’ in a pure form, within the full meaning of human 
rights defence? That between the upper-case Regime and 
lower-case human rights, there is the human rights regime, 
not capitalised? This human rights defence is not interchan-
geable with the ‘civil liberties, justice, freedom, fairness, 
dignity or decency’ that Hopgood (2013a: 172) quotes. All 
those other terms lack an international legal counterpart 
and do not have the utility of human rights norms as instru-
ments of social change. If Amnesty International, or the US 
State Department, or a Chinese blogger address the case of 
a Chinese prisoner, they refer to international standards of 
freedom of expression, a fair trial and humane prison conditi-
ons. Hopgood rightly notes that such standards are neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient reason for action. One may answer 
Hopgood by saying that now that we have them, they help. 
They are a lot less ‘universal’ than they claim, but more uni-
versal than anything else.
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Yet Hopgood has good reason for doubt. The very term 
‘human rights’ is not so clear and well-defined, let alone 
that the concepts are engraved in stone as some advocates 
would have it. Many aspects of the human rights discourse 
can at best be described as an ‘agreement not to disagree’. 
NGOs active in development or humanitarian aid, national 
and UN officials, legal scholars and grassroots activists 
all have their own accents in, if not definitions of, human 
rights. Human rights communication has a strong tendency 
to be, in Niklas Luhmann’s term, ‘autopoietic’ (Verschraegen 
2006). That is, the terms of human rights discourse refer 
to themselves rather than to anything outside them. In 
1946 one of the framers of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, philosopher Jacques Maritain, explained to 
an outsider that ‘we all agree on the rights as long as no 
one asks us why’ (Glendon 2002: 77). The result is, again 
in Luhmann’s words, ‘silence’. Those of us in the human 
rights community do not gladly discuss one another’s ideas 
of human rights and prefer to leave unmentioned what we 
differ on.
From this silence it becomes harder and harder to set limits. 
Witness the ever-growing number of mandates of UN special 
rapporteurs. Initially there were a few experts reporting on 
torture and disappearance and extrajudicial killings. Now 
there are dozens of human rights rapporteurs, addressing 
issues such as toxic waste or the environment or ’international 
solidarity’. The authors of an overview written for the Freedom 
Rights Project have labelled this ‘human rights inflation’ 
(Mchangama & Verdirame 2014). A case in point may be 
the mandate of the special rapporteur on the situation of 
the human rights defender. A Fact Sheet (United Nations 
2004) explains that people in all kinds of circumstances and 
professions can be (non-violent) human rights defenders, 
even if only temporarily. Amnesty reports have subsumed 
a wide array of individuals under this defender label: an 
American doctor killed for working in an abortion clinic, 
a Nepalese forester protesting onslaughts on the natural 
environment by a multi-national corporation, a Pakistani 
woman who refuses to wear a burka in a fundamentalist 
community, a Brazilian boy who survived a police raid on 
street children, a Palestinian nurse in a rape clinic (see for 
instance Amnesty International 2012). In some ways and in 
specific circumstances, this implies, each and every one of us 
can be a human rights defender. This is obfuscating rather 
than clarifying the human rights defender case. 
I return to Weber’s concept of the ‘ethics of principles’. 
In 1919, he said: ‘We must be clear about the fact that 
all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of 
two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed 
maxims: by an “ethic of ultimate ends” or to an “ethic of 
responsibility.” This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate 
ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that an ethic of 
responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism’. 
Can we conceptualise a type of human rights defender who 
somehow combines the best of all worlds? People who are 
knowledgeable about international law but also committed 
to action, organisations that know how to use conventions 
but are also connecting to the individuals most concerned? 
And can we do all this without undue claims to whatever 
success, without assigning themselves responsibilities they 
are not entitled to assume, without ‘drinking from the well 
of power’ (Hopgood 2013a: 141)?
The present-day confluence of human rights activism 
started in 1993. In Vienna, the United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights was a gathering of many 
people who were sometimes called human rights defenders 
(Marks 1994) The Conference organised them into a 
consistent group, that includes not only ‘classical’ activists 
for integrity rights, but also advocates of much more: the 
rights of indigenous people, social and economic rights, 
compensation for comfort women from wartime Japan, 
rights of domestic servants and street children and AIDS 
patients. From this moment in history, the human rights 
movement could seek a way out of the labyrinth by following 
Hopgood’s advice of opening up to ‘less secular, less 
categorical, less universal’ human rights interpretations. 
But not so fast. More needs to be said on the pitfalls that 
human rights defence is facing, for if we don’t recognise 
them we are bound to repeat them.
Human rights pitfalls
The 1993 Vienna Declaration stressed not only the 
universality but also the indivisibility and interdependence 
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of human rights. The indivisibility notion has since 
been a shibboleth of the great majority of human rights 
organisations. It is actually a pitfall. Indivisibility and 
interdependence may have a valid political or philosophical 
meaning, but they obscure what is needed in campaigning 
and concrete policies. Amnesty had always said there 
was ‘no hierarchy’, yet during its first four decades it 
was campaigning for selected aims only. In the words 
of a founding father of Amnesty’s Dutch section, Peter 
Baehr (1994: 20): ‘Amnesty International draws part of its 
strength from its focused mandate. If it became a general 
human rights organization, it would risk dispersing its 
efforts and thereby its power to influence.’
Does Hopgood applaud this indivisibility? According to 
human rights veteran Aryeh Neier (2013), Hopgood’s book 
argues that social justice is the same thing as human 
rights or an overlooked aspect of human rights. Neier’s 
article is titled ‘Misunderstanding Our Mission’, but here 
he seems to misunderstand Hopgood, for Hopgood does 
not equate the two. It’s the human rights ‘movement’ itself 
that in recent years has encroached greatly on the domain 
of social justice. Taking indivisibility as a starting point 
easily assimilates human rights with social justice. And 
that places human rights activism on very muddy ground. 
Social and economic services and provisions are always 
predicated upon a measure of scarcity (Cranston 1967). 
There is only so much food or water, there are only so many 
doctors and hospitals, while in protecting people from 
being tortured, scarcity of any goods does hardly play a role. 
Social and economic provisions demand investments, often 
huge ones, which have to be budget-balanced with other 
possible investments, while most of the work for ‘classical’ 
human rights comes quite cheap or for free. Of course there 
are costs involved in organising elections, training police, 
installing a proper judiciary and so on, but much of that is 
not a conditio sine qua non for protecting against attacks 
on their physical and mental integrity. 
Another pitfall made its appearance in Amnesty in the 
early 2000s when then-secretary-general Irene Khan 
promoted the end of the ’voicelessness’ of those subjugated 
to human rights abuse. Human rights defenders are 
supposedly the agents of this ‘voice’ (Khan 2009). This 
was nothing new. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Václav 
Havel, Andrei Sakharov, Albie Sachs, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
Wei Jingsheng, Wole Soyinka and many others had been 
such outspoken individuals during the years and decades 
before. But broadening this to a much more generalised 
‘voice of the affected groups’ - a cherished maxim of those 
advocating human rights as an instance of social justice 
- is problematic. Evidently there are advantages in giving 
a voice to the people who are suffering the abuses. Their 
reports are often first-hand testimonies, local people may 
know the situation better than anyone else, local people 
may be the primary ‘agents’ in change and protection. 
But the disadvantages are no less real. Victims often are 
not objective, if only because of traumatisation. They may 
not be bound to the tests of evidence that monitors would 
be submitted to. The (international) political situation 
may be far beyond the scope of their knowledge. The 
spokespersons, through their local ties, often have local 
interests. It may not be clear whom they are actually 
representing and what other voices they are suppressing. 
Most importantly, the ‘voice’ of local spokespersons is 
nearly always selected by international organisations, since 
they are the ones with access to media, politicians and 
public. As Hopgood remarked at the Changing Perspective 
on Human Rights seminar in The Hague (February, 
2014) that gave rise to this collection of essays: ‘The 
overwhelming voice in Russia nowadays is against the 
rights of LGBT. In that sense, Putin is the democrat who 
listens.’ But that is not the kind of cherry that international 
NGOs like to pick.
The human rights defender, 
restrictedly defined
What if we could go beyond the pitfalls? Can a concept of 
‘pure’ human rights defence, as defined in Weber’s ethics 
of ultimate ends, be the way out for sustainable human 
rights activism? It should be noted that Weber himself was 
not so positive about the supporters of principled ethics. In 
his aforementioned essay (Weber [1919]2004), he makes 
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such observations as that ‘I am under the impression 
that in nine out of ten cases I deal with windbags who 
do not fully realize what they take upon themselves but 
who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations’. But 
that was in 1919, and in a country that was in the grip of 
violent radical movements of high-strung communists and 
nationalists. Nowadays, ‘romantic notions’ is not really 
what you can say of human rights principles that are so 
embedded in international and domestic law. 
Can the present-day human rights defenders be mediators 
between the grand human rights narrative and the plights of 
those whose human rights are violated? And can they keep 
their hands clean from the compromises and sell-outs that 
are the normal ways of political life? If such a defence is at 
all possible, it should be conditioned by a number of factors. 
First, the basis for activism can be none other than a 
rather limited interpretation of human rights, based on 
those aspects of international human rights law that 
are most widely accepted and are defined in the greatest 
detail. The integrity rights of the Universal Declaration 
brought us conventions and protocols on the prohibition 
of discrimination, racism, torture, capital punishment, 
extrajudicial executions and disappearances. It is not true 
that these rights are ‘Western’, nor would it be the point. It 
is simple enough to acknowledge that a person’s physical 
and mental integrity is not something to be tampered with 
under any pretext.
Second, this ‘pure’ human rights defence should refrain 
from making any decision where interests have to be 
balanced, which goes for nearly all political decisions. They 
should only speak out when laws or policies are in clear 
violation of human rights norms. In line with Weber’s ethic 
of principles, Martti Koskenniemi states (2009: 10-11): 
‘There is certainly much to be said in favor of 
human rights staying outside regular administrative 
procedures, as critics and watchdogs, flagging 
the interests and preferences of those who are not 
regularly represented in administrative institutions. 
[…] If human rights cannot – as I have suggested 
here – be identified with any distinct projects of social 
policy or economic distribution, they can be identified 
with a professional sensibility, a set of biases and 
preferences. […] To deal with that involves some 
capacity for critical reflection, engagement and 
distance, passion and coolness. This, I think, is what 
legal training ought to produce.’
Third, human rights defenders should not don the mantle 
of activists who ‘know the solutions.’ Activists may 
make pronouncements about the numbers of immigrants 
that should be accepted, protest against ‘globalisation’ 
as a violation of human rights, demand that business 
refrain from investing in repressive countries, press for 
a boycott of sport events, militate against a particular 
president being elected chairman of an intergovernmental 
organisation. But human rights defenders get lost when 
they take on these kinds of responsibilities. There are just 
too many steps and decisions involved which cannot be 
purely human-rights based. The human rights defender can 
and should campaign for upholding the principles, but then 
make room for others to do the wheeling and dealing.
Fourth, the defenders should refrain from making 
pronouncements about virtually everything that is done 
among citizens, be it discrimination, insult, contempt, 
abuse or aggression. It is not up to human rights defenders 
to substitute for criminal responsibility or social justice. 
They can speak out however when the authorities are 
condoning these practices or are not making the efforts 
that the rule of law prescribes.
And fifth, as human rights defenders never advocate the 
use of violent means, nor should they comment on the 
means that states choose to use within their territory 
(administration, policing) or elsewhere (intervention) 
unless the actual use and results of those measures clearly 
violate human rights.
This kind of restricted and restrained human rights defence 
does not arrest the progress of human rights discourse. 
Human rights can and should be progressively elaborated 
on. For instance, after torture was defined in the 1984 UN 
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convention, a legitimate and valuable debate ensued on 
what constitutes ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’. 
Besides human rights defence, there is ample room for 
all the activism, action, reporting and testifying that is 
not strictly human-rights based in nature, nor should it 
be referred to as such. This brings us back to the earliest 
years of Amnesty International: a solidarity movement for 
prisoners of conscience that did not mince many words 
about whether it was a human rights organisation. From 
Amnesty and like-minded organisations have come the 
individuals that we should not hesitate to characterise as 
human rights defenders in the true sense of the word. They 
include persons named by Hopgood (2013a: 178): José 
Zalaquett (Chile), Juan Méndez (Argentina), Wilder Taylor 
(Uruguay) and Alex Boraine (South Africa). One might add 
people such as Liu Xiaobo (China), Lyudmila Alexeyeva 
(Russia), Hihah Jilani (Pakistan), Adam Michnik (Poland), 
Shirin Ebadi (Iran) or Theo van Boven (Netherlands).
Human rights between the ground and 
the sky
Not long ago, a staff member of a small Southern Amnesty 
section visited Amsterdam. His office fully depends on 
Western money and when there is not enough of it, well, 
they survive without it for a while. He told us that he, 
notwithstanding the international instructions of the 
organisation, did not want to move too ‘close to the ground’ 
(see Steve Crawshaw in this volume). He did not want to 
raise local money, or become intimate with local advocacy 
groups, or focus too much on domestic issues. Because all 
this would make him vulnerable to the local sponsors and 
spokespeople who have strong political agendas of their 
own. What makes his work sustainable, he explained, is that 
it stands under the aegis of an international human rights 
organisation and a human rights regime that his government 
endorses, most times hypocritically of course. In cases like 
his, human rights make a real difference. And insofar as this 
case is representative, the movement that adorns itself with 
the epithet of human rights is more than the Secular Church 
as Hopgood has so aptly characterised it. It’s the collection 
of actions, minute as they may be on world scale, that is 
somehow protected by real-life international rules.
In the final paragraph of his book, Hopgood (2013a: 182) 
sums this up as to the Human Rights Regime: ‘The eclipse 
of its moral authority at the global level [is] only a matter 
of time.’ We may only hope Hopgood is not completely 
right, that even if the ICC, the R2P and other international 
machinery collapse, there will be enough left of covenants 
and commissioners and monitoring for human rights work to 
survive - sadder, slimmer and wiser - in the efforts of human 
rights defenders.
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In 2013, Stephen Hopgood published an important book 
whose title says it all: The Endtimes of Human Rights. 
In this book, Hopgood asks how far can ‘we’ push for the 
human rights agenda in what is fast becoming a multi-
polar world, ultimately reaching a negative conclusion. 
With Europe declining, the United States ambivalent about 
permanent multilateralism, and new powers emphasizing 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, there is 
no political power left to defend the global human rights 
regime. According to Hopgood, the decline of its prime 
institutions has already set in, particularly the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) that Hopgood (2013a: 168) dubs as 
‘Europe’s Court for Africa,’ because ‘African states are too 
fractured politically to resist.’ 
Hopgood offers a deep analysis and criticism of the Court, 
right down to the architecture of the ICC’s temporary 
premises in The Hague and even the cut of the defendants’ 
suits. Hopgood is unrestrained in his criticism of Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, the Court’s first prosecutor. He writes 
(2013a: 8): ‘The ICC’s first prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
was not a disciplined or dispassionate man and some of 
those who worked with him describe his style as “erratic 
and irrational”.’ Luis Moreno Ocampo was, in fact, elected 
without opposition. He was determined to activate the Court 
quickly. Throughout his tenure as ICC prosecutor, Ocampo 
opened investigations in eight situations. He gathered 
a workforce for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and 
created vetting procedures for information coming into the 
office. He was, in the opinion of some ICC supporters, an 
operationally sound choice for the OTP. Hopgood, however, 
seems to interpret Ocampo’s alleged charisma and his 
outspoken nature as feeding into the dramatisation of 
the Court and its ‘show trials.’ He states (2013a: 126): 
‘International criminal trials are grand ritualized spectacles 
that symbolize authority and power by dramatizing the 
archetypal myth of the hero defeating existential threats to 
the community.’
Some member states of the Assembly of the African Union 
(AU) have been similarly vocal in their dissatisfaction with 
the Court. Composed of 54 or all-African states (except 
Morocco), the Assembly called in 2013 for the cases against 
the Kenyan and Sudanese leaders to be deferred. It argued 
that no sitting head of state shall be prosecuted before any 
international court or tribunal during their term of office.1 
Member states have been urged to speak with one voice 
against the ICC in its prosecution of African heads of states 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.2
I have problems with this perception of both Hopgood and the 
AU and its implication that the ICC is futile and that accoun-
tability for large-scale violations of international criminal 
and human rights law is, essentially, an unworthy pursuit. 
This perception fails to fully appreciate that the ICC is based 
on the principle of complementarity. After all, a case is only 
admissible in situations where the investigating or prose-
cuting State is unable or unwilling to act.3 Thus, all cases 
being pursued in the ICC, including the Kenyatta case, have 
actually been deemed admissible based on this principle. In 
Stephen A. Lamony
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this essay, I will argue that the ICC is not ‘Europe’s court for 
Africa’, as Hopgood and the AU claim, explaining why and 
how it can function as a truly international court that ensures 
justice and accountability globally. 
Condemnation of the ICC and its 
positive effects
The first decade of the International Criminal Court – 
which has been defined by Ross O’Donnellan (2013) as 
the first era (1998-2013) - was wrought with difficulties 
and criticism. Even the most committed ICC advocates are 
provoked to question the institution, and rightfully so. The 
more academics and practitioners who study the Court, 
the more questions they ask. Why have there been only two 
convictions? Why is the Court having such trouble with 
the enforcement of arrest warrants? Is the Court racist? 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the former 
chairman of the African Union (AU) in 2013 thinks so. 
According to BBC Africa (2013), Desalegn accused the ICC 
of ‘race hunting’. Former AU Commission Chairperson Jean 
Ping also believes that the ICC is biased against Africa. 
In a 2011 interview with Voice of America (Stearns 2011), 
Ping said ‘the court is “discriminatory” because it only goes 
after crimes committed in Africa while ignoring crimes by 
Western powers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.’
I understand and do respect and sympathise with the 
widespread African feeling that the absence of ICC 
investigations elsewhere implies that serious crimes are 
happening only in Africa. Eighteen cases in eight situations 
have been brought before the ICC, and all of these are in 
Africa. However, it should be remembered that four of these 
situations were referred by the states parties themselves 
(Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mali and Uganda). The situation in Ivory Coast 
or Cote d’Ivoire is exceptional because it was referred to 
the Court (under Article 12(3) declaration and the former 
prosecutor initiated investigations himself). Two situations 
(Darfur and Libya) were referred by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) and the situation in Kenya was 
initiated by the former prosecutor himself. With this in 
mind, it must be appreciated that the ICC was essentially 
invited to Africa. 
Indeed, as Desmond Tutu reminds us in a letter sent to the 
delegates of the AU Extraordinary Summit in October 2013: 
‘More than twenty African countries helped to found 
the ICC. Of 108 nations that initially joined the 
ICC, thirty are in Africa. Eleven Africans hold senior 
management positions at the court. Five of the court’s 
eighteen judges are African, as is the Vice President 
of the court. The chief prosecutor of the court [Fatou 
Bensouda], who has huge power over which cases 
are brought forward, is from Africa. Other high level 
offices occupied by Africans include, the director of 
jurisdiction complementarity and cooperation division 
in the OTP, the head of the UN Liaison office to the UN, 
the head office of public counsel for defence (OPCD) 
and head of International cooperation section of the 
OTP. The ICC is, quite literally, Africa’s court.’ 
In fact, African countries have been heavily involved in 
the ICC since initial negotiations over twenty years ago. 
As far back as 1993, delegations from African states 
(Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, and South Africa) 
participated in discussions when the International Law 
Commission presented a draft statute to the United Nations 
General Assembly. Of the 47 African states present for the 
drafting of the Rome Statute, the majority of them voted in 
favour of its adoption and the subsequent establishment of 
the ICC. Hundreds of African NGOs -many of which belong 
to the Coalition for the ICC - would disagree with the 
categorisation of the ICC as a ‘European Court for Africa’, 
as this characterization would neglect the important role 
that African countries have played in the ongoing creation 
of the international human rights regime.
Still, Hopgood, the AU, and countless others, have publicly 
condemned the Court as having an unfair focus on Africa. 
In response, efforts are being made to strengthen the legal 
framework within Africa so that cases will not go to the ICC 
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and in addition, member states seeking to refer situations 
to the ICC have to seek the advice of the AU.5 This may 
in fact be the ICC’s biggest triumph. The ICC has always 
aimed to prosecute the most serious crimes only, leaving 
room to states for national prosecutions. If governments are 
not happy with the standard of justice or perceived lack of 
bias on the part of the ICC, they should undertake their own 
credible investigations.
The continuing effort by the AU to participate in the ICC 
process and strengthen African mechanisms to deal with 
African problems has been noted by the AU.6 The Activity 
Report of the African Court for the Year 2013 positively 
noted that between April and October 2013, there had 
been increased human rights-related interventions at 
the national level by member states (particularly in Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ethiopia) as well as increased recognition 
of the need to protect children’s rights and the need 
for peaceful, free and fair elections. Furthermore, 2016 
has been declared the African Year of Human Rights. 
However, the difficulty of domesticating the international 
instruments of human rights, lack of financial resources, 
and fragmentation and competence of judicial officers are 
challenges to reinforcing the AU’s ability to fight impunity 
through strengthening Member States’ national judiciary 
and reconciliation mechanisms. 
At the validation workshop on the subject of International 
Criminal Justice System, Peace, Justice and Reconciliation 
as well as the Impact/Actions of the ICC in Africa and 
the Ways of Strengthening African Mechanisms to Deal 
with African Challenges and Problems, which took place 
in Tanzania in 2013, the ICC was seen to be failing to 
encourage complementarity. Some situations outside the 
African continent have been under preliminary examination 
for a number of years, in contrast to situations in Africa. 
Alternatives to the ICC were considered as well as the 
pursuit of ICC and UN reform by the AU. The establishment 
of Extraordinary Chambers within national courts, with the 
participation of qualified foreign judges, was suggested 
as an alternative to the ICC in prosecuting serious 
international crimes. Concerns were also raised regarding 
the UNSC using its power under the Rome Statute only on 
weaker or enemy states. It was then considered that the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union may play 
the same role currently played by the UNSC in referring 
cases to the ICC, referring such cases to the African Court 
of Justice and Human and People’s Rights. 
There has thus been extensive dialogue in Africa concerning 
the ICC. A working document from a meeting of the AU, 
Concept Note on International Criminal Justice System, 
Peace, Justice and Reconciliation as well as the Impact/
Actions of the International Criminal Court in Africa and 
the Ways of Strengthening African Mechanisms to deal with 
African Challenges and Problems, discusses for instance 
‘The fight against impunity in Africa’. The fight against 
impunity constitutes a fundamental principle in the basic 
law of the AU (e.g. Article 4(h)), and such commitment 
(further expressed by each Member State through various 
avenues) led to the establishment of the African Court on 
Human and People’ Rights. The Concept Note highlighted 
three concerns of the AU on the indictment of (sitting) 
African Heads of State and Government by the ICC: 1) 
The politicisation of indictments; 2) The undermining of 
sovereignty; and 3) Distraction from duties (in terms of 
the head of state). According to the Concept Note these 
concerns arise from ‘the functioning immunity for the 
Heads of State’, even though the Rome Statute clearly 
states, under Article 27, that it ‘shall apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity’.
But what are the proposed solutions to these problems? 
Withdrawing from the ICC? No longer calling for the 
indictment of Heads of State who have committed crimes 
against humanity? My modest contribution here would be to 
underline and dismiss the hypocrisy of the AU’s assertions 
that the ICC as a racist, imperialist and ineffective court, 
as well as Hopgood’s criticisms which regurgitate the AU’s 
critique of the ICC as ‘a European vanity project’ (p. 165) 
(..) ‘with only an imagined constituency beyond activists 
and advocates’ (p. 141). This can be rejected easily by 
reviewing the Court’s make-up and establishment and 
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72Changing perspectives on human rights
Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights | Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World 
the reality that the ICC has jurisdiction over two-thirds 
of African governments, two-thirds of North America 
governments, ninety-five percent (95%) of Europe, seventy-
five percent (75%) of South and Latin America, and less 
than fifty percent (50%) of Central, East and South Asia. 
Still, there is a clear benefit to the AU’s complaints. They 
will spur the international community to monitor the ICC 
and ensure that cases outside of Africa that are worthy 
of scrutiny and trial are being pursued. Also, clearly, it is 
forcing Africa to re-evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of their own mechanisms. This will ideally ensure that 
justice and accountability are effectively sought within 
Africa, thus allowing the Court to operate as it was truly 
intended, as a court of last resort. Examples of steps taken 
within Africa to strengthen institutions include (Kariri & 
Mayekiso 2014):
• The AU’s establishment of a Commission of Inquiry in 
South Sudan. 
• The installation of Uganda’s War Crimes Division (WCD), 
now known as the International Crimes Division (ICD) of 
the High Court.
• (Failed) attempts to establish a special tribunal in 
Kenya.
• The formation of an International Crimes Division of the 
High Court of Kenya that, while not yet in operation, will 
deal, inter alia, with international crimes.
• The extension of the jurisdiction of the East Africa Court 
of Justice (EACJ) to cover crimes against humanity 
(Lamony 2013).
• The recommendations of the AU High Panel on Sudan 
(the Mbeki Panel) how to bring peace to Sudan (while 
still recognising the role of the ICC).
• The establishment of the Special Criminal Court for 
Events in Darfur (SCCED), however, the cases at the 
SCCED do not address major issues of accountability in 
Darfur (Lamony 2013).
• The suggestion by the AU’s Panel of the Wise for an 
African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework 
(ATJF), which addressed peace, justice and 
reconciliation in Africa. 
Internationalisation of the ICC and its 
challenges
It is clear that the ICC, including the OTP and Assembly 
of State Parties (ASP), have learned from the first 
investigations and prosecutions, and the need for 
corrections and improvements are being taken seriously 
by all. Still, NGOs, including the CICC, have raised many 
concerns and wish to work with the ICC, the Assembly, 
the AU and all others in making the ICC more effective. 
There remains a particular need to see the ICC trying cases 
outside of Africa. But this is a difficult issue which cannot 
be addressed simplistically.
 
First, indications that the ICC will open investigations 
elsewhere as a result of pressure from the AU or other 
states will lead to conclusions that the ICC is politicised. A 
belief exists amongst several academics that opening any 
investigation outside Africa will tackle the misperception that 
the court is picking on alleged criminals from one continent 
only. Perhaps Fatou Bensouda, Ocampo’s successor, will find 
a way of addressing this huge challenge for the OTP. 
Second, a higher case load naturally means higher 
expenses. This increased financial strain upon the Court 
is compounded by the global financial crisis. The ICC is an 
independent body, and the majority of its funds come from 
States parties. The contributions of each state are based 
on a determination of the country’s income.7 The global 
economic crisis has had a negative effect on most of the 
Court’s Member States, resulting in delayed or partially 
paid contributions. Whereas some contributors originally 
paid in one instalment in the first quarter of the year, 
new trends show payments in two instalments spread out 
over the course of the year. Thus, the issue of funding is 
a key factor that needs to be addressed so that the Court 
can operate effectively and not fall victim to criticism 
from Hopgood and many others. Obviously, improving the 
effectiveness of the Court by addressing these pressing 
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issues will, to some extent, assuage the fears of ICC 
sceptics. There is a need to see the court overcoming these 
logistical obstacles so that it may affirm its legitimacy. 
In sum, the Court does not need to function as ‘Europe’s 
court for Africa,’ as Hopgood views it. Nor does it need to 
function as ‘Africa’s Court,’ as perceived by Desmond Tutu. 
The International Criminal Court should be just that: an 
international court, ensuring justice and accountability in 
not one, but every region of the world. 
How to ensure an even greater internationalisation of the ICC 
is a challenge that ties into Hopgood’s broader perception 
of the doomed future of international human rights law in a 
neo-Westphalian world. As Kenneth Roth (2014), Executive 
Director of Human Rights Watch has observed:
‘Certain obvious non-African candidates for 
prosecution are from states that have never joined 
the court, such as Sri Lanka, North Korea, Uzbekistan, 
Israel, Palestine, Syria, or Iraq. The Security Council 
could have given the ICC jurisdiction over crimes in 
these cases, but the council’s permanent members 
have tended to shield nations they favour from the 
court’s attention. The UN General Assembly, where no 
state has a veto, lacks the power to grant the court 
jurisdiction.’
The ICC is not a useless institution, but unsatisfactory 
ratification of the Rome Statute prevents it from fulfilling 
its potential. Only increased ratification, particularly by 
the more powerful states, will allow the Court to function 
effectively. Will this ever happen? 
In a lecture delivered in 2013, Hopgood dismisses the 
possibility that the world’s most powerful countries will ever 
ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC. He poses the rhetorical 
question: ‘If you’re a serious aspirant to global power, why 
would you join this Court?’. What about the US? A 2012 
poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs provides that 
seventy percent of Americans believe that the US should 
ratify the Rome Statute. There is a more positive approach 
to the ICC by the Obama administration compared to 
the Bush administration, which completely withdrew US 
support for the ICC by removing its signature from the 
Rome Statute. The US already has laws in place to punish 
the crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction over. But despite 
increased engagement with the ICC, it remains difficult 
to imagine the US ratifying the Rome Statute in the near 
future. What conditions would have to be in place for it to 
do so? And what about Russia? China? India? 
My assessment is that the efforts of civil society groups 
are of fundamental importance in this regard. Increased 
dialogue and understanding spurred by NGOs (e.g. 
American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (AMICC)) may be the best hope 
for facilitating ratification. It is useful to believe that this is 
possible, even though it takes time and might not happen 
in the near future. It is politics that has prevented the US 
and others from joining the ICC. This is why the work of civil 
society is so important in this regard.
Opportunities for a complementary 
human rights advocacy
The author makes some dubious assertions concerning the 
ICC, and argues that a Western-controlled human rights 
regime will fail in a neo-Westphalian world, because the 
UN system and the idea of a top-down approach are flawed 
and difficult to maintain. Although I agree with Hopgood 
on the need for a bottom-up approach, I believe he too 
easily dismisses the efforts of Amnesty International and 
other INGOs to adapt within Africa and to cooperate with 
local NGOs that engage their communities to advocate 
international justice and human rights. 
First, the same concerns about a top-down approach, or 
about credibility issues, could be raised with regard to the 
role of local organisations (capital city-based NGOs vs. 
rural-based or grassroots NGOs). 
Second, INGOs are not only gatekeepers of human rights 
claims but have also facilitated the advocacy process by 
bringing local concerns to the highest level at the United 
Nations and gaining success. For example, in 2011 and 
2013, when the government of Kenya requested that the 
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UN Security Council defer the ICC investigation in Kenya, 
coalition members in Kenya opposed the request, and 
the coalition wrote a letter to the president of the UNSC 
supporting the position of its members in opposition. INGOs 
have also facilitated the process of communication between 
UNSC members and the legal representative for victims in 
the Uhuru Kenyatta case by putting them in contact with 
one another so they could express victims’ concerns and 
opposition to delays in the case. 
Third, INGOs have provided opportunities for local NGOs to 
better influence policy decisions by improving the flow of 
information between New York and their nations’ capital 
cities and by sharing with them timely, daily reports or 
briefings, analysis and recommendations from the UN. This 
has resulted in local NGOs writing letters to UNSC members 
and governments, the AU and to newspapers, raising their 
organisations’ concerns or recommendations. Conversely, 
consultations and collaboration with the coordinator of 
African States Parties in New York and legal advisers from 
Africa have increasingly been hallmarks of INGOS. Together 
they draft position papers aimed at influencing negative 
outcomes at AU summits -- such as withdrawal from the ICC 
-- or provide clarity on misperceptions or political concerns 
about the ICC. Whenever the Coalition for the ICC (CICC), 
for instance, has concerns to share with African states 
or generally states parties, the CICC has lobbied them, 
distributed papers and information to states parties, as well 
as monitored and discussed ways of improving the tensions 
between the Court and Africa. The CICC has obtained 
agendas and reports of AU meetings on the ICC held in Addis 
Ababa and New York, received feedback from these meetings 
and disseminated this information to our members, ICC 
officials and friends of the ICC group in New York.
Fourth, INGOs have mobilised local, regional and 
international NGOs to speak with one voice. This carries 
more weight before the governments they intend to 
influence in comparison to advocacy campaigns conducted 
by either INGOs or individual local NGOs only.
In sum, I would like to state that INGOs and local NGOs have 
a complementary role to play in preventing human rights 
abuses and promoting the protection of human rights. INGOs 
should continue to facilitate network strengthening at local 
and regional levels by facilitating collaboration between 
member organisations. Local NGOs should develop innovative 
projects or activities for engaging their communities and 
avoid duplicating projects, which leads to confrontation 
or competition for donor funding or claiming credibility or 
the success of an advocacy campaign. The relationships 
between INGOs and local NGOs must be based on trust, 
consensus, mutual understanding and support, and not 
petty competition so that they can remain motivated to work 
together. Cross-cutting issues should be mainstreamed 
across international, local and regional human rights work. 
Through dialogue and consensus, INGOs and local NGOs 
can settle on a mutually beneficial division of labour, with 
INGOs playing a role in engagement at the UN and other 
IGOs, while local NGOs address local and regional problems 
on the ground. Donors or funders should be encouraging 
partnerships between INGOs and local NGOs because they 
(donors and NGOs together) are powerful agents of change.
The way forward 
In this manner a balance can and should be struck between 
universal human rights and a rights regime which respects 
different cultures and traditions. This does not mean that 
INGOs should not continue their mission. INGOs have an 
enormous amount of resources at their disposal to initiate 
dialogue and action that may inspire change. But we need 
to see the continued rise of human rights organisations 
born in the Global South. They face a number of difficulties 
including, but not limited to 1) Lack of funding; 2) Poor 
governance within the sector; 3) Limited technical and 
organisational capacity; 4)Political interference hindering 
operations such as a climate of intimidation; and 5) 
Draconian/repressive CSO laws that impose restrictions on 
the operations of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and 
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hinder them in their fight against human rights abuse and 
impunity.
Nonetheless, advancements in media and social media 
are making it easier for human rights organisations to 
make an impact. Over the past number of years we have 
seen videos and images go viral via Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube. This can be used to great advantage by human 
rights NGOs operating in the South to relate what is actually 
occurring on the ground. Communication is important, not 
just between NGOs and the public, but also between NGOs 
themselves. Cooperation and communication help to avoid 
duplication of efforts and will allow small NGOs to make a 
greater impact.
Finally, I do agree with Hopgood that we need a 
redistribution of power in order to be effective in our 
human rights and international justice work. The UN and 
international human rights organisations are not perfect 
and need improvement. We need a re-evaluation or even 
reform of the UN and international NGOs. The future of 
human rights advocacy lies in collaboration between 
international, regional and local NGOs and supporting 
local and regional efforts. Reformation and transformation 
of international systems are of crucial importance for the 
future of human rights and international justice. So, it is 
solely Hopgood’s analysis of the International Criminal 
Court that I deem unfair. I fully agree with some of his 
broader arguments on the advancement of human rights. 
His observations are important, for anyone seeking to 
promote human rights in today’s multi-polar world to read 
The Endtimes of Human Rights, even if it is just to remind 
you that the human rights sphere is changing, and we must 
not be afraid to re-evaluate, re-think and re-structure.
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This essay dissects Hopgood’s main arguments in his book 
and focuses on three important flaws in his examination of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. In particular, his 
book: 1) fails to present a more nuanced discussion of the 
status of the R2P as a universal norm; 2) focuses only on 
the third pillar of the R2P, which is the use of coercive force 
or military intervention; and 3) exaggerates the role of major 
powers in advancing international support for the R2P norm.  
 
Stephen Hopgood’s work is a post-modernist deconstruction 
of the international Human Rights regime – including the 
emerging global norm of the Responsibility to Protect – which 
he considers to have become ‘dependent on the successes 
of liberal power and money’ and thus ‘the eclipse of its 
moral authority at the global level was only ever a matter of 
time’ (p. 182). He points out that Human Rights dominated 
international humanitarianism in the 1990s, which 
contributed to the building of an interventionist infrastructure 
based on protection and justice. Specifically, he examines the 
structure and dynamics of cases in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and how the principle of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) was debated in the UN and applied in Libya and Syria. 
Both the ICC and the R2P are important pillars of what he 
calls the ‘Human Rights Imperium’ that prefers universal 
norms over local forms of authority. He described the ICC 
as the ‘cathedral of humanist authority’ that not only has to 
symbolise international justice but, more importantly, also to 
show or perform justice.  
In addition, Hopgood argues that the creation of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), which launched the principle of R2P in 
2001, serves to make sense and legitimise – albeit after 
the fact – NATO’s attack in Belgrade that was supported 
by Western powers. As a norm, according to him, the R2P 
encapsulates the merging of the two discourses on Human 
Rights and ‘just war’ law. He sees R2P advocates as norm 
entrepreneurs who build their legitimacy through a spiral 
process of transforming the norm from morality (natural 
law) to politics (positive law), then back to morality and 
politics again (p. 135). He contends, for example, that ICISS 
‘implicitly claims that there is a moral authority, that of 
humanity, over and above the Security Council’ (p. 137), 
which to him is a political act that could then lead to further 
innovation based on precedent. For example, failure on 
the part of collective organisations like the UN to respond 
could lead to intensifying pressures for collective action to 
intervene ‘by ad hoc coalitions or individual states’ (ibid.).
Following the ICISS Report, the R2P was embedded in 
various statements and reports of UN Secretaries-General 
Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon and in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, launched on the occasion of the UN’s 
60th anniversary. The Security Council invoked the norm in 
Libya in 2011 and, mainly by Western powers, in the ongoing 
crisis of Syria. France also applied it in the case of Cyclone 
Nargis in Myanmar/Burma in 2008 (Curiously, however, 
Hopgood does not cite Russia’s use of R2P in the Ossetia 
crisis in Georgia in 2008 as another example. It is significant 
to underscore here, however, that the Cyclone Nargis and 
Ossetia cases are incorrect applications of R2P).  
Hopgood’s book is an excellent scholarly work that, overall, 
contributes to ongoing academic and policy debates on 
universal human rights norms in general and the institutions 
of the ICC and the R2P in particular. His post-modernist 
approach to explaining the ‘endtimes’ of Human Rights 
provides an alternative perspective to understanding the 
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dynamics of social and state power in building international 
institutions and global norms. However, his portrayal of the 
R2P norm is not accurate and is somewhat contrived to suit 
his major thesis that it is part of a Western liberal project 
that seeks to impose certain human rights values that are far 
from universal. The following section presents the three major 
flaws in his book in more detail.
R2P as an evolving and contested norm
Hopgood’s book gives the false impression that the R2P has 
achieved full status as a universal norm. This is problematic 
because he fails to recognise the nuances not only in 
regard to the substance or contents of the R2P, but also the 
complexity and difficulties in its implementation. The fact of 
the matter is that it remains a contested norm even before 
the Libyan and Syrian crises started in 2011. Relying mainly 
on the ICISS Report published in 2001, he fails to present a 
more nuanced discussion of how the R2P is still traveling and 
evolving based on debates, discussions, and consultations 
between important stakeholders at various levels of the 
global community. 
The ICISS was formed upon the initiative of Canada in 
response to the challenge posed by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan in the General Assembly in 1999 and 
2000 for the international community to, once and for 
all, seek a consensus on the basic questions related to 
humanitarian intervention. The ICISS report is R2P 1.0 at 
its conceptual stage. Even though the report identified the 
critical elements of the responsibility to protect (to prevent, 
to react, and to rebuild), its most elaborate discussion 
was of the interventionist principle that should guide the 
international community in using military force for purposes 
of stopping mass atrocities. While the report acknowledged 
that prevention is ‘the single most important dimension of 
R2P’ (ICISS 2001: XI),1 it only devoted one chapter to this 
element compared to three chapters related to intervention. 
The scope of mass atrocities covered by R2P 1.0 includes 
not just the four crimes – genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity – but also the large-
scale loss of lives arising from state collapse, civil war, and 
environmental and natural disasters.
 
By taking the ICISS report as the starting point for his 
analysis, Hopgood overlooks a series of important evolutions 
of R2P that show that it is far from an uncontested or 
final doctrine. R2P 2.0 is paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD), which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 in the largest 
meeting of world leaders in New York. This version of the 
R2P narrows the scope of crimes covered by the principle 
to four: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. It also underscored both the primary 
responsibility of states to protect their people from these 
crimes, and the responsibility of the international community 
to assist states in building their capacity to prevent them. If 
there is a ‘manifest failure’ on the part of states to exercise 
their primary responsibility to protect their population, 
the international community, through the UN Security 
Council and in cooperation with regional and sub-regional 
arrangements, has the responsibility to respond in a ‘timely 
and decisive manner’ and on a ‘case-by-case basis’ to 
prevent and halt mass atrocities. 
 
From these evolutions came the three-pillar approach 
to implementing R2P: prevention (focusing on the 
primary responsibility of the state), assistance (focusing 
on capacity-building of states through international 
assistance), and timely and decisive response (focusing on 
the role of the UN and regional organisations/sub-regional 
arrangements). These were presented in the first Secretary 
General’s Report on R2P in 2009 on ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect,’ which was the basis of the first 
interactive dialogue on R2P in the UN General Assembly. 
To date, there is still no consensus among member states 
whether these three pillars should be applied sequentially 
and, particularly with regard to the third pillar (timely and 
decisive response), whether all peaceful means should 
first be exhausted before military intervention or the use 
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of coercive force is invoked. The crises in Libya and Syria 
highlighted this issue further with certain supporters of R2P 
questioning the ‘excessive use of force’ and overstepping 
the mandate of NATO in Libya.
Brazil’s ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) proposal 
in 2011 may be referred to as further updating the norm 
to R2P 3.0. It called for creating an effective monitoring 
system in the UN Security Council and the exercise of 
prudential principles – such as the right intention, use 
of coercive force as last resort, proportional means, and 
reasonable prospects, which were already identified in the 
ICISS Report in 2001 and various UN documents – when 
applying Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the name of R2P. 
The Brazilian initiative also highlighted the importance of 
transparency and accountability in implementing R2P in the 
aftermath of NATO operations in Libya. Specifically, it raised 
questions about how Resolution 1973, which authorised 
military action to protect civilians, turned into intervention 
in a civil war and, subsequently, the aim shifted to regime 
change. Among the set of principles proposed in RwP are: 1) 
emphasising prevention; 2) exhausting all peaceful means; 
3) strict adherence to the Security Council mandate; 4) 
diligent use of force to minimise violence and do no harm; 
and 5) judicious and proportionate action carried out within 
the limits of the mandate.
The initial response to the RwP proposal was somewhat 
mixed, although the US and other Western countries 
were generally supportive of the concept that calls for 
judicious exercise in the use of force and if all peaceful 
means have failed. Disagreements remain on the 
following points: first, equating ‘manifest failure’ with 
strict chronological sequence and, second, that collective 
action is needed when all diplomatic means have been 
‘exhausted’ inasmuch as diplomacy is even more important 
in situations that require forceful action (Morada 2014: 
316). Even then, in his R2P Report in 2012 on ‘Timely and 
Decisive Response’, the Secretary General recognised the 
value of RwP in enhancing further the R2P norm and called 
for continuing debate on the concept.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the R2P is still an 
evolving and contested norm, which is far from what 
Hopgood tries to portray as one that is already a universally 
accepted principle rooted in Western liberal values. It is 
in fact, according to Welsh (2013), a ‘complex’ norm that 
continues to face procedural and substantive contestation. 
Much of this stems from the pluralist nature of the 
international system where both the principle of equality of 
states (a legal ‘fiction’ according to Welsh) and the reality 
of hierarchy of power exist (Welsh 2013: 394). It has only 
achieved limited institutionalisation within the UN (Marlier 
& Crawford 2013), which is quite contrary to what Hopgood 
attempts to portray in his book.
In addition, the R2P principle also needs to be 
‘mainstreamed’ within the UN system particularly in regard 
to various agendas such as the protection of civilians in 
conflict situations, peacekeeping, and the protection of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (Bellamy 2013). 
The ‘consensus’ achieved in 2005 is at best a political 
declaration rather than a binding legal norm (Loiselle 2013), 
and its operationalisation will continue to face challenges as 
the international community grapples with the appropriate 
ways of implementing it, particularly with regard to the use of 
coercive force in stopping mass atrocity crimes.
The Future of R2P in a Neo-
Westphalian world
There is no question, however, that at the minimum there 
is general agreement amongst UN member states that the 
primary responsibility to protect populations against mass 
atrocity crimes rests on states and that the international 
community should also assist in building state capacity for 
the prevention of these crimes. In contrast to Hopgood, I 
do not believe that in a neo-Westphalian world, progress in 
advancing the R2P norm is absolutely impossible. In fact, 
notwithstanding the reality of hierarchy of power in the 
international sphere, one could argue that human rights 
protection and humanitarian values are increasingly being 
shared by more states and societies in general. This stems 
mainly from the process of globalisation, where social 
media plays a critical role in disseminating information and 
creating networks of advocates worldwide that will continue 
to exert pressure on states to take their commitments to 
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R2P and human rights protection seriously. In addition, 
images and reports of human suffering brought about by 
mass atrocities committed by states or non-state actors 
(such as rebels in Syria, Central African Republic, and 
Democratic Republic of Congo, to name a few) are realities 
that cannot be ignored by the international community.
It is significant to note that over the last three years, an 
overwhelming majority of the member states of the UN have 
supported the five resolutions in the General Assembly that 
strongly condemned the systematic violation of human 
rights in Syria despite the continuing stalemate in the UN 
Security Council. Specifically, a number of developing states 
from the global South have expressed frustration over the 
failure of the Security Council to respond more effectively 
to the crisis to end the continuing suffering there based 
on the report of the panel of UN investigators headed by a 
Brazilian diplomat and scholar (Associated Press 2014). 
More importantly, the issue of past and ongoing mass 
atrocities in different parts of the world has been kept alive 
not only by UN agencies, such as the Human Rights Council, 
but also by major international media networks, various 
international humanitarian organisations, and the global 
network of human rights advocates. Recently, a Global 
Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC), which 
is mainly a state-led initiative supported by academic 
institutions and civil society groups, was launched in 
Costa Rica in an effort to sustain a global ‘community of 
commitment’ in preventing genocide and mass atrocities. 
This initiative by various states from Europe, Latin America, 
Africa, and the Asia Pacific, can undoubtedly contribute to 
the realisation of the R2P as it focuses on building mass 
atrocities prevention architectures that are appropriate 
in national and regional contexts through the exchange of 
ideas, lessons learned, and good practices.
It can also be argued that the R2P should be seen as a friend 
– rather than an enemy – of sovereignty. Specifically, the 
norm can actually enhance the state’s legitimacy at home 
if it is linked to the promotion of good governance and rule 
of law at the domestic level, particularly in ‘securitising’ 
the issue of human rights protection. As Welsh (2013: 395) 
points out, ‘Given the continued strength of attachment 
to sovereign equality, and states’ wariness about creating 
a clear international responsibility to protect, greater 
consensus on R2P might emerge by continuing to emphasize 
individuals’ right to be protected but by avoiding the spectre 
of hierarchy and external enforcement.’ This may be done 
by establishing a ‘floor of decency’ that will be expected of 
governments to ‘take human rights to security’ seriously, 
and any extreme violation will be met with an appropriate 
response, such as suspension – ‘subject to the checks and 
balances provided by international institutions’ – of some 
the prerogatives that come with sovereignty (Welsh 2013: 
395-396). This underscores even more the importance of 
the R2P’s prevention pillar, which focuses on the primary 
responsibility of states in protecting populations from mass 
atrocity crimes.
In other words, states not only have sovereign rights, but 
also certain obligations to fulfil. In the context of ASEAN, 
for example, its charter includes provisions for duties and 
obligations of member states in ensuring that they take 
their primary responsibilities seriously in implementing 
the norms and principles of the organisation, including 
the promotion and protection of human rights. In fact, 
even prior to the ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2008, 
the practice of exerting pressure on erring member states 
especially if their behaviour undermines the collective 
interest of the regional organisation has been ongoing. 
It may be recalled that, in 2005, Myanmar/Burma was 
pressured by other member states to pass on the ASEAN 
chairmanship after Western dialogue partners threatened 
to boycott the organisation’s annual meetings due to 
dismal human rights conditions in that country. Following 
general elections in 2011 and the release of political 
prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, the other members 
of ASEAN approved Myanmar/Burma’s request to assume 
chairmanship of the organisation ahead of schedule (in 
2014 instead of 2016).
Similarly, in Africa, the AU suspended Libya’s membership 
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in 2011 at the height of the crisis in that country, and 
Syria’s membership in the Arab League was also suspended 
in 2011 because of systematic human rights violations by 
the Assad government. These regional organisations could 
also use institutions in the UN, such as the peer review 
mechanism of the Human Rights Council, in strengthening 
their case vis-à-vis their members who fail to fulfil their 
human rights protection and mass atrocity crime prevention 
obligations, for example.
 
Thus, rather than signalling the endtimes of Human Rights 
in general and the R2P in particular, these examples 
show that certain regional organisations already hold 
their member states to account when they fail to assume 
their human rights protection responsibilities. Even in 
a neo-Westphalian order, these practices can actually 
be enhanced further through state capacity-building 
assistance from the international community (under Pillar 
2 of the norm) and can serve as an incentive for member 
states of regional organisations to fulfil their commitments 
to the norm. In the long-term, the R2P will even contribute 
greatly to enhancing the legitimacy of states as it is linked 
to capacity-building in good governance and rule of law.
R2P is not all about military 
intervention
Much of Hopgood’s discussion about the R2P highlights 
the sharp end of the norm, which is about the use of force 
or military intervention, focusing primarily on the crises in 
Libya and Syria since 2011. These two cases, however, do 
not define what the R2P norm is all about despite criticism 
regarding its implementation in Libya and the impotence 
of the Security Council in breaking the current stalemate 
over Syria. In the case of the elections in Kenya in 2008, for 
example, the UN and the African Union employed mediation 
in a timely and decisive manner among protagonists in 
the dispute to avert what could have been a potential R2P 
crisis situation (Sharma 2012). The R2P’s prevention pillar 
was again utilised in Kenya’s 2012 elections to contain 
the escalation of inter-communal violence in that country. 
In 2011, the principle was also invoked in Cote D’Ivoire 
when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1975 
imposing targeted sanctions against recalcitrant Gbagbo 
and his associates to prevent them from using heavy 
weapons against civilians in the post-election crisis in that 
country. Also in the same year, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 2014, in cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), which called on the government in Yemen to 
halt the use of force against unarmed civilians and invoked 
the norm in reminding the government of its primary 
responsibility to protect is population. 
Indeed, there is no question that there are still ‘dissenters’ 
and reluctant supporters of the R2P for various reasons 
and, in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis, some degree of 
‘buyer’s remorse’ may have come about as a result (Welsh 
2012). But what needs to be underscored here is that 
dissenters of the R2P do not necessarily share the same 
objections to the norm even as their dissent is not about 
why the international community should stop the four mass 
atrocity crimes but how it should be done (Quinton-Brown 
2013: 274-275). Accordingly, while conscious dissenters 
view the first two pillars of the R2P favourably, much of 
their criticism is focused on the third pillar (ibid.).3
However, there are quite a number of opportunities to 
advance the norm further by responding to many of 
these concerns. Quinton-Brown (2013: 278) suggests, 
for example, that the international community should 
further develop the R2P at the UN level on four key points, 
namely: 1) non-coercive prevention and domestic capacity 
building; 2) enhanced prudential criteria for intervention 
(which is similar to the RwP initiative of Brazil); 3) global 
norm entrepreneurship from the Global South; and 4) veto 
restraint in R2P scenarios. Of these points, the normative 
entrepreneurship of the global South is critical in driving 
home the point that R2P is not a Western idea but a 
universal one, notwithstanding Hopgood’s assertion to the 
contrary. This is the case because support and advocacy by 
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many developing states and non-state actors, especially in 
countries that have experienced past atrocity crimes (e.g., 
Rwanda, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cambodia, to mention a 
few), should endeavour to build national architectures to 
avoid atrocities from happening again in the future. To 
date, there are a number of states and non-government 
organisations in Central and South America (e.g., 
Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica), Africa (e.g., Tanzania, 
Ghana, Uganda, and Kenya), and Asia (e.g., Indonesia, 
Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) that 
are supportive of the R2P. A network of civil society groups 
has, in fact, been growing continuously since 2008 across 
different regions of the world that provide training and 
education on the R2P through seminars and workshops, 
and actively mainstreaming this principle in the areas of 
peace-building and conflict prevention; women, peace, and 
security issues; and human rights protection.4
More importantly, even the idea of intervention is not 
necessarily an alien concept for some non-Western 
countries. Interestingly, Hopgood’s book fails to even 
mention the importance of Article 4(h) of the African 
Union’s Constitutive Act, which deals with the AU’s ‘right 
to intervene’ in a member state in order to halt genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This provision 
of the AU’s Charter, which preceded the ICISS Report in 
2001 and the formal adoption of the R2P in the UN in 2005, 
is anchored in the principle of non-indifference that is a 
radical departure from the traditional norms of sovereignty 
and non-interference that were enshrined in the old 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).   
Indeed, with the decline of American power and the 
constraints faced by the UN Security Council, one could 
argue that the role of regional organisations and sub-
regional arrangements in Africa and elsewhere will 
increasingly become more important in implementing 
the R2P. In fact, enhancing the coordination between the 
UNSC and regional organisations becomes even more 
necessary in implementing R2P, not just in terms of the 
use of force, but more importantly in the prevention and 
capacity-building pillars of the norm at regional levels. 
States and civil society groups could work in partnership 
in order to strengthen the role of regional organisations 
in mass atrocity crime prevention. For example, there 
are currently ongoing efforts in the AU to strengthen its 
role in dealing with mass atrocities on the continent 
through a more robust set of mechanisms related to the 
three pillars of R2P, including the implementation of 
Article 4(h). Specifically, the Pretoria Principles on ending 
mass atrocities were submitted to the AU as part of 
operationalising the continent’s commitment to R2P under 
Article 4(h). This is an important output produced by a 
group of scholars, civil society groups, and practitioners 
within and outside of Africa that resulted from a conference 
organised by the Centre for Human Rights Studies of the 
University of Pretoria in December 2012 (Kuwali & Viljoens 
2014: 347-352). 
Similarly, the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a network of think-tanks engaged 
in Track II diplomacy, produced a report on R2P in 2011 
that, among other things, recommended a number of ways 
to mainstream mass atrocities prevention in the region 
and endeavour to convince states in the Asia Pacific to 
take their commitment seriously to implement the norm 
(CSCAP 2011). A Southeast Asia High Level Panel on R2P 
was created in 2013, composed of former diplomats in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 
an effort to implement some of the CSCAP R2P Report’s 
recommendations in the context of ASEAN’s norm-building 
agenda. And in 2012, the Latin American Network for 
Genocide and Mass Atrocities Prevention was launched 
by Argentina, Chile, Panama, and Brazil as part of their 
efforts to implement R2P in the region. Primarily a state-
led initiative, this network covers over ten fully functioning 
national initiatives on training and education on mass 
atrocity crimes prevention, which contribute significantly 
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to strengthening regional capacity in implementing R2P 
(Kousouros 2013).
R2P norm cascade in the Global South
Hopgood’s work privileges the role of major powers, 
in particular the importance of American-led liberal 
international order and Western bourgeois identity, in 
writing the story of the rise and inevitable demise of 
universal Human Rights and humanism international. He 
portrays the creation of ICC and institutionalisation of 
R2P as essentially a Western project aimed at imposing 
universal norms and structures to deal with mass atrocity 
crimes. To recapitulate, he contends that: 1) without 
American support, R2P is a ‘meaningless doctrine’ 2) the 
ICC is ‘a European vanity project’ and 3) both the ICC and 
R2P are institutions ‘with only an imagined constituency 
beyond activists and advocates’.
 
These statements, however, betray the lack of appreciation 
for, if not total ignorance of, what is happening outside of 
New York and Geneva with regard to the process of R2P 
norm cascade or internalisation that has been taking place 
at regional and domestic levels in different parts of the 
world. Over the last five years, various civil society groups, 
academic institutions, and government agencies in the 
global South have been engaged in building awareness and 
constituency around the R2P. They have been involved in 
capacity-building efforts through education and training 
programmes, international and regional conferences, 
national workshops and seminars across sectors in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.  
For example, the UN Office of the Special Adviser for 
Genocide Prevention (OSAPG) in New York, in partnership 
with the Global Centre for R2P (GCR2P), the International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), the 
Stanley Foundation, and the Auschwitz Institute for Peace 
and Reconciliation – all based in the United States – have 
held various regional and national workshops and seminars 
on R2P and mass atrocity crimes prevention in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America.
The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
(APR2P), based at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, 
Australia, has been engaged in policy-relevant academic 
research, and regional diplomacy and capacity-building 
activities in Southeast Asia and Africa through the training 
of diplomats and government officials, as well as holding 
workshops and seminars for scholars and civil society 
organisations on the importance of mass atrocity crime 
prevention, peacekeeping, civilian protection, gender 
and sexual violence, and the protection of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. Efforts in mainstreaming R2P 
in the Asia Pacific region have been undertaken through 
Track II diplomacy seminars involving government officials 
and think-tanks, which produced the Council for Security 
and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Report on R2P 
in 2011 (CSCAP 2011) as well as the creation of a Southeast 
Asia High-Level Advisory Panel on R2P in order to generate 
support for mass atrocity crime prevention in ASEAN.
In Africa, the University of Pretoria’s Centre for Human 
Rights Studies and the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) have been at the 
forefront of academic and policy-relevant studies on 
operationalising R2P in the context of the African Union’s 
norms and human rights protection framework. These 
non-Western institutions, together with other African civil 
society organisations, have been keen on advancing the 
R2P-norm cause with due regard to the unique national 
and regional contexts within which they pursue their 
advocacy work on human rights protection, women, peace 
and security, and mass atrocity crime prevention.
Indeed, the R2P norm does not automatically cascade down 
to regions and the domestic sphere. As was already pointed 
out above, there is a need for home-grown champions 
and advocates who are committed to pursuing a bottom-
up strategy in advancing mass atrocity crime prevention 
as part of their advocacy program. They need to work in 
partnership with other critical stakeholders in government, 
academia, local communities, and the media in order to 
help build the capacity of states and societies to prevent 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. In many multi-ethnic societies in Asia and Africa 
that are mired in identity-based conflicts and governed 
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by weak states, the R2P norm resonates strongly with 
communities and local advocates of human rights because 
they see first and foremost the promise of holding states 
accountable if they fail to exercise their responsibility to 
protect people within their territory from mass atrocity 
crimes. There are, for example, civil society groups in 
these two regions – such as the Global Partnership for the 
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Alternative ASEAN 
Network for Burma (ALTSEAN), the African Centre for Peace 
and Justice, and the Pan Africa Lawyers Union – that have 
supported R2P because the norm is an important framework 
in which they could anchor their advocacies in promoting 
human rights protection, genocide prevention, conflict 
prevention, and peace-building.
Additionally, these civil society groups can also use R2P 
as a powerful tool to exert pressure on governments in the 
global South to promote rule of law, create and enhance 
human rights protection mechanisms, and push for security 
sector reform at home. For example, non-government 
organisations have engaged with states in implementing 
R2P at various levels through: 1) ratifying international 
treaties like the ICC; 2) legislating domestic laws against 
mass atrocity crimes; and 3) creating and strengthening 
national institutions for human rights protection. Indeed, 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in its resolution on 
R2P in March 2013 recognised these as important tools, 
among others, in enhancing the role of parliamentarians in 
preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes.5
While there are varying levels of success in different parts 
of the world in implementing the norm thus far, it is clearly 
important to recognise that these norm-entrepreneurship 
efforts by non-state actors are as important as states 
declaring support in the UN for resolutions and agreements 
on human rights protection and R2P. Moreover, the message 
of the R2P is that perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes 
cannot escape accountability and state leaders can no 
longer hide behind the principle of sovereignty and non-
interference. At the end of the day, if states take their 
prevention responsibilities against mass atrocity crimes 
at home seriously, then there is no need to be fearful of 
external coercive intervention. However, this entails not 
just political will but also readiness to accept international 
assistance for capacity building and the capability of the 
international community to provide such help.
Conclusion
There will always be difficulties in the implementation of 
the R2P, particularly with respect to its third pillar, as this 
will be influenced by the dynamics of hierarchy of power and 
competing interests in the international arena. Even so, its 
core value as a universal principle is certainly not in decline. 
Contrary to what Hopgood asserts, the R2P matters and is 
here to stay because since 2005 the global consensus on 
this norm has grown deeper roots despite controversies in its 
application in Libya in 2011 and elsewhere. Much of this can 
be attributed to the expanding network of norm entrepreneurs 
and stakeholders across the world that spare no effort 
in building a ‘community of commitment’ to preventing 
genocide and mass atrocity crimes. Far from it being just 
another project of Western liberal democracies rooted in 
their ‘bourgeois identity’, the R2P norm resonates well with 
populations of non-Western societies that have experienced 
(or are still experiencing) mass atrocity crimes and those who 
are also at risk of facing these.
In the long run, the viability of the norm is not going 
to depend on American hegemony but on how it is 
tightly anchored in shared humanitarian values and 
contextualised in various regions, as well as the sustained 
vigilance of its supporters as part of their efforts to protect 
human rights and to end human suffering caused by mass 
atrocity crimes. 
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